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  Abstract	  
Coming to terms: scepticism and the philosophical essay 
Erin S. Plunkett 
Royal Holloway, University of London 
Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 This study aims to link the essay form in a novel way to the philosophical 
problem of scepticism and to suggest the ways in which analytical philosophy can 
benefit from the employment of literary reading strategies, including generic or 
stylistic approaches to philosophical texts. While a number of literary studies link 
the essay to a broadly sceptical worldview, the term scepticism has not been 
employed with any philosophical rigour, and so the precise connections between 
this form of writing and an epistemological position have yet to be made.  
 The authors in this study, an exemplary rather than exhaustive sampling of 
essayists from Montaigne to Cavell, adopt a therapeutic approach to the sceptical 
problem that resonates with ancient Pyrrhonism in rejecting foundationalist 
attempts to justify knowledge claims and instead situating the will to know within a 
broader frame of meaningful human activity. This performative response takes 
shape in texts that are open-ended, dialogical, and heterogeneous, resisting 
systematisation or reductionism. Embodying Hume’s ‘league betwixt the learned 
and conversable worlds’, the essay decisively rejects specialisation or any attempt to 
separate philosophy from its wider social and ethical context. Rhetorical strategies 
of discontinuity are used to call attention to the conditions of time, subjectivity, and 
language under which reason operates and by which philosophical activity is 
constrained. In this way essayists redefine the stakes of the problem of knowledge 
and offer ways of coming to terms with the limitations of the will to know. For 
Stanley Cavell, the sceptic’s error is to deny the ‘human conditions of knowledge 
and action’. If the denial or disappointment that underlies the sceptical project 
creates the task of recovering the world, then the essayistic tradition can be seen as 
the therapeutic project of calling philosophy back to common life.  
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Il	  Disinganno,	  Franceso	  Queirolo,	  1753-­‐‑54,	  Museo	  Sansevero,	  Naples.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   7	  A	  note	  on	  methodology	  
 The title of the present work links the philosophical problem of scepticism 
to a way of writing, an essayistic mode. Adopting a generic approach to a 
philosophical question may strike some as counter-intuitive, as if a literary 
methodology were being misapplied or the fundamental differences between 
philosophy and literature were being ignored. Despite the broad application of the 
term ‘text’ in literary and cultural criticism and despite Richard Rorty’s (1978) still-
timely reminder that, whatever else it may be, philosophy is a kind of writing, there 
remain few philosophical studies within the Anglophone tradition dedicated to 
questions of genre or form in modern philosophical texts. In the classroom too, the 
formal qualities of philosophical works are too rarely addressed. The lack of generic 
variation in contemporary Anglophone philosophy, as opposed to the enthusiastic 
experimentation with genres in previous centuries, goes hand in hand with the lack 
of attention to philosophical works as texts in current pedagogy. This resistance to 
the literary dimension of philosophical texts has been thoroughly diagnosed, both 
by Rorty and by the subject of his 1978 essay, Jacques Derrida, as a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the nature of language and a misguided attempt by philosophy 
to borrow its legitimacy from the objectivity of the sciences (the fiction of the 
transparent, authorless text), while distancing itself from ‘rhetoric’. In recent years, 
Beryl Lang (2010) has tried to popularise the study of rhetorical strategies as 
expressions of ethical and epistemological commitments, pointing to a blind spot in 
contemporary analytic philosophy. Jonathan Lavery (2007, 2010) has argued that 
genre in particular is a useful lens through which to read philosophical texts, one 
that can supplement logical or semantic analysis and bring to light features of a text 
that would otherwise remain hidden.  
 There are a number of ways in which philosophy can benefit from the 
employment of literary reading strategies. Focussing on the message in the medium, 
on the mode of writing as a vehicle of meaning, is a way of expanding philosophy’s 
analytical vocabulary and gaining fresh perspective on long-standing philosophical 
debates. Grouping texts together by form can also yield productive connections 
between disparate thinkers, opening up the field of philosophical history beyond a 
set of philosophical ‘problems’ identified in advance. Lastly, forms of discourse do 
not exist a priori but unfold in time, and linking philosophical ideas to concrete, 
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historical forms helps to contextualise philosophical assumptions about the real, the 
rational, and the true and to make us more aware of our own ways of speaking: 
what they take for granted and what they cover over.  
 This study explores essayism as a performative response to the sceptical 
problem, a way of writing that attempts to do justice to the anti-foundationalist 
insights of ancient scepticism and that, in the process, brings into focus the 
everyday conditions that underlie speculative doubt. While textual form is an 
important consideration for any philosophical text, scepticism presents a specific set 
of challenges related to justification and authority that for many writers has 
necessitated open-ended, dialogical forms of writing through which a subject may 
be explored from multiple, incongruous points of view, leaving the reader to take an 
active role in weighing the merit of these views. In the preface to Johannes Climacus, 
Kierkegaard promises to ‘combat The System by means of [literary] form’, (1985, p. 
117) and this serves as an apt description of the therapeutic scepticism of the 
authors considered in this study. Essayistic form constitutes a serious response to 
sceptical doubt, one that does not attempt to ‘solve’ the problem but redefines the 
stakes while suggesting a different way of relating to being. The periodic eruption of 
essayistic texts within the history of philosophy marks moments of historical or 
disciplinary crisis, when prevailing modes of philosophical discourse and the aims of 
philosophical inquiry are called into question. The marginal or sub-genre of the 
essay, which as Lukács (1974) argued exists between science and art, is uniquely 
positioned as a critical form capable of standing both within and outside of the 
philosophical tradition. In formally representing the becoming of truth, the 
temporal nature of thought, the essay offers an alternative vision of knowledge and 
of the relationship of subject to world, both key issues in the history of scepticism 
and in the wider practice of philosophy.  
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  Chapter	  1:	  Knowing	  and	  essaying	  
Habe nun, ach! Philosophie, 
Juristerei und Medizin, 
Und leider auch Theologie 
Durchaus studiert, mit heißem Bemühn. 
Da steh ich nun, ich armer Tor! 
Und bin so klug als wie zuvor; 
Heiße Magister, heiße Doktor gar 
Und ziehe schon an die zehen Jahr 
Herauf, herab und quer und krumm 
Meine Schüler an der Nase herum- 
Und sehe, daß wir nichts wissen können! 
 [...] 
Dafür ist mir auch alle Freud entrissen, 
Bilde mir nicht ein, was Rechts zu wissen . . .  
 
Ah! Now I’ve done Philosophy, 
I’ve finished Law and Medicine,  
And sadly even Theology: 
Taken fierce pains, from end to end. 
Now here I am, a fool for sure! 
No wiser than I was before: 
Master, Doctor’s what they call me,  
And I’ve been ten years, already, 
Crosswise, arcing, to and fro, 
Leading my students by the nose, 
And see that we can know - nothing! 
[...] 
Instead all Joy is snatched away,  
What’s worth knowing, I can’t say . . .  
-Goethe, Faust, Part I: Scene 11 
 
What do we know?  
 ‘Scepticism’ and ‘essay’ are each in their own way contentious terms that 
require some explanation and context. In its most basic form, scepticism is a term 
that indicates a doubt about the ability of subjects to know the world, or other 
minds—a doubt that can extend to the existence of the phenomena in question 
(Cartesian metaphysical scepticism), or, at the very least, to their nature, what the 
world is like in itself. As it has been conceived in the history of philosophy, 
scepticism is an epistemological problem of never being able to sufficiently justify 
one’s beliefs about the world. The task of distinguishing between opinion and truth, 
appearance and reality, is foundational to how the philosophical tradition 
understands itself, and in this sense scepticism can be seen as the philosophical 
problem. Disputes over what constitutes genuine knowledge are at the heart of 
nearly every philosophical debate: Plato versus the Sophists, rationalism versus 
empiricism, Kant versus Hume, positivism versus post-structuralism.  
 One way the sceptical problem has played out is in a search for reliable 
criteria on which to base one’s knowledge claims. In the modern sciences, claims 
about the world can be tested using the experimental method, which relies on 
individual researchers reaching a broad consensus through independent, controlled 
experimentation. Scientific hypotheses are empirical and provisional – true in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 1 A.S. Kline translation (2003, p. 19: 354-371). 
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sense that they are supported by overwhelming evidence, but improvable and open 
to change if new instruments make more reliable evidence available or new 
discoveries suggest different interpretations of existing data. Philosophy, historically, 
has not been satisfied with merely provisional truths. Identifying and challenging 
presuppositions to achieve stable, universally valid principles has long characterised 
the philosophical project. Foundationalism, the attempt to find some absolute 
ground for knowledge claims, takes many forms: from Plato’s doctrine of Ideas to 
Kantian apperception, Fichtean idealism, and logical positivism. These efforts are 
motivated by a desire to preserve the distinction between false and true, and further, 
to preserve the ability to make normative claims. If what people accept as truths are 
ultimately groundless, then it is difficult to see how normative claims (ethical 
imperatives) could exercise any force, a principle that is reflected in Ivan 
Karamazov’s suggestion that if there is no God, everything is permitted. Greek 
scepticism is a valuable resource for understanding the foundationalist imperative 
that stands behind sceptical doubt and the problem of infinite regress that plagues 
foundationalist efforts. It also raises the crucial ethical-political question of the 
relationship of philosophical doubt to common life and about the kinds of 
knowledge that could enable one to live well.  
 Scepticism arose in the 4th century BCE as a critical response to the 
positions of other philosophical schools such as the Stoics and Epicureans 
regarding what constituted knowledge and what sort of knowledge would lead to 
the good life.2 There were three main schools of scepticism over a span of roughly 
four hundred years.3 Few sources have survived to give a picture of the positions 
and methodology to which each school was committed; the most comprehensive 
source text is Sextus Empiricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism, dating from the 2nd century 
BCE, which, after a period of obscurity, resurfaced in the 16th century with the 
publication of Stephanus’ Latin translation (1562) in France and became a decisive 
text in the French Renaissance.4 The brief but rich text outlines a rigorous dialectical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   2 For a detailed treatment of the history of scepticism, framed in terms of contemporary 
analytic philosophy, see Gascoigne, 2002. 
 3 1) The Practical Scepticism of Pyrrho (c.360-c.270 BCE); 2) the Academic Scepticism 
of Arcesilaus (315-240), who took over as head of the Academy in 264 BCE, Carneades (c. 214-
129) and Clitomachus (c.187-c.110); and 3) the Neo-Pyrrhonian school comprising Aenesidemus 
(c.100-40 BCE), Agrippa (c. 1st century CE), and Sextus Empiricus (c. 160-c.210 CE).   
 4 As Popkin outlines in his comprehensive study The History of Scepticism (1979), the 
first revival of scepticism can be located in 16th- and 17th-century France as the nouveaux 
pyrrhoniens, including, most notably, Montaigne, looked to Sextus’ work as model for how to 
challenge dogmatic claims, be they scientific or religious. Popkin couches this renewed interest 
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method for diagnosing dogmatism and exposing the internal inconsistencies of any 
criterion of truth. Where other Classical schools make positive (dogmatic) 
knowledge claims about the impossibility of knowing, Neo-Pyrrhonian Sceptics, as 
presented by Sextus, adopt a radically agnostic epistemological stance, characterised 
by the systematic dismantling of any positive position, either for or against the 
possibility of certain knowledge.5 Taking a cue from Socrates, they describe 
themselves as ‘aporetic’, their method issuing not in a new theory of knowledge but 
in a state of aporia, finding oneself ‘at a loss whether to assent or to deny’ (2000, p. 
4: 7). 
 Sextus identifies the sceptical goal as suspension of belief or epoché, and his 
manual outlines ten ‘modes’ to achieve this end, ten ways to demonstrate the 
unreliability of any ground that an opponent may attempt to claim as justification of 
their position. The scope of his critical method is admirable, in that it applies equally 
well to the two extremities of the philosophical continuum—what can broadly (if 
somewhat anachronistically) be called empiricism and rationalism. The possible 
criteria of knowledge are on the one hand empirical – information conveyed 
through sense impressions – and on the other hand rational or logical, claims that 
are thought to be true because they are self-evident or internally consistent. Sextus 
argues against the reliability of sense data by appealing to common errors of 
perception, such as optical illusions; to the relativity of sense perception among 
different bodies (animals, insects, people suffering from illness, those with a high 
tolerance for heat or cold or pain); and to the limitations of the five sense organs 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
in Pyrrhonism in the social context of the Reformation and the rise of rationalist arguments for 
religion. In Protestantism and its various sects, the individual believer was endowed with the 
power to understand the Scriptures and to question Church doctrines through, in part, the exercise 
of his or her rational mind, rather than relying entirely on the authority of Church elders or of the 
weight of doctrinal tradition. Many of the nouveaux pyrrhoniens were Counter-Reformationists 
who used classical sceptical methodology like the infinite regress argument to demonstrate the 
fallibility of reason with the goal of restoring a non-rational faith, a credo quia absurdum, based 
on the established traditions of the Church. Others used sceptical arguments to challenge 
religious belief altogether (as Popkin shows, it is a matter of some debate which of the nouveaux 
pyrrhoniens were intent on saving the Church and which were using the sceptical method 
ironically to demonstrate the absurdity of religious belief. The arguments are the same in either 
case.). As it was essentially a method for bringing about the suspension of belief, scepticism 
could be used as a critical weapon by either side in a debate, and Popkin convincingly shows that 
there is nothing spurious about using scepticism for fideistic ends. Kierkegaard will later do the 
same, using irony as a way to clear the path to receiving divine grace. The importance of 
Popkin’s analysis is to demonstrate that there are many ends to which scepticism might be 
applied, many different answers to the question of what philosophy ought to do if it is unable to 
provide a ground for justified true belief. 
 5 Sextus identifies as his target both those who ‘think they have discovered the truth—
for example the schools of Aristotle and Epicurus and the Stoics, and some others,’ and those (the 
Academic Sceptics) who assert that truth about things ‘cannot be apprehended’ (2000, p. 3: 3-4). 
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(‘other qualities can exist, impressing other sense organs in which we have no 
share’) (2000, pp. 26-27: 97).6 Those tempted to turn away from sensory evidence 
and instead to seek a rational criterion for knowledge claims are likewise led into 
aporia, as Sextus lays out the first recorded version of the infinite regress or 
Agrippan argument (Ibid., pp. 30-31: 114-118) wherein any criterion used to justify a 
claim itself requires further justification and so on ad infinitum. 7 Wittgenstein, two 
millennia on, offers a pithy summary of the consequences of the infinite regress 
problem: ‘My reasons will soon give out. And then I shall act without reasons’ 
(Wittgenstein, 2009, pp. 90-91: 211).8	  This predicament, the ‘because I said so’ 
moment in the process of justification, clearly presents a problem for the examined 
life. Giving reasons and examining presuppositions is fundamental to philosophical 
reasoning, yet philosophy offers no way of saying what counts as sufficient 
justification if the process is in principle endless.  
 The Pyrrhonian critique of foundationalism is presented not as a set of 
propositions but as a dialectic, bringing different points of view into relation with 
one another in order to demonstrate the limited or provisional nature of each.9 This 
rhetorical choice is significant in that it demonstrates an awareness of the problem 
of conveying a sense of aporia through positive, i.e. dogmatic propositions and the 
need instead for a kind of via negativa. Sextus defines the sceptical method as: 
 
an ability to set out oppositions among things which appear and are 
thought of in any way at all, an ability by which, because of the 
equipollence (isostheneia) in the opposed objects and accounts, we come 
first to suspension of judgement (epoché) and afterwards to tranquillity 
(ataraxia) (2000, p. 4: 8).10  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 6 This refutation of anthropocentrism has since been bolstered by the scientific discovery 
of senses like echolocation, magnetoception, and electroception in other species. 
 7 ‘For a proof always requires a standard, and a standard always requires a proof in order 
to be true. A proof cannot be sound if there is no standard there already, nor can a standard be 
true if a proof has not already been made convincing. In this way standards and proofs fall into 
the reciprocal mode, by which both of them are found to be unconvincing’ (2000, p. 30). For a 
thorough treatment of the Agrippan argument in 20th-century analytic philosophy, see Gascoigne 
(2002).  
 8 ‘Wenn das heißt “Habe ich Gründe?”, so ist die Antwort: die Gründe werden mir bald 
ausgehen. Und ich werde dann, ohne Gründe, handeln’. 
 9 The dialectical method that Sextus describes includes comparing beliefs from different 
periods to demonstrate how what is understood as knowledge changes over time. This historical 
approach will be revived and employed to great effect by 19th-century dialecticians, including 
Hegel and Nietzsche.   
 10 An alternative translation: ‘A disposition to oppose phenomena and noumena to one 
another in any way whatever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence among the things 
and statements thus opposed, we are brought first to epoché and then to ataraxia (tranquillity)’ 




The dialectical approach covers both ‘things which appear’, and ideas or internal 
representations (‘things which are thought of in any way’). In seeking to 
demonstrate that all criteria are of equal, which is to say indeterminate, value, 
Pyrrhonians undermine the ability to make knowledge claims and thus seem to 
undermine the very possibility of philosophical discussion, in which criteria are 
evaluated with a view toward affirming or denying whatever claims about the world 
are being made. With their rigorous agnosticism, reinforced by the open-ended 
form of the dialectic, Pyrrhonians were an exasperating adversary, and their 
contemporaries, along with philosophers from the 16th century onwards, viewed 
their agenda as essentially hostile to philosophy. Yet one can also see Pyrrhonism as 
a meta-philosophy that promotes a non-dogmatic way of understanding 
philosophical activity and pits the goal of human flourishing against the goal of 
certain knowledge. Neil Gascoigne nicely summarises this ‘therapeutic’ approach, 
following Sextus’ comparison of scepticism to medicine and Wittgenstein’s notion 
of philosophy as therapy:11 ‘Principally, the Sceptic’s view was that rather than guide 
us in the search for the knowledge that would enable us to live happy lives, 
philosophy should cure us of the disposition to believe that there is any such 
knowledge’ (Gascoigne, 2002, p. 31). Insofar as there was a positive, and not merely 
critical, agenda in this approach, the outcome was meant to be a kind of ‘tranquillity’ 
(ataraxia) afforded by the giving up of unjustifiable views. Sextus suggested that it 
was possible to do away with beliefs about how the world really is and instead to live 
in accordance with custom and habit, after which tranquillity follows ‘fortuitously, 
as a shadow follows a body’ (2000, p. 11: 29).12 The therapeutic scepticism of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 11 The standard view (Popkin), which I adopt here for the sake of simplicity, is that the 
Neo-Pyrrhonians reject any dogmatic position and instead seek to lead people to aporia and 
finally to tranquillity or indifference (ataraxia). This is how Sextus characterises the sceptical 
project. Gascoigne makes the case, based on textual evidence from Cicero, that the Academic 
sceptics, rather than the Neo-Pyrrhonians, epitomise the therapeutic approach. The point of 
contention is the extent to which, for the Pyrrhonians, the suspension of belief is undertaken for 
the sake of ataraxia or whether it is a sort of unintended by-product. For the purposes of this 
study, the term ‘therapeutic’ is applied to the Pyrrhonians but otherwise does not differ from 
Gascoigne’s usage.  
 12 These lines come at the end of a remarkable parable about a painter who tries, 
unsuccessfully, to depict the lather around a horse’s mouth. In frustration, he hurls a wet sponge 
at the canvas, which hits the painted mouth of the horse and leaves a mark that exactly resembles 
lather. Sextus suggests in this analogy that tranquillity is such that it cannot exist as a direct goal 
but only as a kind of by-product of one’s effort; one is granted tranquillity, as a gift or a blessing. 
The painter cannot bring about his desired effect through effort but only through a stroke of grace 
that comes after he has thrown up his hands. The relationship between giving up and being given 
to is central to the question of what philosophy is for and how it ought to proceed. As 
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Pyrrhonians is developed by later philosophers into sophisticated writing strategies 
that reject foundationalist efforts to rescue cognitive certainty – which is viewed as a 
philosophical fantasy – and instead promote a recognition of the conditions of 
everyday life and their philosophical importance.  
 If sceptical philosophy is envisioned as a cure for a misguided conflation of 
knowledge with happiness, the exact nature or success of the treatment is a matter 
of debate. Sextus sets out to demonstrate that the types of absolute judgement we 
seem bound to seek are impossible and lead to unhappiness, since any a priori or 
empirical grounding is insufficient. Yet in his account, the sceptic, apparently not 
content with habit and custom, perennially returns to the activity of philosophy. 
Read as a parable, this return to philosophy might suggest that, in applying the 
sceptical method, the search for foundational truths may be suspended but is bound 
to be taken up again, with the ‘cure’ applied repeatedly over time. This would mean 
that the lived suspension of belief advocated by Sextus could be achieved 
temporarily but is not sustainable; in other words, it is not possible to renounce the 
search for certain knowledge and to live in doubt. A second possibility is that being 
‘cured’ entails giving up the search for foundational truths once-and-for-all, while 
continuing to be committed to some other understanding of philosophical activity.  
 What is at stake in these possibilities is whether our desire to know the 
nature of things is one that we need to be perpetually cured of, as Hume will later 
suggest, or whether we instead can envision a way of thinking philosophically that is 
first-and-foremost about coming to terms with our place in the world, rather than 
knowing. In the natural or naive attitude, the assumption is that our actions are 
guided by what we know, and that the more we know the better our choices and 
our lives will be. One might well fear that the systematic suspension of belief would 
lead to nihilism or indifference, since it seems to preclude any possibility of 
meaningful choice. Yet ancient sceptics are remarkably unconcerned by this 
possibility. In addressing the question of how it would be possible to sustain a lived 
suspension of belief, Sextus suggests that one live ‘in accordance with everyday 
observances’, including biological impulses such as thirst and hunger, cultural and 
societal conventions, and technical expertise or know-how (2000, p. 9: 24). This has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Kierkegaard and Cavell will later suggest, control over language or the realisation of final 
accounts of knowledge lead philosophical inquiry astray and constitute a rejection of the world. It 
is only when attempts at getting reality right, finding the ideal representation of the world, are 
given up that the world is able to show itself, to give itself to us. 
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been read by some (Frede, Nussbaum) as a proto-pragmatist position, 
demonstrating the primacy of Wittgensteinian forms of life over the philosophical 
speculation that implicitly relies on them. Sextus’ vision of the sceptic as utterly 
conventional suggests that everyday action in the world relies more on shared 
cultural practices than on the kind of theoretical knowledge he sought to discredit.  
 
Getting reality right 
 This apparent gap between theoretical knowledge and practical activity has 
led some to question the very impulse that motivates much of philosophical 
inquiry—what Richard Rorty calls ‘getting reality right’ (1991, p. 1). For Rorty, as 
for Nietzsche before him, the will to truth masks unpleasant psychological 
motivations—‘craving for metaphysical comfort’ and the ‘desire to escape 
contingency’. Rorty expresses in no uncertain terms that ‘traditional philosophy’s 
search for final accounts of knowledge, if achieved, would result in the “freezing 
over of culture and the ‘de-humanization’ of human beings”’ (Rorty, 1979, p. 377 
quoted in Guignon and Hiley, 2003, p. 22). Rorty does not ‘view knowledge as a 
matter of getting reality right, but rather as a matter of acquiring habits of action for 
coping with reality,’ including the goal of achieving solidarity with other members of 
a shared community (Rorty, 1991, p. 1).13 Stanley Cavell shares the concern that an 
undue emphasis on what it is to know masks an anxiety about what it is to relate—
to be with others and to be known by them, to take care of one’s environment. Seen 
in this way, the need to ground knowledge claims in a philosophically rigorous way 
constitutes ‘the rejection of the human conditions of knowledge and action and the 
substitution of a fantasy’ (Cavell, 1979, p. 216). The psychological fantasy to which 
Cavell refers is the notion of the subject cut off from the world and from others by 
his insistence on a kind of inhuman(e) knowing.  
 
[It] can be understood as an attempt to account for, and protect, our 
separateness, our unknowingness, our unwillingness or incapacity either 
to know or be known (1979, p. 369). 
 
 Cavell’s reading of scepticism draws not only from the problems of 
foundationalism and infinite regress diagnosed by the ancient sceptics but also from 
the problem of ‘other minds’ in Cartesian scepticism. In the Cartesian version of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 13 See also Rorty, 1989, p. 51 for a summary of how foundationalist philosophy 
undermines the values of a liberal society.  
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sceptical problem, doubt is cast on the existence of the world with the simple, yet 
uncanny, thought that I might be dreaming or that I might be a brain in a vat, 
controlled by a malin génie. In contemporary philosophy, this is known as the 
argument from ignorance: if one cannot say for sure what one doesn’t know (e.g. 
that one definitely is not dreaming), then one cannot make any specific knowledge 
claims. With the thought that the world might be an elaborate and well-painted 
illusion, the whole edifice of knowledge crumbles. Descartes famously attempts to 
rebuild it in on the one certainty he finds himself, as a thinking being, to hold, 
namely the existence of the I: cogito ergo sum. His scepticism thus involves an 
internalist understanding of cognition whereby the I has access only to internal 
representations of objects and not to the world as it is in itself, or to others in the 
world. There is no denying the tremendous influence of this argument, especially in 
modern epistemology.14  
 Indeed, there is a sense in which Cartesian doubt and internalism seem 
entirely natural. The deeply human impulse to distinguish the true from the merely 
apparent can quite easily lead to a divide between the subject to which things appear 
and the object of appearance, the very existence of which can be called into 
question. Rorty and Davidson have argued that the Cartesian brand of metaphysical 
scepticism and the resulting predicament of loss (of the world) and alienation (from 
the other) arose as natural or obvious only at a certain moment in philosophical 
history, not surprisingly coincident with the rise of science and rational discourse as 
a challenge to traditional religious, moral, and social norms.15 Yet, as Cavell is quick 
to point out, we still occupy the historical moment that occasioned the 
subject/object split, and moreover, scepticism can in some sense be seen as the 
‘natural’ or inevitable position of linguistic beings.16  
 Cavell diagnoses sceptical doubt – comprising both the knowledge problem 
and the problem of other minds – as a perverse though all-too-human fantasy. He 
develops this notion of fantasy in In Quest of the Ordinary (1994) through explorations 
of Romantic literary works on the perverse – Coleridge’s ‘Rime of the Ancient 
Mariner’ and Poe’s ‘Black Cat’ – both of which feature characters who actively 
reject the state of indebtedness to the world, who reject the claim of others upon 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   14 See e.g. Gascoigne, 2003, pp. 156ff for an overview of how these themes play out in 
the work of Thomas Clarke, Barry Stroud, and Michael Williams.  
 15 See also Dewey’s Modern and Unmodern Philosophy (2012). 
 16 See e.g. Cavell, 1989, p. 50. 
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themselves. This psychological reading of the sceptical problem gets at the larger 
question of what determines what counts as valid or relevant to philosophy, or to a 
philosophical argument. Cavell makes the phenomenological point that the frame in 
which something appears relevant is assembled from a set of unconscious 
commitments and assumptions, or fears. Another way of characterising the critique 
of knowledge in therapeutic scepticism is to say that philosophy’s commitment to 
knowing the world, to justified true belief, risks supplanting an obligation to form 
better relationships to others, to the environment, and to oneself if it fails to bring 
to light the human conditions of knowledge and rational discourse. Such conditions 
form our common frame, the possibility for any kind of knowing, or doubting.  
 
Language and world 
 From the mid-18th century on, the project of reconciling philosophy with 
what Cavell calls the ‘human conditions of knowledge and action,’ has largely played 
out in analyses of the determinative role of language – or language communities – in 
philosophy. Charles Taylor (1985, p. 215) remarks that in the 20th century, 
‘philosophical understanding is essentially bound up with understanding the 
medium of language.’ J.G. Herder (1744-1803) and his contemporary J.G. Hamann 
(1730-1788) were among the first to properly raise the issue of philosophy’s 
language problem, with Hamann claiming, ‘Not only the entire ability to think rests 
on language [...] but language is also the crux of the misunderstanding of reason with itself’ 
(2007, p. 211).17 The responses to this problem are well known to anyone familiar 
with 20th-century philosophy. On the analytic side, positivists aimed at a purely 
scientific or logical language that, unlike ordinary language concepts, would 
accurately represent the world. Language was envisioned as a tool that could bridge 
the gap that modern scepticism had opened up between subject and world, and 
empirical verification was to take the place of the a priori foundationalist efforts of 
Platonic and German idealism. This developed into the contemporary analytic 
approach, which subjects isolated parts of speech and speech acts to logical 
analysis.18 On the other side, continentals and ordinary language philosophers 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 17 This is the precursor of Wittgenstein’s famous dictum, ‘the limits of my language are 
the limits of my world’.  
 18 The originator of speech act theory J.L. Austin pushed back against the impulse that 
stands behind the analytic approach to language, which he linked, in Sense and Sensibilia (1964), 
to a flawed notion of sense-data, proposed by Ayer and others: ‘they wish to produce a species of 
statement that will be incorrigible; and the real virtue of this invented sense of perceive is that, 
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sought to immerse philosophy in its untidy linguistic medium by exploiting the 
expressive and performative dimensions of language, at the same time arguing for 
the primacy of these aspects against the designative function championed by the 
positivists. One of the central goals of this latter group was to show that many 
codified philosophical problems fall out of wrong ways of speaking and are best 
addressed with new vocabularies that allow us, not to more accurately mirror the 
world or get the world right, but to better say what we mean to one another and to 
get at the conditions that lead us to ask certain questions rather than others. This 
constitutes a performative and therapeutic response to the sceptical problem, 
bringing to light the ways in which language is constitutive of world and the 
conditions within which philosophical enquiry is carried out.  
 The immersion of the subject in language forms a large part of the anxiety 
about other minds that Cavell describes, since the effort to know and be known 
takes place largely in language. It includes the nagging sense of disappointment that 
characterises daily exchanges with others, the sense that one has not quite said what 
one has meant or that language has a life of its own, an awareness of the 
conventions which frame our conversations and interactions with one another, 
including philosophical discourse. For Cavell, the sceptical – and here he would 
include both positivists and idealists – error is to try to remove oneself from the 
condition of being ‘of a world’ and to occupy a fictional place ‘outside language 
games’ (Cavell, 1979, p. 224).  
 
The essayistic mode  
 The constellation of concepts that make up the sceptical problem – 
foundationalism, the subject/object split, and conventional and contingent nature 
of language – present a unique challenge to the philosophical author. 20th-century 
continental and some ordinary language philosophers chose to respond to this 
knotted problem in a performative way, using the form of their texts to help readers 
recognise the everyday conditions that determine the exercise of reason. But there is 
a long tradition of self-reflective, quasi-literary philosophical composition that 
predates these efforts, of philosophical authors who sought forms of writing that 
would affirm the temporal, historical nature of truth as it is revealed to the subject.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
since what is perceived in this sense has to be as it appears, in saying what I perceive in this 
sense I can’t be wrong’ (p. 103). 
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 The essay has a long and rich history as a mode of philosophical expression. 
It is a genre that has often been said to exist somewhere between philosophy and 
literature, science and art. Lukács (1974) frames his discussion of the essay in terms 
of the divergent aims and methods of art and science, arguing that the essay is 
scientific in its fidelity to the object and artistic in its commitment to the formal 
qualities of presentation, in the style of writing as a vehicle of meaning. The essayist 
is able, through fragmentary, polyphonic form, to conceptually reorder life without 
freezing it into philosophy’s ‘icy, final perfection’ (1974, p. 1). In this reading, the 
essay is the genre that comes the closest to fulfilling Friedrich Schlegel’s Romantic 
imperative to unify philosophy and poetry. But this marriage has caused some 
discomfort for both poets and philosophers. ‘From the point of view of science or 
philosophy, the essay is too “artistic”, too concerned with the strategies of writing 
itself; yet this does not suffice boldly to admit the genre into the realm of so-called 
creative or imaginative literature’ (de Obaldia, 1995, p. 6). The essay then occupies 
the uneasy territory between the methodological assumptions of two different 
disciplines, which have many reasons for wanting to remain separate from one 
another. Yet for philosophy, resistance to the idea that truth is embodied in modes 
of representation that are inherently meaningful – one of the principal insights of the 
essay – threatens to undermine philosophy’s ability to challenge received wisdom 
and to speak to what is essential or universal. 
 The history of the essay as a genre has more often been the subject of 
literary criticism than philosophical study. Literary studies have pointed to the 
difficulty of affixing the label ‘genre’ to the essay, since essayistic writings fall 
outside of the division into lyric, epic, dramatic that defined genre study from the 
19th century onwards, and since, moreover, essays cannot be defined either by 
subject matter or style. O.B. Hardison and other critics have described the essay as 
Protean: ‘there is no genre that takes so many shapes and that refuses so 
systematically to resolve itself, finally, into its own shape’ (Hardison, 1998, p. 612). 
Though certain works are universally identified as essays, the openness of the essay 
form presents a challenge to any classificatory system. To complicate matters, 
‘genre’ itself became a highly disputed term in the late 20th century, as 
deconstruction challenged both the hierarchies implicit in generic distinctions as 
well as the very ground for making those distinctions, through concepts like 
intertextuality and textual indeterminacy. Such disputes are not central to this study, 
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but they form part of the anxiety of choosing what texts to include under the label 
‘essay’. I follow Claire de Obaldia in The Essayistic Spirit (1995) in her use of the 
adjective ‘essayistic’ to describe a set of texts and a way of writing, even if these 
texts can be said to belong to another genre (e.g. an ‘essayistic’ novel, such as 
Musil’s Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften). De Obaldia employs Alistair Fowler’s useful 
distinction between a ‘kind’ (genre) and a ‘mode’ (Fowler, 1982, p. 5): ‘Modes 
involve a more elusive generic idea than kind,’ including a diachronic aspect that is 
lacking the former term (de Obaldia, 1995, p. 6). In Fowler’s account, genres can 
grow out of modes, but modes can outlast genres and can thus be applied across 
history to periods with different generic conventions, making ‘mode’ a handy 
comparative tool. The term ‘essayistic mode’ best describes the tradition of writings 
that I hope to delimit within the philosophical tradition, though I will sometimes 
use the term ‘essay’ as shorthand, since the adjectival form can be cumbersome. The 
advantage and the drawback of using the concept of ‘mode’ is that it has a much 
wider purview than ‘genre’. De Obaldia groups, under the heading ‘essayistic’ 
(which she identifies with Fowler’s concept of literature in potentia), a number of 
genres that appear to exist somewhere between philosophy and literature, including 
biography, autobiography, dialogue, history, sermon, maxim, aphorism. One might 
well argue that these genres belong together because they are all ‘non-fictional prose 
works of a limited length (Ibid.)’; the use of ‘essayistic’ as a master term to describe 
them all is somewhat arbitrary. Similar groupings have been made under the 
headings of the open form (Kazin, Eco, Oscar Kenshur), the fragmentary (Marjorie 
Levison and others), the unfinished (Balachandra Rajan), the dialogic (Bakhtin). The 
choice of a master mode of course has some effect on what particular works come 
to be seen as examples of this mode, as the diversity of works treated in the above 
list can attest, though the same features tend to be emphasized.  
 My choice of the essay as a master mode follows that of the two primary 
theorists and champions of the form in philosophy: Lukács and Adorno, for whom 
the word ‘essay’ encompasses not only traditionally recognised essayists such as 
Montaigne and Bacon, but also Plato’s dialogues, the writings of religious mystics, 
and Kierkegaard’s imaginary diaries and short stories.19 My preference for the 
essayistic, or what Robert Musil called Essayismus, over, say, the ‘fragmentary’, is that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   19 See Lukács, ‘On the Nature and Form of the Essay’ (1910, 1974) and Adorno, ‘Essay 
as Form’ (1958, 1984). 
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it captures a sense of activity, of attempt, and of thought in motion as well as an 
essential lack of closure.20 Under this heading, I follow Lukács in including not only 
essays in the conventional sense (problematic in itself) but also the fragments of the 
Early German Romantics, which have sometimes been treated a singular genre in 
their own right, and Kierkegaard’s imaginative discourses. I hope to demonstrate 
that the formal and philosophical ‘family resemblances’ of the essay, the fragment, 
and the imaginative discourse justify grouping them together into a single mode of 
essayistic philosophical writing. One of the aims of this study is to outline an 
alternative quasi-literary philosophical tradition existing alongside a more familiar, 
dogmatic tradition of attempting to ‘get reality right’. By looking at these texts 
together, we see the periodic eruption, over the course philosophy’s history, of 
responses to foundationalist, dogmatic ways of thinking, of critical voices that step 
out of the stream of the theoretical debates of their time and insist on the primacy 
of ordinary experience, on the credulity or faith that underwrites everyday 
communication as well as, they want to insist, philosophical discourse. This 
alternative tradition does not, as a consequence, promote an unconscious or pre-
reflective attitude. The perceived excesses of philosophical speculation give rise to a 
number of different remedies, but they have in common the call to the everyday—
to the existing subject, to the shared practices of linguistic and cultural communities, 
to the practical demands of common (social) life. The authors within this tradition 
share the conviction that philosophy, conceived as a kind of writing, has a unique role 
to play in this call; open-ended, essayistic ways of writing are uniquely suited to the 
task of taking on the philosophical tradition in terms that both belong to it and 
stand outside of it, and of engaging the reader as an active part of the philosophical 
process.	   
 Montaigne (1533-1592) was the first to use the term ‘essais’ – literally ‘tries’ 
or ‘attempts’ – to refer to his own work, and much of the history of the term within 
in the philosophical and literary tradition is tied up with the particularities of 
Montaigne’s writings. His choice of title reflects a certain modesty about his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 20 ‘Fragmentary’ is a narrower term than ‘essayistic’ and comes with considerable 
critical baggage from 20th-century modernist literature and criticism. While concerns about the 
loss of a divinely or naturally given whole or totality undoubtedly motivate the Romantic and 
post-Romantic works in this study, it is limiting to see fragmentary works only within this frame. 
The standard view of Romanticism (Beiser, Levinson) as an attempt to create in art a 
transcendental unity that is no longer available in life is inadequate to understanding the 
philosophical import of 19th-century German fragments, which take part in a more extensive 
philosophical tradition of sceptical, anti-dogmatic writing. 
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endeavour, a sense that the thoughts he presented were not fully worked out. At 
some points in the text Montaigne presents this lack of systematicity as an 
accidental feature of his writing, a product of his inability to organise his thoughts; 
he professes to have the worst memory of anyone living (2007, I: 9, p. 55) and 
apologises for presenting only essays (ne que essais). But these gestures of authorial 
self-effacement are outweighed by the sense that the fragmentary nature of the 
essays is a necessary feature, one that falls out of the author’s commitment to 
portraying the ‘how’ of thought: ‘Je ne peinds pas l'estre, je peinds le passage’	  (2007, II: 2, 
pp. 907-8). Montaigne finds a favourable model in Sextus, whose Outlines of 
Pyrrhonism had been rescued from obscurity and translated into Latin in 1562. 
Montaigne’s nouveau pyrrhonisme is reflected not only in his questioning of the scope 
and value of knowledge, but also in his way of writing. Montaigne adapts the critical 
method of the ancient sceptics – which was defined earlier as a setting out of 
oppositions ‘by which, because of the equipollence (isostheneia) in the opposed 
objects and accounts, we come first to suspension of judgement and afterwards to 
tranquillity’ – into the textual strategy of examining a singular subject from multiple, 
often conflicting, points of view, without resolution. Like the Pyrrhonians, 
Montaigne rejects the notion that knowledge can lead to happiness and instead 
embarks on a therapeutic – and poetic – project of describing and coming to terms 
with the limits of human understanding, which, among other factors, are fixed by 
time itself.  
 
Finalement, il n’y a aucune constante existence, ny de nostre estre, ny de celuy des 
objects : Et nous, et nostre jugement, et toutes chose mortelles, vont coulant et roulant 
sans cesse: Ainsi, il ne se peut establir rien de certain de l’un à l’autre, et le jugeant 
et le jugé estans en continuelle mutation et branle.  
 
There is no permanent existence either in our being or in that of 
objects. We ourselves, our faculty of judgement and all mortal things 
are flowing and rolling ceaselessly: nothing certain can be established 
about one from the other, since both judged and judging are ever 
shifting and changing (2007, II: 12, p. 639/2013, p. 234). 
 
Montaigne’s emphasis on the temporal structure of both subject and world is shared 
by later essayists such as Friedrich Schlegel, who develops the idea of philosophy as 
a circle, beginning in the middle of things rather than with first principles. 
Kierkegaard too seeks a way of writing that is appropriate to the existing subject and 
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that does not, like speculative thought, attempt to smuggle the subject out of its 
temporal position of becoming.  
 The irreducible temporality of human existence is also reflected in 
Montaigne’s starting point for the essays. Like the Pyrrhonians, Montaigne begins 
with the words and arguments of others – in the form of quotations, maxims, 
sayings, and accepted wisdom – which he proceeds to interrogate. Lukács describes 
this a posteriori starting point as crucial to the essay form in general.    
 
[I]t is part of the nature of the essay that it does not create new things 
from an empty nothingness but only orders those which were once 
alive. And because it orders them anew and does not form something 
new out of formlessness, it is bound to them and must always speak 
‘the truth’ about them, must find expression for their essential nature 
(Lukács, 1974, p. 10). 
 
The aim of the essay is thus contrasted with philosophy’s perennial goal of seeking 
out necessary truths as a starting point from which a coherent philosophical system 
can be constructed. Yet, Lukács wants to argue, in rejecting a certain understanding 
of truth, the essay does not give up on the desire for truth altogether. Indeed, as the 
above passage suggests, the essay is necessarily historical. The truth that it reveals 
takes the form of a fidelity to objects as they appear, not only in the rich, 
phenomenological description of an essay like Merleau-Ponty’s L’Œil et l'Esprit, 
which takes Cezanne’s work as a starting point, but also in the representation of 
individual experience itself, the ‘how’ of truth. Adorno glosses this point by 
contrasting the fidelity of the essayist to that of the positivist, in a manner that 
illuminates the sophistication of the essay form. For positivism, he argues, 
presentation is meant to be indifferent to its content, in order to remain objective—
‘an objectivity that is said to spring forth after the subtraction of the subject’ and the 
subtraction of the contingency of forms of discourse (Adorno, 1984, p. 153). The 
rejection of the subjective dimension of knowledge and of the inherently 
meaningful nature of representation is tantamount to ‘running away’ from the 
conditions of human knowing, what Cavell diagnosed as the fantasy of being 
unconditioned and outside of language games. But ‘if truth in fact has a temporal 
core, then the full historical content becomes an integral moment in truth; the a 
posteriori becomes concretely the a priori [...] The relation to [subjective] experience 
[...] is a relation to all of history’ (Ibid., p. 158). For Adorno, individual experience 
and concrete forms of communication are part of the historical unfolding of truths. 
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In its fragmentary, dialectical form and its a posteriori starting point, the essay 
represents thought in motion, which includes the historical processes in which 
concepts are ‘temporally embedded’ (Ibid., p. 160). The essayist thus stands in a 
closer relationship to truth than the positivist in beginning with the actual 
conditions of knowledge rather than adopting a fictional view from nowhere. 
Hume’s essay ‘Of the Standard of Taste’	  is an example of this commitment to the 
temporal or historical core of truth; his sophisticated rhetorical strategy raises the 
question of what counts as relevant to philosophical justification by focussing on 
ordinary language use and the culturally contingent process of consensus building.   
 We begin to see then in precisely what ways the essayistic mode can be 
described as a sceptical form of discourse, and as a therapeutic response to a certain 
kind of overweening speculative philosophy. The link between essayistic writing and 
philosophical scepticism has been made by others, both in individual studies on 
Montaigne and in scattered works of 20th-century criticism on the essay. However, 
within these accounts there is some ambiguity surrounding the nature of the 
sceptical position that the essay is supposed to embody. Part of this comes down to 
the ambiguities of the term ‘scepticism’ itself, which can refer to widely divergent 
philosophical positions: the suspension of all belief, the dogmatic belief that nothing 
can be known, foundationalist attempts to resolve the sceptical problem, or the anti-
foundationalist, anti-dogmatic response summarised here. The latter way of thinking 
about the role of knowledge in philosophy – which I have called ‘therapeutic 
scepticism’ – is what emerges from the essayistic tradition. It combats both 
dogmatism and the excesses of a certain kind of sceptical tradition that, in its 
demand for inhuman certainty, makes a dogma of doubt.  
 One difficult question that arises in this context is whether essayism is a 
proto-form of deconstruction – in other words, whether the scepticism of the essay 
is the same as that of the writings of the deconstructionists, which share many 
formal features: irony, textual indeterminacy, the deferral of meaning, the rejection 
of perspectival neutrality and of ontotheological foundationalism. There are obvious 
differences between the two forms, most notably the humanist underpinning to the 
essay tradition that is radically called into question in deconstruction. 
Deconstructionists are far less likely than their essayist forbears to give credence to 
notions such as shared human experience on the one hand or first-person 
experience on the other, since these are thought to rely on discredited metaphysical 
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concepts. Graham Good (1988) argues that the ‘textualism’ of the post-
structuralists, by which he means the position that any notion of what reality is like 
is only a construct with no ultimate ground, can be contrasted with the essay’s 
fundamental belief in individual experience.  
 
As we have seen, the essay is sceptical in its traditional attitude; but it is 
sceptical  precisely about general laws, even general laws of scepticism. 
Textualism, at least in its deconstructive form, is a universal, even 
dogmatic scepticism. The essay is sceptical about other forms of reality 
but not its own, which stem from personal  experience. That is the 
essay’s ultimate ‘ground’; but that, or any other ground for discourse, 
would be rejected by deconstruction. [...] Deconstructive scepticism, on 
the other hand, carried to its extreme, turns into a form of credulity, a 
naive unrealism believing that we can perceive nothing but our own 
constructs (Good, 1988, p. 181). 
 
It is true that for essayists like Montaigne, the project of criticising prevailing 
wisdom is bound up with a project of observing and understanding oneself, which 
takes place in very personal terms. However, Good appears to underestimate the 
anti-dogmatic rigour of the essay – perhaps because the focus of his study is 
essayists that are most often classed as ‘literary’ rather than philosophical – and 
unfairly treats deconstruction as univocal. Using Montaigne as a paradigm case, the 
critiques presented in the Essais rely to a certain extent on faith in the author’s own 
powers of reason and observation, yet these are also mercilessly subjected to 
scrutiny.21 On the deconstructionist side, Good’s identification of deconstruction 
with dogmatic scepticism would be more compelling if it did not ignore the form of 
deconstructionist texts, which negate the possibility of an authoritative position 
from which this dogmatic rejection of all ground could come. The forms of 
discourse taken up by Derrida and others systematically question foundationalism of 
any kind, including an idealist conception of self-presence, but they do not exempt 
themselves from critique, nor do they negate the significance of or need for such 
‘transcendental signifiers’. Rather than a flight toward the unconditioned, there is 
instead a recognition that all knowledge is conditioned or interested. 
Deconstruction fosters an awareness of how signifiers function and of meaning-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
 21 ‘Paradoxically, then, the birth of the subject or consciousness which coincides with 
the rise of both novel and essays seems to be inextricably linked with the questioning of the 
knowing subject, with its discontinuity or dislocation’ (de Obaldia, 1995, p. 32, quoting from 
Kauffman, 1989, pp. 234-235). 
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making activities more broadly. In this way, deconstructionist texts can be seen as a 
continuation of the philosophical tradition of essayism and the essay as the ‘critical 
form par excellence’ (Adorno, 1984, p. 166). ‘The fact that “all thought is 
circumstantial”, that there is “no unconditioned standpoint” – objective or 
subjective – from which reality can be apprehended explains why the essayist “must 
continually reflect on the content or circumstances of his own discourse, and why in 
its very form the essay will bear traces of that contextuality”’	  (de Obaldia, 1995, p. 
32).	  Deconstruction and essayism share a deep suspicion of authority and 
objectivity, and one of the purposes of the open-ended forms they both employ is 
to reject the notion of definitive, authoritative accounts by requiring the active 
participation of the reader in the critical process.  
 Engaging the reader as part of the meaning-making activity of the text is a 
central feature of the essayistic mode, whether in more traditional essays like those 
of Montaigne or in other essayistic writings like Romantic fragments or novels. 
Engagement is required by the discontinuous nature of essayistic texts, the various 
strategies whereby unified, naive readings of the texts are interrupted. These include 
a shift in perspective on a singular subject, a shift in rhetorical register – such as the 
German Romantics’ use of highly-technical Fichtean terminology alongside 
informal, conversational aphorisms, or Kierkegaard’s tendency to weave key 
Hegelian concepts with fairy tales and biblical allusions – the treatment of 
unexpected subjects side-by-side, or the use of parody or irony to undermine the 
literal level of the text. These strategies enact a dialectical process, whereby the text 
constantly reflects on its means of representation. The essayistic text offers no 
master frame or definitive gesture of sublation to resolve the dialectic but rather 
functions as what Barthes called a scriptible or writerly text.  
  
The writerly text is ourselves writing, before the infinite play of the world 
(the  world as function) is traversed, intersected, stopped, plasticized by 
some singular system (Ideology, Genus, Criticism) which reduces the 
plurality of entrances, the opening of networks, the infinity of languages 
(Barthes, 1995, p. 5). 
 
The essayistic text thus relies on the reader as a site for the construction of a text’s 
meaning – the conceptual organization of the plural or discontinuous structure –
with the understanding that this meaning could be construed differently by another 
reader, or even the same reader at a different time. The self-reflective dialectic 
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initiated by the text continues with the individual reader, who becomes more aware 
of the way she is conditioned by discourse. In this way the essay constitutes:  
 
the rejection, described by Berel Lang, of the ideal of a context-free or 
neutral medium characteristic of a philosophy which models itself on 
scientific discourse. In the latter case, the reader is confronted with a 
ready-made truth, with the ‘static or unified whole’ of a philosophical 
system which ‘intends to describe the world, not to change it, much less 
to be changed by it’ (Lang 1990, p. 35, in de Obaldia, 1995, p. 32). 
 
There is an ethical dimension to the rhetorical strategy of the essayistic mode, in 
that it not only involves the reader in ‘renewed evaluation, deduction, and 
interpretation of the matter at hand (Ibid.)’ but also puts author and reader on the 
same footing, as conditioned subjects trying to find ways to meaningful ways of 
speaking about the world.  
 We have seen that essayism can be read as an alternative philosophical 
tradition that offers life-giving forms of expression able to navigate the risk of 
freezing concepts and becoming trapped in the pseudo-problems to which certain 
forms or philosophical vocabularies seem to lead. Essayistic writers reject the 
project of building a logically consistent philosophical system from a self-evident 
ground, and instead respond to the sceptical problem by disclosing the historical 
and linguistic conventions that shape human understanding, thus opening up the 
possibility of a better philosophical response to those conventions. If the ‘world-
consuming’ (1994, p. 5) disappointment that underlies the sceptical project creates 
the task of recovering the world or, like Kierkegaard’s Knight of Faith, getting the 
world back, then the essayistic tradition can be seen as the therapeutic project of as 
calling philosophy back to common life. 	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  Chapter	  2:	  Reciter	  l’homme	  in	  Montaigne’s	  Essais	  
Nous cherchons d'autres conditions, pour n'entendre l'usage des nostres : et sortons 
hors de nous, pour ne sçavoir quel il y faict [We seek other conditions because 
we do not understand the use of our own; and, having no knowledge of 
what is within, we sally forth outside ourselves]. 
 
-Montaigne, De l’experience 
 
 As I briefly suggest in Chapter 1, one way to characterise Montaigne’s 
work22 is as an attempt to develop a language of becoming, capable of capturing the 
lively, discontinuous, open-ended nature of thinking23 that had been obscured by 
the formulaic conceptual debates of the Scholastics and more generally by 
philosophy’s tendency toward the timeless and universal. Influenced by the sceptical 
arguments of Cicero and Sextus – whose Outlines of Pyrrhonism enjoyed a resurgence 
in the 16th century with a new Latin translation – as well as by the Christian 
understanding of human fallibility, Montaigne cultivated a way of writing that could 
give voice to uncertainty and difference, while remaining committed to truth and 
the project of self-fashioning. Within this frame, the provisional quality of his Essais 
can be read as a necessary feature of the work, one that attempts to preserve and 
make philosophically relevant the features of experience that are generally ignored 
or supressed in systematic or dogmatic philosophical accounts. Montaigne offers 
‘des fantasies informes et irresolues, comme font ceux qui publient des questions doubteuses, à 
debattre aux escoles : non pour establir la verité, mais pour la chercher [...] je me mesle ainsi 
temerairement à tout sort de propos [notions that have no form and reach no conclusion. 
Like those who advertise questions for debate in our Universities I am seeking the 
truth not asserting it [...] I am emboldened to treat all sorts of subjects]’ (2007, I: 56, 
p. 335).24 In their presentation, the Essais emphasise, rather than seek to overcome, 
the dialogical, negative and irrésolu character of thinking, thus challenging 
assumptions about presence and identity that underlie traditional metaphysics.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   22 All references to Montaigne’s work in the original French are taken from the 2007 
Pléiade edition of the Essais. English translations are from M.A. Screech’s 2013 revised edition 
of the complete Essays, unless otherwise noted. I have included book and chapter information for 
each essay for the convenience of readers using other editions. Where the French and English 
versions are given together, the page reference for the French edition is listed first, followed by 
the reference for the English edition.  
 23 However, Montaigne is not, with Descartes, ‘une chose qui pense’; rather his writing 
is emphatically that of an embodied subject, plagued by varying humors, appetites, desires, 
bodily pleasures and pains.  
 24 My own translation. See also II: 10.  
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 Claiming to study himself as his ‘physics and metaphysics (III: 13, p. 
1119/p. 429),’ Montaigne shifts the site of truth away from external authority or a 
god’s-eye view and toward the experience of the individual subject, whose 
representation within the text is a hallmark of the essayistic and prefigures 
developments such as the modern novel. Montaigne claims in the preface to the 
reader: je suis moy-mesme la matiere de mon livre, and indeed all of the essais are written in 
the first-person, offering the portrait of a distinctive, if not always philosophically 
consistent or reliable character. The deliberately discontinuous, non-identical nature 
of the writing subject within Montaigne’s texts further highlights the temporal 
nature of experience and the way in which truth can be grasped only in succession, 
never all in a single view or a single moment. ‘Pour juger d’un homme, il faut suivre 
longuement et curieusement [attentivement] sa trace (2007, II: 1 p. 356). Adorno’s claim that 
the essay ‘does justice to the consciousness of non-identity, without needing to say 
so [. . .] in accentuating the fragmentary, the partial rather than the total (1984, p. 
157)’ is an apt characterisation of Montaigne’s preference for the fragmentary and 
of the pains he takes to avoid a univocal account of his own subjectivity.  
 The formal representation of subjectivity in the Essais – specifically the 
subject as defined by language and time – is an essentially Pyrrhonian move that 
highlights how contingent, extra-rational factors impinge upon judgement and make 
it unreliable. For Montaigne, reason, as exercised by individual subjects, is always 
embodied and always interested. Like the Pyrrhonians, he is wary of positive 
assertions either about natural laws or human nature, since all knowledge comes 
from a certain regard and subjects are incapable of transparency about their own 
perspective—what they fail to see and what they actively supress. His therapeutic 
strategy as a writer is to present as many disparate views as possible—his own, as 
they shift over time, those of the Classical authors from whom he quotes liberally, 
and those that fall out of his exploration of different cultures and historical and 
literary scenarios. This approach allows for contradiction and complexity and 
enables Montaigne to avoid some of the falsehoods that he admits he is prone to in 
heat of live philosophical debate. The resulting work is a textured exploration of 
what falls through the gap between theoretical accounts and lived experience and of 





Montaigne and ordinary language 
 The first striking feature of the Essais is Montaigne’s use of the French 
vernacular. His French, even to the modern reader, is surprisingly earthy and 
colloquial, and though he engages with a range of philosophical texts and weighs in 
on a number of philosophical arguments with the command of a specialist, his 
language is decidedly un-technical. Claiming that an author should allow his subject 
to demand its own form, he clarifies: ‘Je ne dis pas moyen scholastique et artiste, je dis 
moyen naturel, d'un sain entendement [I don’t mean in a scholastic or artificial way but 
naturally, with a sound understanding]’ (2007, III: 8, p. 970). He does not shy away 
from vulgar words such as crotte, chier, and fienter (‘Les rois et les philosophes fientent et les 
dames aussi [Kings and philosophers shit, and so do ladies]’ (2007, III: 13, p. 1133). 
The choice to express himself in ordinary, non-specialist language constitutes a shift 
of focus from the rarefied academic debates of the Schoolmen to how the ordinary 
man, possessed of no special knowledge or talent, might go about trying to 
understand himself. The sceptical ‘que scay-je’ carved into Montaigne’s library ceiling 
and the ‘qui suis-je’ that runs throughout the Essais can be read as questions which 
arise for any language speaker, any being for whom understanding takes place in 
language. Montaigne’s approach defies the notion that more precise or 
philosophically refined ways of speaking could solve the problem of understanding 
oneself or the world. Indeed, he suggests at times that language should be less 
precise. In ‘On the Lame’, he recommends ‘terms which soften and tone down the 
rashness of what we put forward, terms, such as “perhaps”, “to some extent”, “they 
say”, “I think” and so on’ (2013, III: 11, p. 410).  
 
Qui a pris de l'entendement en la logique ? où sont ses belles promesses ? Nec ad 
melius vivendum, nec ad commodius disserendum. Voit-on plus de barbouillage au 
caquet des harengeres, qu'aux disputes publiques des hommes de cette profession ? 
J'aymeroy mieux, que mon fils apprint aux tavernes à parler, qu'aux escholes de la 
parlerie.  
 
Has anyone ever acquired intelligence through logic? Where are her 
beautiful promises? She teaches neither how to live a better life nor 
how to argue properly. Is there more of a hotchpotch in the cackle of 
fishwives than in the public disputations of men who profess logic? I 
would prefer a son of mine learn to talk in the tavern rather than in our 
university yap-shops. (III: 8, p. 971/p. 370). 
 
Montaigne’s preference for the common talk of the tavern over the subtleties of 
Scholastic disputation is in part motivated by the concern that logic imposes an 
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inorganic structure on thought, one that, it is suggested, is in danger of obscuring 
rather than clarifying what one sets out to know. The alternative to a deductive 
structure cannot simply be bare experience or the natural attitude, since one would 
otherwise never be led to pose the questions of what one knows or who one is: the 
answers would be obvious. But Montaigne’s preference for common talk suggests 
that nevertheless we should understand ordinary experience, rather than academic 
speculation, as the site of any possible disclosure of the truth, despite the ways in 
which the ordinary is capable of covering over truth. The question of what is or 
who ‘I’ am may not be a question of knowledge at all, but of learning to see anew 
what is already before one’s eyes, or learning to acknowledge the significance of 
one’s own words.  
 
Moy qui suis Roy de la matiere que je traicte, et qui n'en dois compte à personne, ne 
m'en crois pourtant pas du tout : Je hazarde souvent des boutades de mon esprit, 
desquelles je me deffie : et certaines finesses verbales dequoy je secoue les oreilles : mais 
je les laisse courir à l'avanture, je voys qu'on s'honore de pareilles choses : ce n'est pas 
à moy seul d'en juger. Je me presente debout, et couché ; le devant et le derriere ; à 
droitte et à gauche ; et en touts mes naturels plis. 
 
I, who am monarch of the subject which I treat and not accountable for 
it to anyone, do not for all that believe everything I say. Sometimes my 
mind launches out with paradoxes which I mistrust and with verbal 
subtleties which make me shake my head; but I let them take their 
chance. [...] I describe myself standing up and lying down, from front 
and back, from right and left and with all my inborn complexities (III: 
8, p. 989/p. 376). 
 
Montaigne recognises that he sometimes falls prey to the ways in which language 
breaks down, obscures, or betrays—moments he is unable to say what he means or 
to know what he means to say. ‘Not believing everything I say’ is a feature of 
ordinary communication, and one that Montaigne is keen to preserve in his writing. 
In contrast to logic, where what is said is determined and necessitated by the 
principles from which one begins, Montaigne’s ordinary language allows him to be 
inconsistent, to contradict himself, and so to show the various ways in which the 
self fails to be fully present to itself as well as the way the ‘I’ changes in the process 
of investigation and articulation. His decision to allow his words to stand and to 
‘take their chance’ is a rhetorical strategy by which he hopes to bring into view the 
existential features of diversity and inconstancy that philosophical ways of speaking 
tend to supress.  
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 The Essais reveal Montaigne’s preoccupation with communication, both 
with the ways in which language can obscure what one wants to say and with the 
ways in which debate and argument can lead one to exaggerate and deceive for the 
sake of winning over an opponent (2007, II: 11, p 1074). He was influenced by the 
Pyrrhonian method of argumentation, which involved levying critiques against any 
positive claim in order to reach aporia, but he was keenly aware of the problems in 
formulating a non-dogmatic account of human behaviour, or of himself, in 
language.  
 
Je voy les philosophes Pyrrhoniens qui ne peuvent exprimer leur generale conception 
en aucune maniere de parler : car il leur faudroit un nouveau langage. Le nostre est 
tout formé de propositions affirmatives, qui leur sont de tout ennemies.  
 
I can see why the Pyrrhonian philosophers cannot express their general 
conception in any manner of speaking; for they would need a new 
language. Ours is wholly formed of affirmative propositions totally 
inimical to them (II: 12, p. 556/p. 205).  
 
In contrast to his championing of ordinary language elsewhere, Montaigne here 
emphasises the way in which language, characterised by affirmative propositions, 
can distort what one sets out to explain. In ‘On the Lame’, Montaigne supplements 
this point by admitting the extremes to which he is driven in the heat of debate, 
when he often ends up exaggerating or lying to make a stronger case. Writing, and 
writing in the informal, free-wheeling style of the essai, is a way for Montaigne to 
avoid the dodges and falsehoods to which he is prone in arguments with actual 
interlocutors. Because composition takes place over longer periods of time and 
outside the context of wanting to ‘win’, it is better suited to Montaigne’s task of 
allowing – and not attempting to solve – complexities. The reader in this way is 
made a part of the conversation without being involved in a dispute in which either 
party might be tempted to hide or distort the truth for the sake of amour propre.   
 
Montaigne and the Renaissance 
 Montaigne’s insistence on ordinary language lends itself to the provisional, 
experimental form of the essai, which is conceived as a means of illuminating the 
structure of the self by allowing heterogeneous reflections and perspectives to exist 
alongside one another and to ‘take their chance’. Montaigne’s essayism is both part 
of the wider historical shift in discursive mode that took place during the 
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Renaissance and a deliberate rhetorical strategy to turn away from the kind of 
philosophical models that flourished in Medieval Europe. The significance of the 
Essais can thus be understood as part of the clash between two different textual 
models at a particular historical moment as well as a clash between two different 
approaches to philosophy.  
 Montaigne is typically portrayed as writing against the grain of 
Scholasticism, moving away from the systematic approach of the summa and away 
from the commentary model that enshrined significant philosophical figures of the 
past by appealing to the authority of tradition. Recent critical studies suggest that 
Scholastic methods were more complex, diverse, and dialogical than has been 
previously acknowledged. The argumentative method of disputationes, a widespread 
feature of higher education in Medieval Europe, is a good example; what has long 
been portrayed as a formulaic and slavish imitation of authority figures reinforcing a 
static worldview in fact encouraged questioning of received arguments after the 
fashion of Socratic dialogues.25 Likewise, the ‘modern’ notion that authority resides 
in individual conscience, rather than in collective received wisdom, can be found in 
a number of early Christian works, most notably in the genre of confessions, which 
shares many of the features of the modern essay. But while the dynamism and 
diversity of pre-modern, and especially Medieval, thought has often been flattened 
out to serve as a foil to ‘modernity’ or the ‘modern essay’, there remain substantive 
differences between Scholasticism and the kind of writing in which Montaigne was 
engaged, differences which in part have to do with wider innovations in Renaissance 
thought and culture. 
 The provisional quality that defines Montaigne’s writing was in some 
measure occasioned by material changes in the publishing industry. The rise of 
commercial printing in the early 16th century opened up the possibility of 
publishing works outside of the strict framework of patronage, allowing for more 
stylistically diverse texts and changing the relationship between author and reader. 
Terence Cave (1979) argues that cheap printing shifted generic boundaries by 
enabling works of a more provisional quality, ‘functionally primitive extrasystematic 
texts’ to be published. These ‘works-in-progress’ formed part of a comprehensive 
body of knowledge in the process of being born, the encyclopaedia of all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




knowledge. They existed as fragments of a yet-to-be-articulated whole. Montaigne 
frequently reflects on the provisional nature of his works, and he leaves open the 
possibility that they might fit into some larger whole. 
 
Les sçavans parlent, et denotent leurs fantasies, plus specifiquement, et par le menu : 
Moy, qui n'y voy qu'autant que l'usage m'en informe, sans regle, presente 
generalement les miennes, et à tastons. Comme en cecy : Je prononce ma sentence par 
articles descousus : c'est chose qui ne se peut dire à la fois, et en bloc. La relation, et 
la conformité, ne se trouvent point en telles ames que les nostres, basses et communes. 
La sagesse est un bastiment solide et entier, dont chaque piece tient son rang et porte 
sa marque. Sola sapientia in se tota conversa est. 
 
The learned do arrange their ideas into species and name them in detail. 
I, who can see no further than practice informs me, have no such rule, 
presenting my ideas in no categories and feeling my way, as I am doing 
here now. I pronounce my sentences in disconnected clauses, as 
something which cannot be said all at once all in one piece. Harmony 
and consistency are not to be found in ordinary base souls such as ours. 
Wisdom is an edifice solid and entire, each piece of which has its place 
and bears its hallmark. Sola sapentia in se tota conversa est.’ Wisdom alone is 
entirely self-contained (III: 13, pp. 1123-1124/ p. 379).  
 
Montaigne contrasts his experience or ‘practice’-based insights with the 
methodology of the learned, who, it is implied, gain their wisdom from the study of 
authoritative works rather than through an examination of their own experience. 
‘Disconnected clauses’, Montaigne suggests, are conducive to the representation of 
the latter. The claim that experience cannot be expressed à la fois et en bloc points to 
the disjunctive temporal aspect of experience, the unfolding of successive moments 
in contrast to the all-at-once perspective of a transcendental or divine view. Yet 
Wisdom, like God, is self-contained, described as an edifice both solid and 
complete. Montaigne thus raises the question of how his own ‘decousus’ fragments 
relate to the harmonious and internally consistent ‘whole’ of wisdom. While he 
discounts the possibility that ‘souls such as ours’ could possess wisdom as such, 
precisely because ‘harmony and consistency’ strictly speaking can’t be attributed 
creatures who exist in time, there remains the possibility that the disconnected 
insights of the writer could be read as ‘pieces’ to be assimilated into the eventual 
production of a more perfect literary or philosophical whole. On Terence Cave’s 
reading of Renaissance literature, Montaigne’s essays form the provisional notes of 
the Book of Books, or the Book-to-come. ‘Thanks to the extended and on-going 
process of addition and revision made possible by the advent of printing, these 
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open-ended texts are thus said to function as the “shapeless raw material for future 
literature”, as the “disconnected entries of this new system, as fragments which will 
be discarded with the advent of the Book”’ (de Obaldia, 1995, p. 30).26 
 The conception of the essay as a potential rather than a stand-alone work 
constitutes one of the two main strands of essay criticism. Yet the tendency to see 
the essay as a subgenre destined to be superseded by a more systematic or 
comprehensive form such as the novel, encyclopaedia, or the philosophical treatise 
ignores the historical resilience of essay: essays continue to exist alongside and even 
within novels, most notably the essayistic novels of the early 20th century, and, 
within philosophy, the essay cannot be confined to a historical period. Claire de 
Obaldia (1995) suggests that this resilience has to do with the philosophical 
advantages of the form: its ability to present ideas in non-systematic way that is 
consistent with the anti-foundationalist insights of scepticism (p. 30). Seen from a 
philosophical perspective, a purely teleological reading of the essay supresses the 
possibility that the fragmentary, diverse, and particular insights of the essay are not 
in fact translatable into a coherent whole.  
 How did Montaigne understand his own essais and their relationship to a 
comprehensive account of human nature? His architectural metaphor in the above 
passage suggests that the house of Wisdom, though solid, is composed of pieces; 
‘each piece has its place and bears its hallmark’ (chaque piece tient sa rang et porte sa 
marque). This conveys the notion that each piece27 remains itself and retains its shape 
while also being part of a larger whole. The most straightforward way to read ‘porte 
sa marque’ is as a physical mark on a stone.28 The ambiguity of the phrase comes 
from the use of the possessive, which could either imply that each stone carries its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 26 Claire de Obaldia, expanding on Cave’s understanding of the Renaissance text and 
Alistair Fowler’s concept of literature in potentia, unfolds how historically the essay indeed did 
make way for the novel, which borrows its primary stylistic features, yet she argues that seeing 
the essay as not-yet-novel suppresses certain historical facts of the essay’s development as well 
as a more radical philosophical reading of the essay’s import. De Obaldia also makes the case 
that while the novel exploits the essay’s concern with form, it leaves behind the equally 
characteristic expository or scientific dimension of the essay, which has to do with ‘speaking the 
truth’ about some feature of the world. De Obaldia gives equal weight to the two distinctive 
features of the essay, its receptive or critical dimension – its concern with the inherited world or 
with existing cultural products – and its poetic dimension, the concern for the ethics governing 
presentation. The tendency in one strand of essay criticism to see the essay as raw material for a 
novel thus downplays the feature that makes the essay properly philosophical.   
 27 Piece can of course be understood both in the sense that the English word ‘piece’ is 
understood, as a section or part of something, but also has the sense of a ‘room’, which is an 
equally plausible way of reading Montaigne’s metaphor, since a building is both made up of 
individual stones and of individual rooms. 
 28 It would be harder to conceive of a room as ‘marked’. 
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own mark or that all of the stones carry the ‘mark’ of wisdom. A marque can also be 
understood as a ‘trace’ of something, and in this sense, each essai could be said to 
bear a ‘trace’ of the wisdom of which it is a part, a wisdom that in some sense 
already exists – or else it could not be said to leave a trace behind – but in another 
sense does not yet exist, since it requires each and every stone in order to be ‘solide et 
entier’. The relationship between Montaigne’s fragmentary thoughts and the 
possibility of an orderly whole thus remains ambiguous. The passage continues:  
 
Je laisse aux artistes, et ne sçay s’ils en viennent à bout, en chose si meslee, si menue 
et fortuite, de renger en bandes, cette infinite diversité de visages ; et arrester nostre 
inconstance, et la mettre par ordre. 
 
I leave it to the graduates—and I do not know if even they will manage 
to bring it off [...] to arrange this infinite variety of features into groups, 
pin down our inconsistencies and impose some order (III: 13, p. 
1149/p. 379). 
 
Montaigne’s caveat ‘I do not know...’ conveys a sense of doubt that our (the nostre 
includes both Montaigne and human beings more generally) inconsistencies could 
ever be arrested, or even marshalled into categories. While not expressly denying the 
possibility of a more ordered presentation of his ideas, Montaigne’s irony in this 
passage opens up the more radical way of reading the essay’s potential or its not-yet 
that constitutes an alternative to the notion of the essay as mere raw material. 
Following Cave, ‘The Renaissance text’s difference from itself which the essay 
epitomises turns out to involve not so much a temporary difference due to be 
resolved (like the draft of a finalised work) as a potentially endless deferment or 
différance, in the Derridean sense, of a Book which is at once embodied and endlessly 
gestured toward’ (de Obaldia, 1995, p. 30). This reading keeps alive the more 
profound possibility that the heterogeneity and lack of closure in Montaigne’s essais 
are necessary features unable to be translated into a solid and complete work. While 
Montaigne’s own statements about the metaphysical status of his ‘attempts’ are 
ambiguous – in part because they are coloured by the self-deprecating remarks of an 
unreliable narrator about his own failings as a systematic writer and thinker – 
reading the discontinuous structure of the Essais as a necessary rather than an 
incidental feature supports Montaigne’s consistent emphasis on temporality and the 
‘passage’ over against being: ‘je ne peinds pas l'estre, je peinds le passage’ (2007, II: 2, pp. 
907-8). While Montaigne’s portrait of himself can in some sense ‘stand in’ for a 
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portrait of man in general, it does so by virtue of its provisionality and discontinuity, 
not by its ability to be translated into a more systematic form.  
 The rejection of the possibility of subsuming the particular ‘pieces’ into a 
totality can also be understood as a rejection of a systematic or deductive method in 
which a pre-existing conceptual structure determines in advance ‘both the 
interrelation between the parts and the function of each part within the whole’ (de 
Obaldia, 1995, p. 31). The sense of attempt, ‘essays “trying themselves out” without 
resolving themselves,’ acts to performatively counter what Montaigne sees as the 
truncating tendency of Scholastic philosophical accounts (Ibid.).29 With the social 
upheavals in 16th-century France and new technologies like the printing press, the 
Essais reflect a ‘generalised epistemological anxiety’ (Ibid., p. 30) in which traditional 
top-down structures of knowledge and authority are undermined. In contrast to a 
systematic or closed model of truth, the essai’s truth is based on a wealth of 
experiences structured only very loosely around a theme (e.g. names, fear, 
cannibalism, virtue...) or an occasion (‘some lines of Virgil’). The thematic or lyrical 
rather than deductive or logical structure preserves the inherently excessive nature 
of experience (and of language) against the simplification and clarity afforded by a 
systematic account. Rather than getting to the bottom of a matter or seeing from 
above, the Essais multiply outward with the addition of ever more (yet always 
horizontal) perspectives. ‘Qui ne voit, que j’ay pris une route par laquelle sans cesse et sans 
travail, j’iray autant, qu’il y aura d’ancre et du papier au monde?’ [Who does not see that I 
have taken a road along which I shall go, without stopping and without effort, as 
long as there is ink and paper in the world?]' (Montaigne, III: 9, p. 989/p. 376). 
Cave contends that Montaigne’s writing of experience must carry on indefinitely 
because the fullness of experience that he seeks to represent is never available 
within time. ‘All that the Essais can do, with their ineradicable self-consciousness, is 
to posit paradigms of wholeness of features of a discourse which, as it pours itself 
out, celebrates its own inanity. The Montaignian text presents the emptying of the 
cornucopia by the very gesture of extending itself indefinitely [....] Figures of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 29 Understood diachronically, the Scholastic approach, like the essayistic approach, is 
not confined to a period but is manifest throughout the history of philosophy as ideas become 
calcified and certain rhetorical procedures become established as properly philosophical (vs. 
‘sophistic’ ‘literary’, ‘scientific’). In this sense, essayistic texts can be seen as perennially 
pushing back against the System, whether that is the Christianised Aristotelianism practiced in 
Medieval educational institutions, the positivism of 20th-century analytic thought, which Adorno 
attacks ‘Essay as Form’, or entrenched forms of scepticism.  
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abundance play a prominent part in the closing pages of [the final essay] De 
l’experience’ (Cave, 1979, p. 321).  
 While the Essais fail to conform to the Whole that is solide et entier, they 
represent an abundance or inexhaustibility of experience that serves to 
counterbalance the weight that philosophy has traditionally given to the completed 
edifice,30 and they point instead to the irreducibly provisional nature of any attempt 
to know. Drawing from several texts in which Montaigne describes his choice of 
subjects as ‘egallement fertile’ or ‘toutes enchesnées les unes aux autres,’ Laurence Kritzman 
describes the Essais as an ‘attempt to submit knowledge to discourse without a 
centre’ in a ‘perpetual process of expansion’ (Kritzman, 1983, p. 85). If the 
Renaissance shift in discursive mode amounts to a recognition that any individual 
account or perspective is necessarily provisional and unable to attain a comprehensive 
or god’s-eye view, the Essais, in thematising provisionality and making it part of the 
form of the work, provide a critical, philosophical reflection on this shift. 
 
The shape of experience 
 
Les autres forment l’homme: je le recite; et en représente un particulier bien mal formé, et lequel si 
j’avoy à façonner de nouveau, je ferois vrayment bien autre qu’il n’est [Others form man; I 
narrate him, and portray a particular, very ill-formed one, who, if I could fashion 
him anew, I would make quite different from what he is] (III: 2, p. 845).31  
 
 The contrast in this familiar passage between telling or narrating (reciter) on 
the one hand and forming or shaping on the other helps to further elucidate 
Montaigne’s choice of form. The essayist sets himself the challenge of presenting 
experience in a way that does not alter what it seeks to describe by turning it into a 
concept or a unified system divorced from time and everyday experience, that 
describes without (mis)shaping. ‘Former’ also mean to educate, and Montaigne plays 
with both senses in describing himself as mal formé. Yet his enterprise is not to 
façonner de nouveau either himself or his experience but to faithfully recount what has 
been experienced (‘je n’ay besoing d’y apporter que la fidelité: celle-là y est, la plus sincere qui se 
trouve’ (Ibid., p. 845)) by an admittedly imperfect and imperfectly educated subject. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 30 Diderot defended the essay form by pointing to the truncations necessitated by the 
orderly treatise. ‘J’aime mieux un essai qu’un traité ; un essai où l’on me jette quelques idées de 
génie presque isolées, qu’un traité où ces germes précieux sont étouffés sous un amas de redites’ 
(‘Sur la diversité de nos jugements’ in Oeuvres completes, 1972, p. 874). 
 31 My own translation.  
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Montaigne’s claim to ‘fidelity’ cannot be read in a straightforward way, as the text 
itself undermines any claim to have found a means of representation that is purely 
descriptive or transparent, that does not ‘shape’ its subject. The reflexivity of 
Montaigne’s Essais coupled with his reflections on the arbitrariness of language32 
argue against any notion of the unmediated. Rather, fidelity in this case amounts to 
a new kind of form and so a new possibility of formation: a heterogeneous 
presentation in which features of experience often treated as philosophically trivial – 
eating and drinking, bowel movements, sexual habits, etc. – are interspersed with 
more traditional philosophical and moral reflections, and in which the inconstancy 
and diversity of self and experience are everywhere emphasised. 
 The Essais do ‘not form something new out of formlessness’ but instead 
‘order anew’ things which were ‘once alive’.33 Through the choreographed ‘free 
association’ of the writing subject, for whom all ground is ‘egallement fertile’, the Essais 
bring contingency into focus as a feature of thought and as relevant to the project 
of self-understanding. Montaigne begins with artefacts: quotations from other 
works, socially embedded concepts and laws, and existing artistic or cultural 
products. The assemblage quality of the Essais preserves the ad hoc nature of 
experience, but what is received is transformed and reordered according to the 
imaginative association of the writer. Montaigne thus does not simply imitate the 
way in which thought proceeds but presents that process, consciously, to the reader. 
He ‘proceeds, so to speak, methodically unmethodically’ (Adorno, 1984, p. 161). 
This joining of contingency and creativity serves as a formal representation of the 
combination of receptive and imaginative faculties that enables experience or world; 
the performance of the structure of experience is wielded as a ‘weapon against the 
spell of beginnings’ (Adorno, 1984, p. 166) or against any philosophical or rhetorical 
structures that inorganically impose order on experience. ‘Je n’ay point d’autre sergent de 
bande a renger mes pieces, que la fortune’ (2007, II: 10, p. 429).34 In Montaigne, the formal 
presence of the given in the form of existing texts and cultural artefacts is a 
reminder of the role of luck and chance in human life, the hand of ‘fate’ that 
provides the conditions and limits of human action and understanding.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 32 See 2007, I: 46, pp. 296-301; III: 13, p. 1116. See also Campagnon, 1979, p. 288-290.   
 33 ‘[I]t is part of the nature of the essay that it does not create new things from an empty 
nothingness but only orders those which were once alive. And because it orders them anew and 
does not form something new out of formlessness, it is bound to them and must always speak 
”the truth” about them, must find expression for their essential nature’ (Lukács, 1974, p. 10). 




Mais à le bien prendre, il semble que nos conseils et deliberations en despendent bien 
autant; et que la fortune engage en son trouble et incertitude, aussi nos discours. 
Nous raisonnons hazardeusement et temairement, dit Timaeus en Platon, par ce 
que, comme nous, noz discours ont grande participation à la temerité du hazard. 
 
But it seems, if you take it right, that our counsels and decisions depend 
just as much on Fortune and that she involves in her turbulence and 
uncertainty even our reasoning. ‘We argue rashly and unadvisedly,’ says 
Timaeus in Plato, ‘because in our reasoning as in ourselves, a great part 
is played by chance’ (I: 47, p. 307-308/p. 107-8). 
 
 Montaigne’s rhetorical strategy is one way of understanding Hume’s (and 
later Wittgenstein’s) admonition that Philosophy should strive to ‘leave everything 
as it is’. This task, far from naive or self-evident, involves both deciding how 
everything is, or what aspects of experience to emphasise, and at the same time 
deciding how to represent this conception of experience rhetorically. The essay’s 
reflection on its own means of production, its concern for the conditions under 
which truth is approached and attempted, is a reminder that choices of form have 
the function of supressing or emphasising different features of experience. This is a 
‘problem’ for philosophy in that the choice of how to write necessarily comes with 
decisions about what is philosophically relevant. The self-critical dimension of 
Montaigne’s Essais, which exposes the rhetorical, material, and subjective conditions 
under which the work came to be, amounts to a philosophical argument for the 
relevance of these conditions to philosophy. To ignore them, Montaigne insists, is 
to open the door to a distorted conception of humanity. As philosophy has 
historically tended to emphasise timelessness, universality, unity, and necessity, 
Montaigne counters with a style that allows for diversity, contingency, subjectivity, 
and cultural and historical specificity.   
 
Nous cherchons d'autres conditions, pour n'entendre l'usage des nostres : et sortons 
hors de nous, pour ne sçavoir quel il y faict. Si avons nous beau monter sur des 
eschasses, car sur des eschasses encores faut-il marcher de nos jambes. Et au plus 
eslevé throne du monde, si ne sommes nous assis, que sus nostre cul. 
 
 
We seek other conditions35 because we do not understand the use of 
our own; and, having no knowledge of what is within, we sally forth 
outside ourselves. A fine thing to get up on stilts: for even on stilts we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 35 Screech: ‘attributes’. 
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must ever walk with our legs! And upon the highest throne in the 
world, we are seated, still, upon our arses (III: 13, p. 1166/p. 449). 
 
Representation of the subject in the essay 
 
‘Je m'estudie plus qu'autre subject. C'est ma metaphysique, c'est ma physique [I study myself 
more than any other subject. That is my metaphysics; that is my physics]’ (2013, III: 
13, p. 374). 
 
 Montaigne’s representation of himself as a writing subject within the Essais 
is perhaps the central conceit through which he calls attention to the conditions 
under which philosophical reflection takes place. What might be called the 
psychological realism of the essay, its formal representation of thought and of the 
subject, offers an intimate sense of the writer—indeed it is a hallmark of the form 
that whatever subject an essay might ostensibly be about, it is at the same time 
about subjectivity itself, as reflected through form. Despite the heterogeneity of the 
Essais, Montaigne’s voice as the ‘I’ in the text is unmistakeable: the voice of a 
generous, unpretentious, uncommonly insightful, and immensely likeable36 
character, ready to ironise his own pretensions and those of his fellows and ever 
willing, as he says, to contradict himself for the sake of truth (2007, III: 2, p. 845). 
Yet to take the ‘I’ of the text as straightforwardly biographical or mimetic would be 
to miss the philosophical significance of what is, finally, a poetic construction. As 
Montaigne himself reminds us, the act of writing ‘selves’ as much as a self can be 
said to be writing, and in a work whose stated aim is self-knowledge, the self is 
necessarily a co-creation of the text rather than something that exists in advance of 
it. Je n’ay pas plus faict mon livre que mon livre m’a faict. Livre consubstantial à son autheur [I 
no more write my book than my book writes me. Book and author are 
consubstantial]’ (2007, II: 18, p. 703). The analogy between writing and self runs 
throughout the Essais, supporting a reading that sees the two as co-extensive rather 
than seeing the self as an entity existing prior to writing which is then represented in 
written form. ‘The genre foregrounds, perhaps as no other genre does, the 
relationship between imagination and writing, between the person of the essayist 
made of flesh and blood and the essayist as defined or created out of words’ (de 
Obaldia, 1995, p. 8). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 36 Nietzsche reacted to reading Montaigne with the declaration, ‘that such a man has 
written, joy on earth has truly increased’. 
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 Montaigne’s claims to ‘honesty’ and ‘telling it like it is’ should not make one 
blind to the fact that the subjectivity portrayed in the text is anything but 
straightforward, and that the choice to be honest about oneself, like the choice to 
‘leave everything as it is’ involves decisions that are both rhetorical and 
philosophical. Before examining the nature of the self as portrayed in Montaigne’s 
text, it is worth considering Montaigne’s reasons for turning the mirror on himself 
as his ‘physics and metaphysics’. We have seen that Montaigne rejects the deductive, 
systematic approach of the Scholastics in favour of the open, disjunctive structure 
of the essai that better enables him to present the complexity of his own experience. 
It is also significant to note that his turn toward self-reflection entails the rejection 
of any unconditioned ‘god’s-eye’ point of view which might be invoked to ensure a 
generally coherent, stable universe. The upheaval of social and intellectual structures 
during the Renaissance tended to relocate the site of the comprehension of the 
world from a transcendent divinity to the rational human subject, without altogether 
eliminating the notion of a divinely ordered universe. Montaigne to some extent 
reproduces this duality of perspectives, yet he takes pains to counter the optimistic 
picture of human reason as quasi-divine, championed by Luther and by some in the 
Catholic tradition. He seizes on the sceptical and Christian frameworks of human 
fallibility in order to separate out the Wisdom of God that is ‘solid and entire’ from 
the inherently limited perspective of human beings, claiming that harmony and 
consistency ‘ne se trouvent point en telles ames que les nostres, basses et communes’. Having 
drawn a clear division between the human and divine, Montaigne resists the 
temptation to either recreate God in man’s image or to approximate the divine 
perspective in his own work. ‘Les hommes, dit Sainct Paul, sont devenus fols cuidans estre 
sages, et ont mué la gloire de Dieu incorruptible en l’image de l’homme corruptible [Men, says St. 
Paul, have become fools thinking themselves wise and have changed the glory of 
the incorruptible God into the image of corruptible man]’ (Montaigne, 2007, II: 12, 
p. 559). Montaigne fully embraces the limited perspective of the human subject by 
taking up the inherently provisional and décousu form of the essai, for it is only by 
understanding one’s conditions, rather than ‘sallying forth outside ourselves’ to a 
higher or purer plane, hat one can hope to get any purchase on self or world.  
 Understanding the material and psychological conditions under which 
thought takes place also prevents the all-too-human error of believing that one has 
achieved ‘objective’ truth when in fact one has merely made a universal law of one’s 
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own contingent circumstances. Montaigne is wary of this tendency to approach 
objectivity by generalising from particulars, and he sees philosophers as especially 
prone to this error of judgement. In ‘Apologie de Raimond Sebonde’, he rejects ‘natural 
law’ as no more than an artistic production, and he replaces a conceptual account of 
human nature with the presentation of multiple points of view. Though to him ‘il 
n’est rien si horrible à imaginer, que de manger son pere,’ he attempts to understand the 
perspective of the cannibal who (he argues) sees himself as honouring and 
revivifying the father in the act of eating him.  
 
Il est croyable qu’il y a des loix naturelles : comme il se voit ès autres creatures : mais 
en nous elles sont perdues, ceste belle raison humaine s’ingerant par tout de maistriser 
et commander, brouillant et confondant le visage des choses, selon sa vanité et 
inconstance. Nihil itaque amplius nostrum est: quod nostrum dico, artis 
est [C’est porquoi rien n’est plus nôtre ; ce que j’appelle nôtre est une production de 
l’art]. Les subjets ont divers lustres et diverses considerations : c’est de là que 
s’engendre principalement la diversité d’opinions. Une nation regarde un subject par 
un visage, et s’arreste à celuy là : l’autre par un autre..  
 
It is quite believable that natural laws exist: we can see that in other 
creatures. But we have lost them; that fine human reason of ours is 
always interfering, seeking dominance and mastery, distorting and 
confounding the face of everything according to its vanity and 
inconsistency. Nothing of ours is left: what I call ours is really artificial. 
Any object can be seen in various lights from various points of view: it 
is chiefly that which gives birth to the variety of opinion: one nation 
sees one facet, and stops there; another sees another. (II: 12, p. 616/p. 
226). 
 
Given that every society and indeed every person sees the world under a certain 
regard, privileging some aspects while ignoring or diminishing the importance of 
others, and given the propensity for self-deception – ‘brouiller et confonder le visage des 
choses au gré de sa vanité et inconstance’ – the human as such cannot be grasped through 
generalisation but only through the multiplication of different limited, subjective 
views, including the views of a singular subject – the author himself – at different 
times.  If human nature is a ‘production de l’art,’ and a poor production at that, then 
Montaigne’s response is to develop a better medium through which to represent 
human experience.  
 In the Essais, the possibility of a universally accepted, god-given nature or 
human nature falls away and is replaced by an artistic production. By turning the 
mirror onto himself as his ‘physics and metaphysics’, Montaigne suggests that the 
subject is the site of the disclosure of the world, and that the attempt to know the 
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world must pass through self-knowledge. To reflect this principle, Montaigne as a 
writer ‘does not think, but rather transforms himself into an arena of intellectual 
experience, without simplifying it’ (Adorno, 1984, p.161, emphasis mine). Because 
the form of thought – rather than a conceptual account of consciousness – is 
stressed, the writer’s personal experience is able to serve as an exemplar of the 
human being in general without the pretence of becoming a universal law.   
 The sense of the writer offered by the Essais is complicated by the fact that 
any representation of the writing subject within a work is bound to be fictional, as 
only a possible subject, which points to the mechanism of self-knowledge more 
generally: the subject defines itself and knows itself only by moving through the 
other, that which it is not, or not yet. In the Essais, the project of self-knowledge 
takes place largely through others’ words, specifically through the words of Classical 
texts, from which Montaigne quotes liberally. Montaigne’s remark that ‘On ne fait que 
nous entregloser [We can do nothing but gloss one another] (2007, III: 13, p. 1115)’ 
amounts to a recognition that the process of self-understanding, and indeed the very 
‘self’ at stake in the investigation, involves an assimilation or digestion of existing 
material. One’s own ‘text’ takes its place in the web of other texts, given shape by 
existing words and forms. While Montaigne uses a wealth of quotations from 
Classical and contemporary authors, he does so not to uphold their authority or to 
lend authority to his own arguments but to serve as fodder for his own self-
understanding. Just as the movement through subjectivity is envisaged as necessary 
to the disclosure of the world, so this movement through exteriority (here 
represented by the words of others) is crucial to his entire project, as it is a way of 
stressing the role of extra-rational, contingent factors in rational understanding (here 
the understanding of self) and of situating the self in the world. The latter is 
accomplished in large part by an emphasis on the internal diversity or changeability 
of his own self, in which Montaigne conceives of texts and selves as an assemblage 
of diverse pièces rather than self-identical totalities.37  
 
Toutes le contrarietez s’y trouvent [...] Je n’ay rien à dire de moy, entierement, 
simplement, et solidement, sans confusion et sans meslange, ny un mot. Distinguo, est 
le plus universel member de ma Logique.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 37 Elsewhere, he describes his book as ‘Ce fagotage de tant de diverses pièces’ (2007, II: 
37, p. 796). 
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Nous sommes tous des lopins, et d’une contexture si informe et diverse, que chaque 
piece, chaque moment, faict son jeu. Et se trouve autant de difference de nous à nous 
mesmes, que de nous à autruy. 
 
Every sort of contradiction can be found in me [...] There is nothing I 
can say about myself as a whole simply and completely, without 
intermingling and admixture. The most universal article of my own 
Logic is DISTINGUO.  
 
We are entirely made up of bits and pieces, woven together so diversely 
and so shapelessly that each one of them pulls its own way at every 
moment. And there is as much difference between us and ourselves as 
there is between us and other people (II: 1, p. 355; 537/pp. 126-127). 
 
Montaigne declares himself unable to utter a word about himself ‘entierement, 
simplement, et solidement’, repeating the terms he uses to describe divine wisdom (solide 
et entier) elsewhere. In contrast to divine unity, the position of the human subject is 
that of diversity and contradiction, within which different impulses war with one 
another and pull in different directions. The self is an admixture, not fully one’s 
own possession, and our identity with ourselves is just as fractured as the difference 
‘between us and other people’.  
 Montaigne’s internally diverse and intertextual or con-textual self contrasts 
sharply with the abstract Cartesian ‘I’ that it would later inspire. Montaigne and 
Descartes both suffered from the anxiety of influence; both attempted to separate 
themselves from inherited wisdom and to judge things ‘according to their own 
[individual] estimate’ (Montaigne 2013, III: 8, p. 376). But where Descartes deduced 
an ‘I’ mathematically, by subtracting all that is given or contingent in his 
constitution (including his own physical body), Montaigne plunged himself into the 
given in the form of extensive quotations from other works and in his extended 
reflections on his own physical body. In contrast to Descartes’ internalist 
conception of knowledge that sacrifices the world for a unified ‘I’ and creates the 
problem of how to recover the world, Montaigne’s non-identical subject is 
inextricably linked to the world precisely in its difference from itself. If there are no 
rigid boundaries between self and other, between one’s own text and the text of 
others, then self and other, subject and world, cannot be thought separately from 
one another. Before the question of knowledge of the world arises, Montaigne’s ‘I’ 
is already in the world, as a body (his ‘I’ is resolutely physical) and as a language 
user—as the site of others’ texts. The principle of ‘distinguo’ that Montaigne cites is 
particularly apt to his method. In formal logic, the distinguo is a distinction that 
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challenges the terms of a given proposition, demonstrating that the real subject of 
the argument is other than what it was thought to be. Montaigne’s writing continues 
to function as a distinguo in relation to the version(s) of scepticism that developed 
from Descartes and that continues to exert force over discussion in contemporary 
philosophy of mind and cognitive science.  
 Montaigne’s writing subject is granted integrity precisely through the refusal 
to sacrifice diversity. This is the import of his claim: ‘Tant ya que je me contredis bien à 
l’avanture, mais la verité, comme disoit Demades, je ne contredy point (2007, III: 2, p. 845).38 
The weaving of existing text into an intertext is at the same time the weaving of the 
self that Montaigne claims he is trying to understand. The underlying insight is that 
the process of understanding is also a creative process, and this is true both for the 
writer of the Essais and the reader. The mimetic representation or performance of 
self-reflection offers an occasion for the reader to creatively take up the task of self-
reflection for herself.  
 
Challenging norms of authority  
 Through his unauthorised borrowing from other texts,39 Montaigne places 
himself and his readers on a par with those authors whom he quotes, challenging 
traditional notions of authority both as they relate to authoring and to the right or 
ability to know more generally. Kierkegaard would be the first to develop a 
comprehensive account of how different styles of philosophical writing express 
different ethical positions vis-à-vis the reader, and how, viewed Socratically, 
authority is a stumbling block to helping others to the truth. Montaigne claims no 
great pretensions about the significance of his work for readers; in his preface to the 
reader he declares that he composed the Essais for ‘aucune fin que domestique et privée’ 
giving ‘nul consideration de ton service [celui du lecteur]’ (2007, p. 27). Yet these feints of a 
self-effacing author cannot disguise the philosophical ambitions of the Essais and in 
fact express precisely the kind of disclaimer one would expect from a work of 
philosophical therapy. The author offers no credentials; he makes no argument for 
the value of his text. He speaks to the reader intimately as ‘tu’ and promises only to 
give an honest portrait of himself: ‘je suis moy-mesme la matiere de mon livre’ (Ibid.). In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 38 ‘I may happen to contradict myself, but the truth, as Demades said, I never 
contradict’.  
 39 This is sometimes taken to the point of not including the author’s name. Montaigne 
takes ownership of these borrowed texts by remembering them, but allowing himself to forget 
where they come from.  
	  	  
47	  
choosing himself as the subject of his book, and in developing a lively and 
unpredictable form that emphasises the plasticity of the self, Montaigne provides a 
model for self-examination that refuses to decide the outcome in advance of the 
investigation. Staging the process of judgement as in a drama or a novel, the reader 
is able to exercise her powers of discernment in a quasi-fictional context.  
 Montaigne offers a number of model exercises of this kind within the work, 
and he often reflects explicitly on the problem of judgement, which had particular 
interest for him as a former magistrate. In ‘De l’experience’ he gives examples of legal 
cases in which the law – standing in for any system of general concepts – is 
inadequate to the empirical particulars of a case, arguing that no matter how many 
laws are created, they can never account for the complexity of particular situations. 
In one such example, Montaigne is approached by a group of labourers on his estate 
who have left behind a dying man in the woods. The man had been stabbed and left 
to die by an unknown assailant and begged for aid when the peasants passed by. 
Fearing they would be accused of the crime if they stopped to help, the peasants 
continued on their way and informed Montaigne of the man’s plight. Montaigne 
expresses pity for the dying man and feels disturbed by the lack of human feeling 
the peasants showed in refusing help to a fellow human being. Yet he is unable to 
condemn them; because of inequalities in the application of the law during the time, 
showing a kindness in this instance would almost certainly have led to the peasants 
being accused of having a hand in the stabbing. Montaigne follows this example 
with another case in which men condemned to death are later proved innocent 
through empirical evidence, but rather than set legal precedent for reversing 
judiciary decisions, the magistrate decides to let the sentence stand.  These cases 
reveal the inadequacy of general (here legal and moral) notions and the pitfalls of 
judgement, showing how easily one can be go astray either by failing to 
imaginatively take up the perspective of others or by stubbornly insisting on a 
particular way of seeing, even when it is revealed to be inadequate. While erring is 
an inevitable part of judgement, Montaigne seeks to provide a framework in which 
one becomes responsible for failing to see. 
 
De cecy suis-je tenu de responder, si je m’empesche moy-mesme, s’il y a de la vanité et 
vice en mes discours, que je ne sente point, ou que je ne soye capable de sentir en me le 
representant. Car il eschappe souvent des fautes à nos yeux: mais la maladie du 




What I am obliged to answer for is for getting myself tangled up, or if 
there is any inanity or defect in my reasoning which I do not see or 
which I am incapable of seeing once it is pointed out to me. Faults can 
often escape our vigilance: sickness of judgement consists in not 
perceiving them when they are revealed to us (II: 10, p. 429/p. 154). 
 
Learning to see anew and being able to change one’s perspective are the abilities 
that Montaigne most values in his own activity of self-examination, which is held up 
as a model for the reader. He warns against holding onto positions out of pride or 
habit, of dogmatically refusing to see. The ever-changing self that the provisional 
form of the essai allows Montaigne to present also warns the reader against the 
ethical pitfalls of understanding oneself as a fixed identity—a temptation that 
systematic accounts of human nature reinforce. The dialectic of selves and 
perspectives in the Essais thus not only serves to mirror the process of thought in 
motion but also trains the reader to become a better judge of herself and of the 
wider world.  
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  Chapter	  3:	  Concepts	  in	  conversation	  in	  the	  Humean	  essay	  
Just this: not text, but texture, not the dream 
But topsy-turvical coincidence, 
Not flimsy nonsense, but a web of sense. 
Yes it sufficed that I in life could find 
Some kind of link-and-bobolink, some kind 
Of correlated pattern in the game. 
 
- Nabokov, Pale Fire 
 
 In his very brief essay Of essay writing, Hume bemoans the hermetic quality of 
philosophy of ‘the last Age’ and envisions a ‘League betwixt the learned and 
conversible Worlds’ that would unite philosophical discourse with the lively, social, 
and dialogical features of conversation. His goal of relating philosophical discourse 
to a wider social and cultural context, a conversation already in progress, quite 
naturally leads him to adopt the genre of the essay, the modern form of which was 
inaugurated by Montaigne two hundred years earlier. Hume’s development of the 
philosophical essay, is, furthermore, a self-conscious response to foundationalist 
efforts to ground claims about the world, specifically in Academic or sceptical 
philosophy, a target he identifies directly in both the Essays and his Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding. In addition to the essay’s grounding in the sceptical 
tradition, Hume’s choice of the essay also anticipates the shift of focus in 20th-
century pragmatic and ordinary language philosophy away from abstract, 
foundationalist arguments and toward descriptive accounts of everyday kinds of 
knowing. The rhetorical features of Hume’s essays open up new ways of 
understanding how knowledge relies on prior social and linguistic conditions, and 
how philosophy ought to relate to these conditions. Where Montaigne focused 
primarily on the inconstance of temporal life, Hume turns his attention to 
demonstrating how arbitrary social practices in fact possess a relative stability over 
time, and, accepting the ancient sceptical problem of infinite regress, he sets out to 
rescue normative judgements in the absence of an absolute ground.  
 
Hume and scepticism 
 Like the other authors in this study, Hume’s choice of style is bound up 
with the particular challenges of sceptical philosophy. Hume fits into the tradition I 
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have called therapeutic scepticism in that his goal is not to rationally dismantle 
sceptical arguments or to dispel doubt by producing a reliable first principle but 
instead to find some way of coming to terms with the conditions and limitations of 
knowledge.  
 Hume pits his own ‘mitigated’ scepticism against the ‘excessive’ nature of 
Cartesian theoretical doubt and Hobbesian moral scepticism as well as ancient 
scepticism under the label of ‘Pyrrhonism’. This might place some strain on the 
notion that Hume belongs to a tradition modelled after the Neo-Pyrrhonians, since 
Hume attacks Pyrrhonism in no uncertain terms. However Popkin has argued 
(1951) – and the Treatise supports – that Hume understood the Pyrrhonian position 
to be equivalent to dogmatic (Academic) scepticism: the belief that certain 
knowledge is impossible because knowledge claims cannot be grounded in any 
adequate, that is, rational, way.40 Hume’s rejection of Pyrrhonism thus leaves open 
the possibility of linking Hume to the non-dogmatic, therapeutic reading of 
Pyrrhonian scepticism that I suggest in the first chapter. On the one hand, Hume 
accepts the conclusion of the dogmatic sceptics as inevitable given a certain kind of 
speculative philosophical approach: there simply is no way to prove the truth of 
one’s beliefs about the world beyond a shadow of a doubt. Yet like the ancient 
sceptics he fits the inevitability of doubt into a larger frame of common life and 
everyday kinds of justification.  
 Hume’s investment in the practical questions of common life is evident in 
the sharp dichotomy with which he begins his Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding between the moral philosophers, who view human beings as ‘chiefly as 
born for action’, and that ‘other species of philosophers’, who regard ‘human nature 
as a subject of speculation; and with a narrow scrutiny examine it, in order to find 
those principles, which regulate our understanding [...]’ (2007, p. 3).41 Hume’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   40 As we saw in the Chapter 1, Sextus Empiricus differentiates Pyrrhonism from this 
dogmatic position; the positive claim that one cannot know would contradict itself (if you can’t 
know, how do you know you can’t know?) and usher in an infinite regress, a problem that Sextus 
claims the Pyrrhonian sceptics were keen to avoid. Sextus’ account of Pyrrhonism, as described 
in the first chapter of this study, is in fact consistent with Hume’s own project, taking a 
therapeutic approach that seeks to cure people of the idea that foundational truths could ever be 
adequately established. In both cases, this is achieved not by offering rational arguments for the 
claim that absolute truths are impossible, but by criticising dogmatic claims of any kind as a way 
of getting back to practical life. 
 41 This vision of two species of philosophy is deliberately overstated for rhetorical 
effect, yet Hume’s opposition of a philosophy oriented toward speculative knowledge and one 
aimed at ethical formation still has relevance for the contemporary situation. The question of 
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primary target under the latter heading is ‘Academic or Sceptical’ philosophy, both 
in its ancient form – the dogmatic position that he associates with Pyrrhonism – and 
the Cartesian form, which:  
recommends an universal doubt, not only of all our former opinions 
and principles, but also of our very faculties; of whose veracity, say they, 
we must assure ourselves, by a chain of reasoning, deduced from some 
original principle, which cannot possibly be fallacious or deceitful 
(2007, p. 3). 
 
Hume denies that any such foundational, self-evident principle can be found (2007, 
p. 109), an assertion that could be regarded as self-refuting if it were pronounced as 
part of a positive proof, since the denial of the possibility of certain knowledge 
would then become dogmatic. However, Hume is well aware of the contradiction in 
this approach, which he describes in Enquiry Book XII Part II as using rational 
arguments to destroy reason (2007, p. 113). While recognising that scepticism is the 
logical outcome of a certain mode of philosophical argumentation and is 
‘impossible’ to refute (2007, p. 115), Hume will critique the position from outside of 
these conventions, by posing the question of the relationship between philosophical 
doubt and common life—chiefly by exposing the role of convention in human 
understanding and by undermining the philosophical tendency to look for the 
essential or necessary beyond the everyday. This shift in frame is key to the 
therapeutic task of reclaiming practical activity from the threat of doubt.   
 In Enquiry, Hume portrays sceptical doubt primarily as a form of 
amusement, which can be useful only insofar as it shows how little human beings 
actually rely on philosophically sound knowledge claims when acting in the world. 
He pokes gentle fun at the armchair philosopher42 who abandons his rigorously 
deduced positions in the face of any practical demands, as a sleeper waking from a 
dream. ‘The great subverter of Pyrrhonism or the excessive principles of scepticism is 
action, and employment, and the occupations of common life’ (2007, p. 115). While 
sympathetic to the project of rooting out prejudice and questioning received 
wisdom, Hume finds comedy in the sceptic’s pretence to doubt everything while at 
the same time continuing to live and act in the world.43 For the good-natured 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
whether therapeutic scepticism is philosophy or anti-philosophy hinges on whether one sees the 
goal of philosophy as knowledge or some more fundamental, practical orientation.	  	  	   42 Burnyeat’s ‘country gentleman’. Burnyeat, 1984, p. 231. 
 43 Enquiry 12:2:4. The precise target of these remarks is likely Descartes, who in 
Discours de la Méthode, Part III, feels compelled to establish moral guidelines for himself while 
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Hume, the ‘whimsical condition of mankind’ – moved to seek out rational 
foundations for human experience and yet always already bound by ‘natural’ 
(including social and linguistic) conditions44 – requires forbearance, and a healthy 
measure of irony, rather than despair.  
 Yet what if the speculative metaphysical project of grounding knowledge 
claims were, after all, to be held consistently—if the sceptic attempted to live in 
accord with his own theoretical views? To Hume such a category error would be 
catastrophic since, if theoretical doubt held anything but a temporary influence on 
the mind, or exceeded its proper purview of speculative concepts, ‘all discourse, all 
action would immediately cease; and men remain in a total lethargy, till the 
necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable existence’ (2007, p. 
116). The descent into nihilism and inaction that Hume describes indeed seems the 
logical outcome of a certain understanding of scepticism whereby all of one’s 
foundational commitments must be abandoned because they are insufficiently 
grounded. It is significant that Hume includes ‘discourse’ among the activities that 
would fall away if the sceptic were to take his own ideas seriously. He implies that 
communication relies on some background of shared assumptions that the sceptic 
rejects, an idea that will be developed in greater detail in 20th-century ordinary 
language philosophy.45 Yet after introducing the danger he adds that, happily, ‘so 
fatal an event is very little to be dreaded’ (2007, p. 116). For Hume, the ‘natural’ will 
always assert itself against a philosophical principle (Ibid.)—which can demand 
rational assent but not the force of conviction or habit.46 ‘Nature’ for Hume has a 
double valence as both biological constitution – the basic needs that arise from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
he undertakes the project of speculative doubt. Having razed the great edifice of knowledge to the 
ground, Descartes seeks a place he can be ‘logé commodément pendant le temps qu'on y 
travaillera’. Descartes does not appear fazed by this glaring gap between practical life and 
philosophical activity. 
 44 ‘When he awakes from his dream, he will be the first to join in the laugh against 
himself, and to confess, that all his objections are mere amusement, and can have no other 
tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind, who must act and reason and believe; 
though they are not able, by their most diligent enquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the 
foundation of these operations, or to remove the objections, which may be raised against them’ 
(2007, p. 117). 
 45 See Chapter 6.  
 46 ‘If belief, therefore, were a simple act of the thought, without any peculiar manner of 
conception, or the addition of a force and vivacity, it must infallibly destroy itself, and in every 
case terminate in a total suspense of judgement’ (Treatise, 1:4:1:8, 2007, p. 123). Neil Gascoigne 
summarises Hume’s insight: ‘It is a feeling – something that the theoretical attitude cannot 
accommodate – that rescues him from his scepticism. This discovery leads to the awareness that 
custom and habit have obscured a general feature of our practically oriented beliefs: feeling and 




being the kinds of creatures we are – and habit, which is shaped by social 
institutions and carries the force of a second nature.  
 The figures of the armchair sceptic and the fanatical doubter are part of a 
rich rhetorical strategy by means of which Hume makes the reader complicit in the 
notion that the practical attitude is more primary than the theoretical attitude and 
thus that the latter must in some sense acknowledge the former. Hume counts on 
his readers seeing something amiss in a philosopher who, in the first case, does not 
live as he thinks, and, in the second case, is so devoted to thought that he forgets to 
eat and eventually expires. Recognising the humour in both cases requires a sense 
that there is something erroneous or ridiculous about thinking that is cut off from 
what Hume calls ‘natural necessities’. It appears to be either hypocrisy or an extreme 
form of self-denial, a radical rejection of the conditions of life. Hume uses humour 
here to call attention to the practical attitude as the shared human condition, one 
that not only forms the sine qua non of conceptual thought but that, further, fixes the 
bounds of meaningful enquiry. Hume’s first example – that of the sceptic who, 
though he may doubt the existence of the world or the possibility of ever knowing 
what is true, still takes his tea, votes, falls in love, avoids walking into traffic47 – is a 
reminder that actions are not grounded in rational certainty about what is the case. 
Furthermore, beliefs cannot be grounded in this way, since beliefs about the nature 
of things form part of a pre-existing web of commitments – conscious and 
unconscious – from which the subject can never fully be extricated. Hume calls into 
question the value of a tradition that seeks to ground knowledge claims in a logically 
consistent way while overlooking the background of empirical, historical, and 
emotional grounding that gives to these claims their force and significance.   
 It is important to note that Hume does not simply take for granted the 
primacy of the practical attitude or quotidian existence but offers a way of talking 
about the everyday philosophically, as the condition of possibility within which the 
activity of investigating the world takes place. For Hume, a philosophy that ignores 
or seeks to overcome ‘the necessities of nature’ is prone to self-deception. The kind 
of grounding sought in foundationalist philosophy does not take into account the 
prior empirical (biological, linguistic, and institutional) ground of beliefs and actions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 47 This is a variation of Johnson’s refutation of Berkley’s idealism: kicking a stone and 
proclaiming, ‘I refute it thus!’. It also calls to mind G.E. Moore’s notorious refutation of 
Cartesian metaphysical scepticism in which he proves the existence of the external world by 
holding out his hands and declaring, ‘Here is one hand. And here is another’. 
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and thus is blind to the effect this prior environment might have on the 
investigation itself. The risk for Hume, as for Montaigne, is that whatever ideal or 
systematic accounts philosophy is able to produce will smooth over and so fail to 
comprehend and account for the complex ways in which people actually behave.  
 On this reading, the demands of common life provide the limits of 
meaningful philosophical investigation, and, in a manner similar to ancient 
scepticism, the aim is to be cured of the worry that life is contingent on right 
knowledge. As Hume declares, ‘we must submit to this fatigue [a critique of 
sceptical philosophy] in order to live at ease ever after’ (2007, p. 8). Hume’s remark, 
though tinged with irony, recalls the ancient sceptical notion that the ‘healthy’ are 
able to come to terms with a lack of certain knowledge and achieve tranquillity 
through the continual suspension of belief. While many readers of Sextus, including 
Hume, have found this notion of a lived suspension of belief unintelligible on the 
grounds that beliefs of some kind are required in order to act, it can be argued that 
what Sextus meant by this attitude is in fact quite similar to what Hume eventually 
proposes. For Sextus, the suspension of belief is characterised by living in harmony 
with the conventions of one’s society, or ‘living naturally’. Hume devises a similar 
state of affairs in which what is called a belief ‘is more properly an act of the 
sensitive, than of the cognitive part of our natures’ and ‘derives force from repeated 
experience’ (Treatise, 1:4:1:8, 2007, p. 123). While Hume provides more room for the 
critique of societal convention than does Sextus, he constantly appeals to habit, 
custom and ‘common sense’ (often under the guise of ‘human nature’ or ‘the 
natural’) as a practical ground for action in lieu of a rational foundation. But where 
Sextus merely points to the practical attitude as the foil of ungrounded 
philosophical speculation, as that which everyone already understands and agrees 
upon, Hume devotes himself to understanding the conditions of ‘living naturally’, 
thereby representing the natural attitude as something of philosophical relevance in 
its own right.  
 Hume faced the challenge of showing that social practices and agreed upon 
linguistic conventions had priority over speculative arguments and that philosophy 
ought to allow everything to ‘remain precisely as before’ (Treatise 1:4:5, 2007, pp. 
164) rather than inadvertently making the world conform to philosophical fantasy.48 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 48 Compare to Wittgenstein, 2009, p. 55: 124. ‘Die Philosophie darf den tatsächlichen 
Gebrauch der Sprache in keiner Weise antasten, sie kann ihn am Ende also nur beschreiben. 
Denn sie kann ihn auch nicht begründen. Sie [Die Philosophie] läßt alles wie es ist  [Philosophy 
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The very bounds of what is considered relevant to philosophy, what constitutes a 
valid deductive argument or what counts as sufficient reason, are shown by Hume 
to be a matter of convention, historical accident endowed with the weight of 
necessity. This should not lead us to think that the alternative to excessive 
scepticism is a blind acceptance of cultural and biological imperatives. For while 
Hume often appeals to human nature, he also insists upon interrogating the various 
ways in which we come to regard practices and responses as natural, thus providing 
the possibility of a critical awareness of one’s own conditions.  
 
Writing therapeutically 
 Part of Hume’s strategy to reconcile philosophy with common life involves 
finding a way of writing to replace what he viewed as an exhausted vocabulary of 
scepticism. Instead of refuting the sceptical tradition directly, by way of 
philosophical arguments against scepticism, he responds indirectly by endeavouring 
to change the kinds of questions that philosophy asks and the kinds of answers that 
are deemed philosophically satisfactory, much in the same way as later pragmatists, 
such as Wittgenstein and Rorty.49 As a result, Hume is often described as 
rhetorically sidestepping or dodging philosophical problems. This is frequently the 
charge against those who take aim at the very terms or vocabulary of a philosophical 
problem. Yet, as Timothy Engström (1997) points out in his pragmatic reading of 
Hume, the Humean essay turns the tables by establishing ‘a framework and an ethos 
within which the philosopher risks becoming a comic figure unless sufficiently 
aware of the rhetorical and communal nature of his or her exercise’ (Engström, 
1997, p. 150), just as the sceptic becomes ridiculous by rejecting the conditions of 
life that make doubt possible. The difficulty facing Hume in his attempt to write his 
way to a new kind of philosophising can be imagined in terms set out by Richard 
Rorty (1991), writing about his own pragmatic response to the inherited problems 
of 20th-century philosophy.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
must not interfere in any way with the actual use of language, so it can in the end only describe it. 
For it cannot justify it either. It leaves everything as it is]’. 
 49 The numerous intellectual affinities between Hume and the pragmatists has been 
argued for convincingly elsewhere by Simon Blackburn (2008), Dennis C. Rasmussen (2013), 
and Leo Damrosch (1991), among others. On the level of form too, Hume’s essays anticipate this 
later tradition by addressing questions and evidence that lie outside traditional philosophical 




The trouble with arguments against the use of a familiar and time-
honoured vocabulary is that they are expected to be phrased in that 
very vocabulary. They are expected to show that central elements in 
that vocabulary are ‘inconsistent in their own terms’ or that they 
‘deconstruct themselves’. But this can never be shown. Any argument 
to the effect that our familiar use of a familiar term is incoherent, or 
empty, or confused, or ‘merely metaphorical’ is bound to be 
inconclusive and question-begging. For such use is, after all, the 
paradigm of coherent, meaningful, literal speech (1991, p. 9).   
 
 Hume faces the problem of an entrenched vocabulary of scepticism, one 
that cannot be refuted from within because it would merely beg the question of the 
ground on which this refutation could be based, thus opening up the abime of 
infinite regress described by the ancient sceptics. Faced with a vocabulary that has 
outlived its usefulness, Rorty asserts that ‘interesting’ philosophy simply begins to 
describe things in new ways in an attempt to demonstrate that this new vocabulary 
could be more useful or fruitful than the old.  
 
It does not pretend to have a better candidate for doing the same old 
things which we did when we spoke in the old way. Rather it suggests 
that we might want to stop doing those things and do something else. 
But it does not argue for this suggestion on the basis of antecedent 
criteria common to the old and the new language games, for just insofar 
as the new language is really new, there will be no such criteria (1991, p. 
9). 
 
The rejection of antecedent philosophical criteria is a helpful way of framing 
Hume’s choice of the essay. Though Rorty is not primarily interested in generic 
distinctions, textual form is a part of ‘vocabulary’ and helps to shape ways of 
reading and thinking. For Hume to point out the limitations of the deductive, 
scholastic style of argument that he found objectionable, and particularly for him to 
take on the difficult knot of foundationalism, he had to find an alternative way of 
writing that valorised experience and experimentation—one that would allow for an 
approximation of the truth through the testing and comparison of different 
perspectives. In its trying out of different approaches and points of view, the essay 
is the empirical genre par excellence.  
 A number of studies in recent years have taken a genre-conscious approach 
to Hume’s work, notably Richetti’s study of English empiricist rhetoric in 
Philosophical Writing (1983), the Lacanian-Deleuzian analysis of Hume’s essays in 
Robyn Ferrell’s Genres of Philosophy (2002), and Timothy Engström’s thoughtful 
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pragmatic reading of the Humean essay (1997). I share with Engström the concern 
that the prevailing reading practices in philosophy, which ‘privilege a particular kind 
of conceptual systematicity’, fail to appreciate the crucial role of the performative 
dimension of texts such as essays. This is particularly true in readings of Hume’s 
essay ‘Of the Standard of Taste’, which has been the subject of numerous misguided 
critiques in analytic aesthetics centring on the idea that Hume’s account is circular 
or insufficiently grounded.50 Hume’s calculated rhetorical strategy challenges many 
contemporary ideas about what a philosophical text ought to be, ideas that can in 
fact be traced back to Hume’s philosophical contemporaries. For J.S. Mill, Hume’s 
writings revealed an author for whom:  
 
regard for truth formed no part of his character [...] His mind was too 
completely enslaved by a taste for literature; not those kinds of 
literature which teach mankind to know the cause of their happiness 
and misery, that they may seek the one and avoid the other; but that 
literature which without regard for truth and utility, seeks only to excite 
emotion.51 
 
Though commentators on ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ are unlikely now to couch 
their criticisms in such nakedly Platonic terms, contemporary philosophers continue 
to be confounded by the use of ‘literary’ strategies in philosophical writings.52 
Essayistic modes of writing that exist on the margins between the literary and 
philosophical pose significant interpretive problems, with a tendency in academic 
philosophical analysis to extract essential conceptual content from non-essential form 
and so to miss the philosophical implications of ways of writing.  
 Hume’s empirical, inductive approach to philosophical questions is 
reinforced by his use of the essay form, which rejects a priori reasoning in favour of 
an experience-based dialectic that unfolds in time. As in Montaigne, Hume’s 
essaying makes a display of the provisional nature of all knowledge claims by 
appealing to and preserving the contradictions in everyday experience. Furthermore, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 50 See analyses of Hume’s essay in S.G. Brown (1938), Anthony Savile (1982), Mary 
Mothersill (1984), Jerrold Levinson (2002). 
 51 Quoted from Norman Kemp Smith, 1966, p. 519. See also Barnouw, 1978, pp. 852-
870.   
 52 Engström deals deftly with Savile’s attempt to translate Hume’s essay into a series of 
logical propositions. ‘Savile reduces the rhetoricity of Hume’s prose to logical form, assumes that 
form to be a better and clearer representation of Hume’s attentions, then makes a passing gesture 
toward Hume’s “elegant” style so as to skip over altogether the philosophical consequences of 
Hume’s choice of style, and finally ends of writing something that Hume expressly avoided. In 
effect, the logical formalism is an attempt to avoid writing’ (1997, p. 152). 
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the essay’s grounding in the first-person experience of the writer is, for the 
empiricist tradition and its aspiration to practice philosophy scientifically, a 
reminder that the subject’s role in holding the world together is crucial for any 
notion of objectivity. Starting from the singular observations of an individual 
subject, essays move toward inter-subjective consensus, with the voice of the one 
becoming the voice of many: the essay writer draws not from any particular 
authority but from a ‘common sense’ or from the powers of observation common 
to all. This emphasis on shared, conditioned experience, rather than an abstract 
‘view from nowhere’, is a key feature of the Humean essay and helps to reinforce 
Hume’s post-foundational vision of knowledge as historically and socially 
determined.  
 
‘Of the Standard of Taste’ 
 ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ is a case study in how Hume’s literary aim of 
uniting, in the essay form, two distinct vocabularies – that of the ‘learned’ and of the 
‘conversable’ world – serves Hume’s wider pragmatic project of connecting 
philosophical inquiry to everyday practices by justifying ordinary ways of speaking 
and knowing. In the essay, Hume attempts to get to the bottom of a paradox: while 
common sense tells us that ‘all sentiment is right’, or, ‘everyone is entitled to their 
opinion’, common sense also tells us that some judgements are better than others, 
and experience tells us that we’re likely to forget ‘the natural equality of tastes’ as 
soon as someone makes an aesthetic claim that we find offensive, e.g. J.K. Rowling 
is superior to Virginia Woolf. Philosophically, the problem with taste is that 
admitting the validity of subjective judgements (‘all sentiment is right’) threatens the 
possibility of any objective aesthetic standard (Woolf is better than J.K. Rowling). 
Hume’s approach is to step outside of the subject/object opposition, examining the 
linguistic and social conventions that contribute to pronouncements of taste with a 
view toward developing an account of their inter-subjective validity and relative 
stability over time. In seizing on instances of ‘what has been found – universally, in 
all countries and at all times – to please’ (p. 9) to establish a pragmatic standard, 
Hume’s essay is similar to a number of other 18th-century works on aesthetics, 
especially those of Addison and Shaftesbury.53 What makes Hume’s work of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 53 ‘In his essay on taste in Number 409 of Tbe Spectator (an important model for Hume's 
essay), Addison expresses confidence in the normative consensus established by works ‘which 
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particular interest is his performative strategy. Rejecting the method of establishing 
philosophical definitions of aesthetic terms, he sets out to describe how aesthetic 
concepts are used in ordinary speech in the context of the interests of a particular 
community. He then stages these concepts in a play of mutual refinement: a series 
of attempts and qualifications. His adherence to the conventional meanings of 
concepts such as ‘taste’ and ‘human nature’ and to the temporal, dialectical process 
whereby these meanings are established in practice constitutes a rejection of the 
foundationalist imperative to establish an absolute starting point. Yet without 
reverting to the any a priori absolute to ground moral or aesthetic claims, Hume also 
offers a method for establishing norms based on purely empirical criteria and on the 
shared background of consensus upon which language games rely.  
 ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ opens, in essayistic fashion, with a supplement, 
an ‘aside’ on the language of moral terminology – virtue and vice, good and bad – 
offering a sort of genealogy to demonstrate the ways in which moral judgements 
can be reduced, in practice, to statements of praise and blame.54 Hume does not go 
as far as Nietzsche to show the ways in which the material practices of power and 
punishment underwrite the meaning of these concepts; rather, he aims to show that 
general terms such as virtue, goodness, beauty, etc., are apt to confuse us into 
thinking that we have achieved some harmony in moral and, by analogy, artistic 
judgements when, in the particulars, we differ significantly.  
 
The sentiments of men often differ with regard to beauty and deformity 
of all kinds, even while their general discourse is the same. There are 
certain terms in every language, which import blame, and others praise; 
and all men, who use the same tongue, must agree in their application 
of them. Every voice is united in applauding elegance, propriety, 
simplicity, spirit in writing; and in blaming fustian, affectation, coldness, 
and a false brilliancy: But when critics come to particulars, this seeming 
unanimity vanishes; and it is found, that they had affixed a very 
different meaning to their expressions (1987, p. 168). 
 
Hume resists a definition of beauty that would provide the essence of the beautiful 
behind all individual uses of the term. He instead offers a description of how beauty 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
have stood the Test of so many different Ages and Countries’ and recommends (in Spectator 29) 
that the arts ‘deduce their Laws and Rules from the general Sense and Taste of Mankind, and not 
from the Principles of those Arts themselves; or in other Words, the Taste is not to conform to the 
Art, but the Art to the Taste’ (David Marshall, 1995, p. 324). 
 54 The analogy between moral and aesthetic judgement runs throughout Hume’s essay. 
The implicit assumption is that our moral terms, like our aesthetic judgements of good and bad, 
are used to express praise and blame within a context of socially negotiated desires and ends.  
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is employed in practice as a term of praise, of the same order as the moral concept 
‘good’. This descriptive account of moral-aesthetic terms anticipates Wittgenstein’s 
insight that understanding a concept means knowing how it is used, rather than 
being able to define it clearly or precisely. The person who pronounces a work of 
art beautiful expresses her approval of it within the context of ends valued by 
members of her linguistic community, while that which offends within this same 
context of values is called ugly.  
 Hume goes on to give examples of works from different cultures whose use 
of terms such as ‘justice’ appears to align with his own until the particular 
behaviours being described as ‘just’ are scrutinised; it becomes clear that barbarous 
acts are called just by those who benefit from them. From what perspective then are 
they barbarous? From the writer’s own, and from the norms of culture to which he 
belongs, which he assumes from the outset his readers share. Barbarity is just as 
relative to those it harms as the concept of good is to those it benefits.55 The relative 
understanding of moral terms must be borne in mind when examining any apparent 
moral agreement between cultures. One cannot, Hume argues, simply claim that the 
proper exercise of reason will lead all people to agree on what is good or beautiful. 
Difficulties arise in part from the nature of language itself, particularly in the use of 
general concepts.   
 
This great unanimity [of moral opinion] is usually ascribed to the 
influence of plain reason; which, in all these cases, maintains similar 
sentiments in all men, and prevents those controversies, to which the 
abstract sciences are so much exposed. So far as the unanimity is real, 
this account may be admitted as satisfactory: But we must also allow 
that some part of the seeming harmony in morals may be accounted for 
from the very nature of language (1987, p. 168). 
 
Hume’s remarks here suggest that concepts are misleading when frozen from the 
particular contexts in which they are applied, since it is the nature of concepts to 
synthesise what is different under a single name: language organises individual 
experience into conceptual categories. One philosophical approach to concepts – 
which Hume rejects – is to rein in the confusing and often contradictory ways they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 55 However, Hume balances this relativist perspective elsewhere by positing the shared 
biological and social needs of human beings that operate across cultures. Richard Rorty’s norm 
of reducing cruelty would be one way of thinking about a natural moral principle, since it relies 
only on the experience of embodiment and the desire to avoid pain, something that all human 
beings (and other animals) share. 
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are employed in everyday speech by providing clear definitions. These definitions 
then serve a prescriptive function as rules that clarify debates about the appropriate 
use of specific terms by rooting out those uses that stand in conflict with a precisely 
formulated definition. By contrast, Hume’s pragmatic approach to concepts does 
not admit of right or wrong usage per se, but rather describes the way concepts are 
used by different groups of speakers within an existing web of commitments or 
goals. The suggestion is that there is no way to get beyond or behind particular uses 
of language to a truer or more precise understanding of concepts. On the contrary, 
our most precise understanding of concepts comes from understanding how they 
are concretely embodied and authorised. Hume does not claim that barbarous acts 
are indistinguishable from acts of heroism, but underlines that all such judgements 
take place within a cultural horizon, and that to ignore how concepts are culturally 
embodied leads to a covering over of real differences between cultures and peoples. 
The consequence of this smoothing over of difference, which for Hume is all-too-
common practice in philosophy, is the substitution of a convenient fantasy of 
universal consensus for an inconvenient reality. Hume at times appears to be guilty 
of just this kind of error in his reliance on terms like human nature and the ‘natural’, 
but there is a difference between Hume’s rhetorical attempt to persuade by finding 
or creating common ground and a philosophical claim of unanimity that, in 
Adorno’s words, seeks ‘to eliminate the irritating and dangerous elements of things 
that live within concepts’ (1984, p. 160). Difference can be a destabilising force, and 
the recognition of real difference where it exists opens the way for a philosophy that 
is better able to forge meaningful, non-totalitarian models of consensus.  
 In Hume’s account then, a definition that offered specific qualities of 
beauty, such as ‘beauty is the form of the good’ or ‘beauty is harmonious 
arrangement’ would simply be tautological, since the predicates attached to the word 
beauty would function as synonyms, specifically terms of praise for what gives 
pleasure, which would still leave one at a loss for how to apply the term in a specific 
context. The difficulty with judgements of taste, or indeed any conceptual 
judgement, is precisely in knowing when it is appropriate to apply a general concept. 
How does one attach the word ‘love’ to a particular experience or ‘beautiful’ to a 
particular object? Hume declines to provide any a priori rules for this process and 
instead offers examples of what is ‘obvious’56 or what ‘everyone knows’, appealing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 56 The word and its variants occur many times throughout the essay. 
	  	  
62	  
to the concrete social practices that shape a subject’s application of concepts. 
Speaking about the norms of artistic composition, Hume claims:  
 
Their foundation is the same with that of all of the practical sciences: 
experience; nor are they anything but general observations, concerning 
what has been universally found to please in all countries and in all ages 
(1987, p. 170).  
 
 
 While pointing to the unconscious rules that govern language use and 
composition, Hume expresses disdain for the kind of conceptual clarity that would 
dismiss non-philosophical language as imprecise or set up a standard by which 
artistic works ought to be judged.  
 
To check the imagination’s outbursts, and reduce every 
expression to geometrical truth and exactness [...] would 
produce a work of a kind that universal experience had 
shown to be the most insipid and disagreeable (1987, p. 
170).57 
 
Hume’s lack of interest in purifying concepts from their everyday use or in 
prescribing how specific concepts ought to be used puts him at odds with much of 
the philosophical tradition, for whom his arguments appear circular and lacking in 
rigour. Yet Hume insists that the ‘merit of delivering true general precepts in ethics 
[and by extension in aesthetics] is indeed very small. Whoever recommends any 
moral virtues, really does no more than is implied in the terms themselves,’ 
suggesting that, at least for ethical-aesthetic concepts, a ‘true’ or useful account will 
have to incorporate the many contingencies of lived experience. Indeed, Hume is 
careful in his account of taste to emphasise all of the ‘delicate’ springs of perception 
and judgement, which can differ from person to person (1987, p. 171). He at times 
suggests that if the human form were to achieve machine-like perfection and 
regularity, everyone could agree on what is beautiful (1987, p. 172). But in the 
progression of the essay, he tempers this passive notion of perception with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 57 Hume shares this insight with Herder, who, writing about the origin of language 
(1767-1768) expresses his relief that the Creator was not a grammarian who would have ‘ordered 
what he saw into classes and washed away the excess’ (Herder, 2004, p. 64). Every effort should 
be made to understand how language games function—but the goal of conceptual clarity should 
not be to proscribe speech and should not be the basis for a misguided attempt to make ordinary 




active practices of the critic,58 and, further, suggests that differences in personality 
and the dispositions arising from different stages of human life will always lead to 
some ‘innocent’ variation of taste (1987, p. 179), which no singular standard can 
resolve. ‘At twenty, Ovid may be the favourite author; Horace at forty; and perhaps 
Tacitus at fifty’. Hume’s unwillingness to smooth over these empirical differences in 
order to make the grounds of aesthetic consensus more solid is not an oversight but 
an essential part of his rhetorical strategy. In exploring the empirical conditions of 
aesthetic judgement, Hume also offers a ground for deciding which variations of 
taste are worth arguing about and thus what species of justification are 
philosophically useful.   
 What is seen by some as Hume’s failure to provide a philosophically 
rigorous account of how aesthetic judgements might have a dimension of 
universality is in fact a misreading of the genre of the essay, which is defined by a 
mistrust of the kind of conceptual rigour that is being demanded. In essayistic 
writing, process is truth, and Hume’s essays, perhaps more than any other example of 
the genre, gain their precision through a gradual refinement of (often contradictory 
or apparently contradictory) ideas that unfolds in the process of reading, not shying 
away from contradiction. The rigour that is achieved in an essay has to do, in the 
terms set out by Lukács, with the fidelity to the phenomena that one has set out to 
better understand. Hume’s method is to faithfully describe how aesthetic terms are 
used and how disagreements about taste can be adjudicated in common life. This 
rhetorical move points to the philosophical insight that, 1) while norms cannot be 
given a priori, practical rules of engagement exist which govern a community’s use of 
terms and forms of justification, rules which will met with recognition if one is 
made aware of them, and that 2) drawing back from the historically-specific norms 
of a given culture, one in fact can recognise relatively stable aesthetic norms across 
time (1987, p. 178, 181)—for example the enduring worth of Homer or Milton. 
Within this approach, Hume is able to account for the wide variety of taste as well 
as provide some necessary, though not a priori, conditions for judgement. 
 The challenge of such an account is that, viewed from within the traditional 
philosophical aims of conceptual clarity and systematicity, the essay simply mirrors 
back the imprecision and variability of everyday kinds of knowing and speaking, in 
effect, ‘betraying the intended matter to the arbitrariness of previously decreed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 58 For an account of the tension between these two claims, see Carroll (1984). 
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significations’ (Adorno, 1984, p.160).	  Where speculative philosophical accounts err 
in subtracting the transitory in order to achieve the eternal and universal, Hume’s 
alternative, in its fidelity to the transitory or contingent, threatens to unravel into 
total relativity or incomprehensibility. In contrast to the ‘geometrical truth and 
exactness’ of speculative philosophical works, the concepts in Hume’s essay gain 
precision only through their relation to and difference from one another, existing as 
part of a conceptual web. This rhetorical choice is not a failure to recognise the 
standards that the tradition imposes, but rather a performative way of challenging 
those standards. In Hume, the contingent, ephemeral forms in which ideas appear 
are not separable from the ideas themselves. These forms are not only relevant but 
crucial to rigorous philosophical investigation, since it is only by acknowledging 
them that philosophers are able to get any purchase on their own presuppositions 
and avoid unwitting dogmatism. Essays stand apart from other genres of 
philosophical composition in elaborating concepts ‘as part of the process in which 
they are temporally embodied’ (Adorno, 1984, p. 160). In Wittgensteinian terms, 
concepts are embedded in the specific language games of a community, and, rather 
than possessing fixed meanings, they are constantly refined as part of an on-going 
dialectic with other concepts and with broader social aims. Hume’s introductory 
‘aside’ on moral language is meant to emphasise our cultural, practical investment in 
concepts such as ‘beautiful’ and ‘good’, lest we lose sight of these ends in the 
attempt to clarify these concepts philosophically.  
 A helpful formulation of the philosophical significance of Hume’s dialectical 
or contextual approach in essay is found in Adorno, who in ‘Essay as Form’ lays 
bare the ways in which meaning is or might be constructed:  
 
The essay perceives that the longing for strict definitions has long 
offered, through fixating manipulations of the meanings of concepts, to 
eliminate the irritating and dangerous elements of things that live within 
concepts (1984, p. 160). 
 
The danger of a certain kind of philosophical rigour, a certain conception of what it 
means to know, is that the everyday practices that lend meaning to our words and 
provide the ground for any kind of understanding whatsoever are cast aside for a 
more precise method of forming propositions and justifying claims. As in 
Montaigne, the worry is that what the philosopher sets out to know is changed, in 
the process of adopting a conceptual and rhetorical scheme, into something 
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unrecognisable, a fantasy. This is not to suggest that there is any natural or 
transparent means of representation, any neutral model that philosophy could 
adopt. Rather, it is an acknowledgement that representation always involves 
philosophical choices, and that the essay’s dialectical, contextual presentation of 
concepts retains a dimension of the complexity and ambiguity of everyday language 
and of ‘things’. The ‘irritating and dangerous elements of things’ is a reference to the 
disturbing fact, which Hume acknowledges, that the world could be otherwise than 
our way of imagining it, that our understanding of what is is a reflection of habit and 
is in constant negotiation.  
 
The ethics of essaying 
 Hume’s conversational style also reflects an interest in the ethics governing 
discourse as such—as an encounter between human beings, author and reader.  
He recognises the motive force of emotion at the root of judgement, and so part of 
the aim of the implied author is to develop the sentiments of the reader through 
performance or example, drawing the reader into the conversation by creating 
opportunities for agreement and dissent and thereby staging the kind of 
conversations we can have about matters of taste (Engström, 1997). We have 
already seen how he uses humour, specifically irony, to create a sense of common 
ground with the reader from which flows his critique of the excesses of speculative 
thinking that ignores this common ground of ‘natural necessities’. Through the use 
of irony, he sets a tone for the discussion, ‘a context, an ethos, an attitude in which 
on-going argument does or does not take root’ (Engström, 1997, p. 168). This 
contrasts with the authoritative form of the systematic or deductive argument, 
which demands consent through the rigorous application of method. He also 
appeals to the shared experience of reader and author by offering examples of 
common sense that are meant to be immediately recognisable. To return to the 
beginning of the essay, Hume opens with the observation that everyone knows 
there is great disagreement of taste among individuals. But he then makes the 
apparently contradictory claim, also authorised by common sense, that there is vast 
agreement about which artworks are worthy of being passed down from one 
generation to the next. On the one hand, this is a neat rhetorical trick that creates 
the sense that we are talking about the same thing when we’re talking about 
common sense, when in fact common sense – the mechanism of consensus – is 
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precisely what is being interrogated. In addition, in alternating between conflicting 
common senses, the essay offers a sense of progression in the form of an ever more 
detailed and faithful survey of the terrain, and what Adorno calls the ‘texture’ of the 
concepts at play, exemplifying an essayistic mode of expression that ‘rescues, in 
precision, what the refusal to outline sacrifices’ (Adorno, 1984, p. 160). ‘Of the 
Standard of Taste’ preserves the value of the things ‘everybody knows’ and the 
process of coming to consensus while at the same time refining our understanding 
of what it is that we (readers) all know and agree to be true. The sense of 
progression in Hume’s essay relies in large part on a spatial trope of moving from 
the general to the particular to the general, switching the focus back and forth from 
particular empirical differences of delicacy, attention, humour, impartiality, etc. to 
wider agreements in aesthetic judgement between individuals and over time. This 
movement suggests that general principles or truths are born out of these 
particulars, and that patterns can be discerned, some sense amidst individual 
difference. The human nature to which Hume frequently appeals is not something 
to be delimited through definition; rather it is the collected weight of history, of 
convention: a kind of on-going game in which everyone participates. 59 We 
recognise, through the presence of regularities over time, that the game is governed 
by rules of some kind, though we make up the rules as we go along and are often 
entirely unaware of what they are. These rules, while not grounded in a priori 
principles, carry the weight of necessity, since they make meaningful 
communication possible. Indeed Hume claims that a ‘very violent effort is requisite 
to change our judgement of manners, and excite sentiments of approbation or 
blame, love or hatred, different from those to which the mind from long custom 
has been familiarised’ (1987, p. 181). Hume reminds us that conventions, second 
nature, are the product of our own activity, the activity of individuals, yet when we 
draw back from our ‘narrow circle’ (1987, p. 171) to look at group activity across 
time and space, we see patterns emerge, like a school of fish collectively changing 
direction. This account offers a sense in which the ‘natural’ or the ‘necessary’ can be 
understood without dogmatically appealing to foundational principles and without 
ignoring the real differences between individuals and cultures. It also allows for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 59 Human nature then could be understood as a collective fate, a pattern seen only in 





possibility of change by insisting that norms have no other source or authoritative 
force than the experience of human beings.  
 Hume describes the ideal critic or judge as a person possessing ‘strong 
sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, 
and cleared of all prejudice’ (p. 177). But no sooner does he offer this definition 
than he immediately raises the ‘embarrassing’ question of how such a critic could 
ever be known, and thus how an ultimate arbiter of taste could be established (Ibid.) 
He comes to the conclusion that there is no way to positively identify a good critic, 
and that when ‘doubts occur, men can do no more than in other disputable 
questions, which are submitted to the understanding: They must produce the best 
arguments, that their invention suggests to them [...]’ (p. 178). While some have read 
this as a problem of circularity or regress in Hume’s work, moving the problem of 
how to adjudicate disagreements about taste back one level to the problem of how 
to identify a reliable critic (see Carroll, 1984), Hume’s own claim is that in arguing 
for the criteria such a critic would need to have, he has shown that ‘such a character 
is valuable and estimable’, which is a pronouncement that ‘will be agreed in by all 
mankind’. By extension, ‘it is sufficient for our present purpose, if we have proved, 
that the taste of all individuals is not upon an equal footing [...]’ (p. 178). Viewed in 
this way, Hume’s essay can be read as a staging of the kind of judgement and 
process of consensus that he views as ideal, without departing from the ordinary 
conditions of conversation. In focusing on the ideal conditions under which to view 
a work or art, he is at the same time describing what is required to make good 
judgements in general, and in the progressive, shifting form of his essay, he engages 
the reader in a constantly renewed process of evaluation, thus providing a training 
ground for the reader’s judgement. In addition, through his use of terms such as 
‘common sense’ and ‘natural’, which rhetorically bring readers to common ground, 
he is able to stage the kind of consensus he argues is necessary to move from 
individual judgement to the level of inter-subjective consensus that provides a 
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  Chapter	  4:	  Infinite	  approximation	  in	  the	  German	  Romantic	  Fragment	  	  
   
Clov: Do you believe in the life to come? 




Jedes System ist nur Approximation seines Ideals. Die ‘sx’ [Skepsis] ist ewig 
[Every system is only an approximation of its ideal. Scepticism is 
perennial].  	  
-F. Schlegel, fragment 114960  
 
 Montaigne and Hume occupy two points on the spectrum of the essayistic 
mode, both positioning themselves against ‘neutral’ philosophical language and 
against speculative structures that would impose order on experience a priori, rather 
than interrogating the conditions of experience from within those very conditions. 
We saw in Hume a reaction, in particular, against the notion of a ‘single principle’ 
that would act as the criterion in claims of knowledge or judgements of taste. The 
early German Romantics follow Hume in rejecting the possibility of a single 
foundational principle and, like Montaigne, opt for a mode of writing that allows for 
difference and emphasises the temporal unfolding of knowledge through experience 
and comparison. The fragments61 of Friedrich Schlegel, Novalis and the other 
members of the Athenäum circle can be situated within a larger genre of therapeutic 
essayism, though they must also be understood within their immediate idealist 
context, which shapes the foundationalist conception of knowledge to which they 
objected as well as the kind of writing they envisioned as a cure. One of the 
difficulties confronting readers of Romantic fragments is that the texts are steeped 
in the technical vocabulary of Kantian and Fichtean philosophy, often used playfully 
or ironically, a feature that sometimes renders them obscure. Some effort must be 
made to explain the rather dense philosophical milieu in which the fragments are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   60 KFSA XVIII, 2006, p. 417: 1149 
 61 To avoid clutter, I have omitted the full references for the Kritische Fragmente and 
the Athenäums-Fragmente, which are hereafter referred to as KF and AF. Those wishing to read 
the KF and AF in the original German should consult KFSA II, 1967, pp. 145-163, 165-255. 
Citations of other material from the Early Romantic authors include a reference for the original 
German and, where a translation has been used, for the English reference as well. 
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situated, yet without losing sight of the larger context of the anti-foundationalist, 
anti-systematic essayism to which I will argue the fragments belong. The challenge 
in this chapter will thus be to balance an account of the particular innovations of 
the Romantic fragment – which are significant – with an account of its membership 
in a larger generic (or, more properly, modal) whole. As in Montaigne, the 
relationship between part and whole, between attempt and completion is one of the 
central questions occasioned by the Romantic fragment collections. In their effort 
to give meaning or shape to the everyday through its relationship to a horizon of 
being as a whole, they guard against dissolution into absolute difference on the one 
hand and false unity on the other.  
The early Romantic period (Frühromantik) is datable to around 1797-1800, 
the years of the publication of the avant-garde literary, philosophical, and critical 
journal the Athenäum, which was conceived by brothers Friedrich Schlegel and A.W. 
Schlegel and featured contributions from a circle of (mostly very young) writers and 
intellectuals including Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg) and Friedrich 
Schleiermacher. The publication of the Athenäum marks a turning point in the 
history of philosophy, which can be characterised as the moment at which 
philosophy becomes self-critical, becomes, in Friedrich Schlegel’s words, ‘the 
philosophy of philosophy’ (KA XVIII, 2006, p. 37: 197). This critical impulse 
involved an examination of the conditions under which certain philosophical 
questions came to be asked or under which understanding was possible at all, 
including – with the rise of modern language theory in J.G. Hamann (1730–1788) 
and J.G. Herder (1744-1803) – questions of presentation or form that had for the 
most part been relegated to the study of rhetoric or aesthetics. One of the central 
ways in which the Athenäum lived up to its self-critical imperative was in its focus on 
the appropriate presentation (Darstellung) of ideas or the relationship between ideas 
and form. The rhetorical self-awareness of the Athenäum gave a distinctly literary 
cast62 to many of the writings, putting them stylistically at odds with the idealist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 62 The literary character of the writings and the (false) assumption of a generally anti-
rational, mystical bent among early Romantic practitioners led to German Romanticism being 
cast as a literary movement, insufficiently serious to warrant philosophical study. It is only with 
the publication of some of the primary and secondary texts into English and French* in the past 
four decades that English language studies of these authors have begun to appear alongside them 
and to demand that the Romantics be taken seriously as a philosophical movement. Chief among 
those writing about the philosophical relevance of the Romantics in English are Andrew Bowie 
and Fredrick Beiser, both of whom take pains to explain the 18th-century philosophical context 
out of which Romanticism was born. Additionally, Bowie traces the legacy of these thinkers to 
debates in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. Along with German sources such as 
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philosophical treatises of their mentors Reinhold and Fichte and with the type of 
systematic philosophy in which Hegel was engaged during the same period. They 
cultivated a variety of formal techniques to deliberately and methodically upset the 
expectations of their readers. The tone of the Athenäums-Fragmente is worldly, ironic, 
paradoxical, and polemical, and they treat a diverse range of subjects from philology 
to Greek literature to logic, metaphysics, politics, sexual emancipation, and moral 
theory. The writing style is a pastiche of vocabulary from Kantian and Idealist 
philosophies, the aphoristic tradition of the French moralistes, and what would now 
be recognised as ‘literary criticism’. Fragment collections in the Athenäum were 
composed collectively63 and anonymously, in a complete rejection of the ‘authority’ 
and self-identity of the author. 
 The peculiarities of the fragments make it tempting to treat them as a genre 
in their own right, a ‘law unto themselves’, as they indeed claim to be (KF 66, AF 
116). This was the approach of Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, who argued that, ‘In 
fact, only a single ensemble, published [in the Athenäum journal] with the one-word 
title Fragments, corresponds entirely (or as much as possible) to the fragmentary ideal 
of romanticism, notably in that it has no particular object and in that it is 
anonymously composed of pieces by several different authors’ (Lacoue-Labarthe 
and Nancy, 1988, p. 40). While the authors briefly mention the influence of the 
French moralistes, particularly Chamfort and La Rochefoucauld, on F. Schlegel, they 
opt to treat the Athenäums-Fragmente as something radically new, different in kind 
even from the other fragment collections – either unfinished or intentionally 
fragmented – that Schlegel and Novalis left behind. When they gesture toward any 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Walter Benjamin, Hans Dieter, Peter Klaus, Ernst Behler, and Manfred Frank and the exceptional 
French contribution, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s L’absolue littéraire, the terrain for the study 
of the Frühromantik has been given a definite shape, with a clear set of epistemological, 
linguistic, aesthetic, and ethical considerations coming to the fore.  
 *A by no means exhaustive sampling of these texts includes: Schlegel’s Lucinde and a 
selection of his fragments translated into English by Peter Firchow in 1971; the Athenäum 
materials translated into French by Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy for their 1976 study L’absolue 
littéraire (unfortunately the English version of this text includes only the analysis and not the 
source materials themselves); Ernst Behler’s English translation of Schlegel: Dialogue on Poetry 
and Literary Aphorisms in 1968; a range of Frühromantik texts translated in German Aesthetic 
and Literary Criticism: the Romantic Ironists and Goethe, ed. Kathleen Wheeler, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984); the English translation of Ernst Behler’s Philosophy of 
German Idealism, published in 1987; Novalis’ philosophical writings translated in 1997 by 
Margaret Mahoney Stoljar; Andrew Bowie’s translations of Schelling in 1993 and 
Schleiermacher in 1998; and the 2003 English translation of Manfred Frank’s lectures on the 
‘Philosophical Foundations of Early German Romanticism’. 
 63 The extent to which this collective ideal was realised is called into question by the fact 
that Friedrich Schlegel was responsible for the bulk of the fragment contributions as well as for 
the editing of others’ contributions. 
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wider conception of (literary) genre, essais are treated as a subset of fragments, a 
genre of ‘essential incompletion’ that ‘includes 18th-century works such as Lavater’s 
Physiognomical Fragments and Lessing’s Fragments of an Anonymous Person’ (1988, p. 42). 
The authors’ limited comments about genre largely cohere with the framework of 
the ‘essayistic mode’ elaborated in the present study and reflect a degree of 
arbitrariness in the designation given to the ‘master mode’, discussed in the opening 
chapter. My preference for the term ‘essayistic’ over ‘fragmentary’ has to do with 
emphasis on attempt in the former. The Romantic fragments are conceived by F. 
Schlegel as part of an ‘infinite’ attempt to achieve totality. That the activity is infinite 
implies an ultimate failure to achieve what is sought, but the failure is not viewed 
tragically, as it came to be viewed in modernism. Rather, it is seen as an 
impossibility that breeds creativity, that spurs subjects on to ever more attempts. In 
this sense, the term essayistic seems more appropriate to describe Romantic 
authorship, though ‘incompletion’ is a defining characteristic of both fragmentary 
and essayistic writing, and the three terms have been used interchangeably in this 
study. Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s treatment of the Athenäums-Fragmente as 
singular ultimately proves unsatisfying even on the texts’ own terms, and the 
decision to bracket a number of questions about the relationship of the Athenäums-
Fragmente to previous literary-philosophical hybrids has relegated to other scholars 
the task of establishing this relationship. I will try to further the authors’ 
constructive and thought-provoking work of reading the Romantic fragments 
through a post-Kantian lens while also insisting on the value of seeing fragment 
collections as part of a wider performative strategy of essayism. The therapeutic end 
of essayism – to cure readers of the idea that certain knowledge is the ultimate aim 
of philosophy – appears here as rejection of foundationalist thinking. But the 
Romantics also bring into focus the limits and temptations of essayism by 
committing themselves to the ever-receding goal of unified or total understanding. 
 
Anti-foundationalism and thinking in circles  
 Some understanding of the philosophical environment in 18th-century 
Germany is required to appreciate how the Romantic project might be considered 
therapeutic in the sense used in this study and how the stylistic choice of fragments 
contributes to this end. The group that came to be known as the Athenäum circle 
first met while studying in Jena, an intellectual hub in the 1790s boasting two 
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prominent lecturers in idealism, Karl Reinhold and J.G. Fichte. Both sought to 
further Kant’s transcendental project by finding a grounding principle that would 
bridge the divide between subject and object, mind and world, which Kant was seen 
to have left open64 and which made Kantian philosophy vulnerable to the problems 
of scepticism on the one hand or determinism on the other: how can we know that 
the world conforms to our ideas about it, and how can we been sure that all of our 
actions aren’t determined (finally caused) by the world?   
 Fichte conceived of his Wissenschaftslehre (1794-1795) as a re-presentation of 
Kant’s system in a different form, one that would successfully introduce into ‘the 
whole human being that unity and connection that so many systems lack’ (Fichte, 1971, 
p. 295, quoted in Reid, 2003, pp. 243-244). The way that both Reinhold and Fichte 
set out to establish this unity was by locating a self-evident first principle (Grundsatz) 
in subjectivity itself, from which a coherent system of philosophical propositions 
could be derived.65 The idealist project promised both to unify mind and nature and 
to lend philosophy more scientific rigour by deriving objectivity from the process of 
self-reflection. During their time as students at Jena, members of what would 
become the Athenäum circle took part in debates about the possibility of a 
foundational starting principle or absolute ground for philosophy, in direct 
conversation with Reinhold and Fichte. Novalis, who was a student of Reinhold in 
the early 1790s, was part of a group of students who began to doubt the tenability 
of foundationalism (Frank, 2003, pp. 33ff), while maintaining the aim of a unified 
philosophical system. In his notebooks from the period, Novalis suggests that the 
absolute unifying principle should function more as a regulative ideal, as a goal 
toward which to orient philosophy rather than a grounding principle given at the 
beginning of the system.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 64 Kant’s emphasis on the conditions of possibility of the phenomenal world of 
appearances had stressed the fundamental role of the subject in all truth claims. However, he was 
logically forced to admit the presence of a noumenal world of ‘das Ding an sich’, which was not 
available to consciousness as such: ‘though we cannot know these objects as things in 
themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think them as things in themselves; otherwise 
we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that 
appears’ (Critique of Pure Reason, Bxxvi-xxvii). 
 65 Reinhold and Fichte sought a starting point that would be clear and available to 
everyone as a general feature of consciousness and settled on the basic experience of self-
conscious or self-positing structure of the I. In self-consciousness, the I represents itself to itself, 
becoming both a subject, the I doing the thinking, and an object, the I being thought about. For a 
more detailed discussion of this philosophical position, see Paul Redding, 2009, pp. 103-113 and 
Manfred Frank's Unendliche Annäherung: Die Anfänge der philosophischen Frühromantik, Vol. 
1 (1997).  
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Was thu ich, indem ich filosofire? [...] Alles Filosofiren muß also bey 
einem absoluten Grunde endigen. Wenn dieser nun nicht gegeben wäre, 
wenn dieser Begriff eine Unmöglichkeit enthielte – so wäre der Trieb 
zu Filosofiren eine unendliche Thätigkeit [...] Durch das freywillige 
Entsagen des Absoluten entsteht die unendliche freye Thätigkeit in 
uns – das Einzig mögliche Absolute, was uns gegeben werden kann 
und was wir nur durch unsre Unvermögenheit ein Absolutes zu 
erreichen und zu erkennen, finden. Dies uns gegebne Absolute läßt 
sich nur negativ erkennen, indem wir handeln und finden, daß durch 
kein Handeln das erreicht wird, was wir suchen. Dis ließe sich ein 
absolutes Postulat nennen. Alles suchen nach Einem Princip wär 
also wie ein Versuch die Quadratur des Zirkels zu finden./  
Perpetuum mobile. Stein der Weisen./ 
 
What do I do by philosophizing? [...]All philosophising 
must terminate in an absolute foundation. If this were not 
given, if this concept contained an impossibility,—then the 
urge to philosophize would be an infinite activity 
[...]Through the voluntary renunciation of the Absolute, 
infinite free activity arises in us—the only possible Absolute 
which can be given to us, and which we find only through 
our incapacity to arrive at and recognise an Absolute. [It] 
may only be recognised negatively, in that we act and find 
that through no action do we arrive at that which we seek. 
This much could be called an absolute postulate. All 
searching for a single principle would be like the attempt to 
square the circle [...] Perpetuum mobile. The philosopher’s 
stone (Novalis, 1978, II: p. 180ff: 566/Frank, 2004, p. 32-
33). 
 
Novalis recasts unified totality as an end toward which philosophy is always 
oriented but can in practice never achieve. His conception of the Absolute is 
essentially negative; it is that which is sought but never found—‘through no action 
do we arrive at that which we seek’. What is crucial in Novalis’ account is that the 
very impossibility of grasping a totality that would unify subject and world, freedom 
and receptivity, is the source philosophy’s productivity, of ‘infinite free activity.’ 
Novalis’ language of ‘infinite free activity’ in his remarks on the absolute echoes 
Kant in the third Kritik, where he elaborates a theory of free play of the cognitive 
faculties, guided by an ‘aesthetic idea’ that provides direction but not closure. The 
Romantics seized on this ‘purposive’ behaviour of aesthetic experience to describe 
the possibility of an endlessly deferred totality. Kant says of the artist that he creates 
freely yet ‘does not know how he came by the ideas for [the work]: nor is it in his 
power to devise such products at his pleasure, or by following a plan, nor to 
communicate [his procedure] to others in precepts that would enable them to bring 
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about like products’ (2000, II: 5: 307, p. 187). The interplay of receptivity and 
spontaneity in the creation of a work of art forms a powerful analogy to the 
‘creative’ process of experience, of seeing a world. Both processes involve a 
production – in one case a tangible artwork in the other case an intelligible world – 
but in neither case is the ground of this production cognisable conceptually. The 
idea then is that aesthetic experience may offer a non-conceptual way for the subject 
to represent itself to itself as a simultaneously creative and receptive being. While 
this exists as a possibility for all artistic and literary forms, it is my contention that 
essayistic writing, in its emphasis on the contingent ‘occasion’, brings special 
attention to the creative and receptive capacity of human subjectivity. This activity is 
not merely conceptual but poetic; it necessitates a particular kind of writing that 
resists homogeneity and closure and invites the reader to participate in the 
production of meaning, which is without end.  
 Novalis’ worry that establishing an absolute foundation is finally impossible 
is shaped by a live debate in the 18th century over the problem of infinite regress, 
specifically as it played out in the ‘Pantheism Dispute’ (1783) involving Gotthold 
Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781) and Friedrich Jacobi (1743-1819), and eventually 
Kant himself. The focus of the debate was Spinoza’s monist philosophy, which 
posited an absolute, unified reality underlying all appearances, including the 
apparent division between subject and object, mind and world.66 Jacobi claimed that 
Spinoza’s position led to an infinite regress, since in his system everything was 
conditioned by everything else and there was no unconditioned principle outside 
this coherentist picture that could ground knowledge claims.  
 In raising the ancient sceptical problem of infinite regress, Jacobi challenged 
the idea that knowledge could ever be grounded in a purely logical or rational way, 
as the idealists thought it could. The basic problem of regress runs as follows: When 
I believe X, I justify my belief in X to another person by giving a reason, which 
functions as the cause or condition of my belief—what makes me believe x or what 
makes x so. The proffered cause necessarily takes place within a chain of causes, and 
the reason or explanation for any particular phenomenon, or any belief about a 
phenomenon, would have to involve the totality of this chain, which is not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 66 Spinoza’s position was highly controversial, given its religious implications, which 
threatened the Christian notion of a personal God who intervened in human affairs while also 
remaining different in kind from His creation. In Spinoza’s vision of ultimate substance, the 
world itself was divine, and any division between God and creation – indeed any divisions at all – 
were merely illusory.  
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empirically or rationally available since it extends, in principle, infinitely. What I call 
a reason or a cause merely plucks a link out of the chain, isolating, arbitrarily, one 
moment in a long process. In order to really ground any particular knowledge claim, 
there would need to be an absolute beginning to the chain, and this beginning 
would have to be a cause that is in itself uncaused, that does not rely on anything 
else for its being. In other words, the possibility of absolute knowing would require 
an unconditioned (unbedingt) first principle. Short of this, any belief, including the 
simple belief that the sun will rise tomorrow, is dogmatic in the strict sense of not 
being ultimately justifiable. As Hume demonstrated in the Treatise (1738), such 
beliefs are justifiable only pragmatically, grounded not in necessity but in the 
normative force of habit. For Jacobi, infinite regress pointed to a flaw in rational 
thought: reason cannot grasp its own foundation or its own condition of possibility, 
since any examination of these conditions already takes place within the 
(conditioned) space of rational thought; ‘as long as we can conceptually 
comprehend, we remain within a chain of conditioned conditions’ (Jacobi, 1994, p. 
376). Claims made about the world, or ways in which the absolute is carved up into 
finite beings, ‘modes’, or causes, are never objective in the sense of being verifiable 
outside of consciousness, since they are only meaningful for thought. As a result, 
‘the unconditional must lie outside of nature and outside of every natural 
connection with it [...] therefore this unconditioned must be called the supernatural’ 
(Jacobi, 1994, p. 376).  
 Jacobi argued that the only way to relate to the absolute was through a salto 
mortale, a leap or somersault outside of the chain of conditions (Pinkard, 2002, p. 
96). This movement was conceived in religious terms, anticipating Kierkegaard’s 
leap of faith some 50 years later. But, like Kierkegaard’s leap, it pointed to a deeper 
philosophical problem of conviction. Only a belief possessing immediate truth and 
meaning for the individual subject, as opposed to a rationally justified claim, could 
escape infinite regress and could account for the basic fact of human orientation 
and motivation, since, as Jacobi asserts in a letter to Mendelssohn, ‘Conviction 
based on argument is secondhand conviction’ (quoted in Frank 2003, p. 204). 
Jacobi’s argument is that to claim certainty about anything, to claim to have reached 
the ultimate principle of justification, amounts to resorting to an immediacy that is 
no longer subject to ‘the mediation of further reasons or states of consciousness. To 
want to justify the assumption of such a fact once again means that one has not 
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understood what is involved in our having to make recourse to an infinite regress in 
the language of justification. Therefore immediate consciousness (Jacobi calls this 
“feeling”—Novalis and Schleiermacher will follow him in this terminology) must be 
understood literally to be a ground-less, unjustified assumption, that is, as a belief 
(Glauben)’ (Frank, 2003, p. 205).  
 While the early Romantics rejected Jacobi’s overtly religious solution of a 
salto mortale, they shared his sense that conceptual knowledge failed to account for 
the whole of human experience, and that any project of absolute justification or 
grounding from within a philosophical system was doomed from the start. The 
philosophical import of Jacobi’s leap for the Romantics is the idea there exists a 
non-conceptual, pre-reflective commitment or orientation that cannot be reduced to 
or grasped by the mediated understanding of conceptual thought. In other words, 
scientific or philosophical understanding relies on a prior capacity of the world to be 
intelligible or for the subject to orient himself toward the world (see Bowie, 1996). 
The early Romantics’ shift toward poetic form was an attempt to bring Jacobi’s 
feeling into focus as fundamental to the practise of philosophy, and their 
experimentation with the part/whole structure of fragments provided further 
reflection on the intelligibility of being as a whole. Manfred Frank stresses that this 
poetic solution was arrived at through purely immanent and philosophical means. In 
Novalis’ critique of Fichte: ‘The thesis that the Absolute is inaccessible to reflection 
indeed opens the gates to poetics and invites it to achieve what philosophy was 
incapable of achieving; but the thesis itself is not a piece of poetic thought, but 
rather a work of genuine and rigorous philosophical speculation’ (Frank, 2003, p. 
248).67 
 Novalis’ ‘voluntary renunciation’ of a self-evident foundational principle 
amounts to a rejection of the kind of conceptual schema that his mentor Fichte had 
sought. Andrew Bowie explains that Novalis’ ‘basic objection to Fichte is summed 
up in a later fragment: “Fichte has, as it were, chosen the logical schema of science as 
the pattern of a real construction of humankind and the world (Novalis 1978 p. 
684)”, thereby, as Hölderlin suggested, inverting the relationship between being and 
thought’ (Bowie, 1990/2003, p. 88). Although Novalis did not subscribe to Jacobi’s 
salto mortale, he recognised that the dimension of prior belonging to or commitment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




within the world, something which Jacobi’s solution was intended to address, was 
missing from Fichte’s idealist schema. The problem for Novalis was that the 
reflection of the I on itself that served as the Grundsatz in Fichte’s system in fact 
made self-knowledge or self-representation impossible, since what was reflected on 
was altered in the process of reflection (Ibid). Similar to Jacobi’s argument that any 
attempt to understand the unconditioned subject already takes place within the 
(conditioned) space of rational thought, Novalis argued that in the structure of self-
reflection:  
Sie hängt von der ersten Handlung ab – die werden wir nicht gewahr, folglich fühlen 
wir diese nichtfrey. Warum wir sie nicht gewahr werden – weil sie das 
Gewahrwerden erst möglich macht, und folglich dis in ihrer Sfäre liegt – die 
Handlung des Gewahrwerdens kann ja also nicht aus ihrer Sfäre herausgehn und 
die Muttersfäre mitfassen wollen.  
We do not become aware [of the ‘first action’], in consequence we feel 
it as not-free. Why do we not become aware of it [?] – because it first 
makes becoming aware possible, and consequently this [becoming 
aware] lies in its sphere – the action of becoming aware therefore 
cannot go out of its sphere and wish to comprehend the mother-sphere 
[because it depends upon it, is within it, in the manner of subject and 
object in relation to Hölderlin’s ‘being’] (Novalis, 1978, II: p. 9/ Bowie, 
1990/2003, p. 89). 
Novalis recognises that it is not possible to become aware of the supposedly 
foundational action of the self-posting I, since the act of becoming aware would rely 
on precisely the self-consciousness that is being posited. The basic problem 
formulated by Jacobi still stands—‘as long as we can conceptually comprehend, we 
remain within a chain of conditioned conditions’ (Jacobi, 1994, p. 376) so we have 
failed to reach either an ultimate ground for knowledge claims or to account for 
human freedom, which must be stand outside of the chain of conditions and 
conceptual throught altogether. The idealist notion of the subject as the cause of 
itself and also the source of appearance of the world (not-self) as world was 
intended to both explain the ability of human actions to be free (uncaused, 
unconditioned, spontaneous) and to connect mind and world. However, Novalis’ 
critique, in pointing to the dimension of existential awareness or feeling, shows the 
inadequacy of a purely logical solution to the problems at stake. As Schlegel 
expresses elsewhere, ‘the I cannot ultimately be proved (beweisen) but can only be 
found (gefunden)’ in existence (Frank 2003, p. 186; KFSA XII, p. 334: 2). As a result 
‘intelligent people’ recoil from philosophers who ‘try to explain everything. They 
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feel certain (even if perhaps they cannot express this) that there exists something 
incomprehensible; that they themselves are incomprehensible (unbegreiflich)’ (Frank, 
2003, p. 186).68 There remains a gap between thought or rational reflection and the 
existing I.  
 The ultimate failure of the reductionist strategy in idealism led the 
Romantics to consider a different approach to the unrepresentability or 
incomprehensibility of the subject from within rational reflection. In 1796 in his 
study of the Wissenschaftslehre, Novalis sketched out an alternative to the standard 
philosophical proof. He argued that the process of truth-seeking ought to proceed 
not by fitting experience to a priori truths but by way of what he designated a 
‘Wechselbestimmungssatz (reciprocal proposition of determination); a pure law of 
association, it seems to me, must be the highest principle, a hypothetical 
proposition’ (Novalis, 2003, p. 75). The notion of a dialectical relation or reciprocal 
determination of different hypotheses69 is a rejection of the idealist focus on a 
single, founding principle, since ‘all searching for a single principle would be like the 
attempt to square the circle’. Instead, Novalis’ dialectic emphasises the contextual 
and temporal dimension of truth-seeking, whereby a progressive refinement of ideas 
is made available through the interchange of self and other, of an idea and its 
opposite.70 Association is a lyrical or aesthetic principle, the logic of metaphor, 
rather than a mathematical principle of deduction, and shows the extent to which 
the early Romantics had assimilated the 18th-century language theory of Hamann 
and Herder, who argued both that language is primarily metaphorical or poetic 
(rather than descriptive or conceptual) and that the misunderstanding or 
misappropriation of language is at the heart of philosophy’s misunderstanding of 
itself (Hamann, 2007, p. 211; N III, 286: 1-10). Kant’s critics put into relief the real 
site of tensions between the idealist and the sceptic, with the early Romantics falling 
into the latter group. It is the inability to control language itself, language’s 
ineluctable remainder, that prevents the establishment of any coherent, definitive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 68 ‘Dies Rätsel des Selbstgefühls, welches uns immer begleitet, ist auch wohl die 
Ursache, warum sich bei nachdenklichen Menschen, wenn Philosophen gewisser Art alles 
erklärlen wollen, immer ein Zweifel erhebt und erhält. Sie fühlen es zu gewiß (wenn sie es auch 
vielleicht nicht aussprechen), daß es etwas Unbegreifliches gibt, da sie sich selbst unbegreiflich 
sind’ (KFSA XII, p. 334:1).  
 69 This is developed more fully in the Saussurean conception of language in which the 
identity of concepts is a function of their difference from other concepts.   
 70 Hegel would describe this process in a systematic way a few years later. For the 
differences between the Romantic and Hegelian understanding of dialectics, see Bowie 
1990/2003, pp. 140-178.	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system.71 Romantic fragments call attention to the medium of language – both on 
the thematic and performative level – making one aware of language as a ‘problem’ 
rather than a transparent medium for the transmission of ideas, or still more 
problematically, of truth. Hamann and Herder’s insights about language are 
reflected in the many Romantic fragments calling for philosophy to learn from 
poetry or be transformed into poetry (e.g. AF 115, 116, 131). The fragments are a 
rallying cry for philosophy to adopt the mimetic, affective dimension of poetry, its 
concern with language and form, lest philosophy risk being blind to the way in 
which it is determined by language and thus fail in its critical project of uncovering 
the conditions of understanding.  
 In correspondence with Novalis, Schlegel developed his own alternative to 
foundationalism he called the Wechselerweis, the alternating or reciprocal proof.  
 
Es muß der Philosophie nicht bloß ein Wechselbeweis, sondern auch ein 
Wechselbegriff zum Grunde liegen. Man kann bei jedem Begriff wie bei jedem 
Erweis wieder nach einem Begriff und Erweis desselben fragen. Daher muß die 
Philosophie wie das epische Gedicht in der Mitte anfangen, und es ist unmöglich 
dieselbe so vorzutragen und Stück für Stück hinzuzählen, daß gleich das Erste für 
sich vollkommen begründet und erklärt wäre. Es ist ein Ganzes, und der Weg es zu 
erkennen ist also keine grade Linie, sondern ein Kreis. Das Ganze der 
Grundwissenschaft muß aus zwei Ideen . . . 
  
Philosophy must have at its foundation not just a proof assuming the 
form of reciprocal determination, but also a concept subject to 
reciprocal interchange. In every concept as in every proof, one can ask 
again for a concept or proof of the same. Thus philosophy, like epic 
poetry, must begin in the middle, and it is impossible to convey and 
dissect it in such a way that the original and first might immediately and 
itself be completely grounded and explained. The original and first is a 
whole, and the way to recognise it is therefore not a straight line but a 
circle. The whole of foundational theory must be derived from two 
ideas . . . (KFSA XVIII, 1963, p. 518: 16/Frank, 2004, p. 32). 
 
Schlegel alludes to the problem of infinite regress in his remark that for any given 
proof, one can ask for an additional proof, just as a child, when offered an 
explanation for something, can force the explanation one level deeper by continuing 
to ask ‘why?’. As Jacobi argued, there is no natural stopping point to the process of 
justification, which raises the troubling question of whether beliefs can ever be 
adequately justified, or whether, as Jacobi suggested, the truth of a belief must be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 71 It also argues against the continued analytic approach to language, which subjects 
isolated parts of speech and speech acts to logical analysis. 
	  	  
80	  
based on some species of non-conceptual insight or conviction. Schlegel’s solution 
is to reject the logic whereby one moves in a straight line from one cause to a more 
fundamental cause and instead to embrace the hermeneutic form of a circle, 
wherein regress can be viewed as infinite progress. Since for Schlegel ‘the beginning 
point in philosophy is just one part of an infinite chain,’ it is ineluctable that 
philosophy begin in medias res. What he proposes is, in effect, to call attention to the 
fact that one always stands in the middle of things, in the space of conditions, and 
therefore not to indulge in the fiction of an ‘indubitable first principle will enable us 
to spin a web of certainty’ (Millán-Zaibert, 2012 p. 135).  
 This admission of one’s own existential position takes the form of an 
interest in the Darstellung of philosophy, particularly with experiments in 
fragmentary writing. In the fragment, any contingent starting point – an observation 
on moral life, an artwork, a philosophical concept, a national characteristic – can 
open itself up to the totality of which it is a part, ‘ein notwendiger Teil im System aller 
Wissenschaften [a necessary part in a system of all the sciences]’ (AF 77). Indeed, it is 
precisely because a Grundsatz ‘does not contain its consequences epistemically in 
nuce’ that totality remains a goal toward which to strive (Frank, 2004, p. 183). The 
‘motive to philosophise is not a successful intuition of an omnitude realitatis, but 
rather (as had been the case with Novalis) the “feeling” of a lack’ (Frank, 2004, p. 
183). Spurred on by the desire to understand the world as a Whole, rather than 
merely analytically, the Romantics gesture toward an ever richer ‘infinite’ 
approximation of truth by multiplying different ways of seeing, a strategy that is not 
only philosophical but rhetorical, and is one of the hallmarks of the essayistic.  
 The concept of alternating proofs in the early writings of Novalis and 
Schlegel goes some way toward explaining how Romantic philosophy will 
proceed—a new shape has to be created to allow this new kind of philosophising to 
unfold, ‘not in a straight line but a circle’. The conclusion that there must always be 
more than one principle or idea in play for thought to progress leads the early 
Romantics to embrace an essayistic form of writing that stresses difference and a 
multiplicity of perspectives. In the choice to publish the Athenäums-Fragmente 
anonymously, even the identity of a singular author is denied. This latter move, 
rather than arguing against the fragments’ membership in the essayistic, can be seen 
as an extension of the gestures toward the non-identity of the self already seen in 
Montaigne’s Essais, where it is claimed that ‘there is as much difference between us 
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and ourselves as there is between us and other people’72 and where the ‘voice’ of the 
I is polyphonic. While one of the features that distinguishes the essayistic is its 
subjectivity, this does not entail that essayistic texts uphold traditional notions of the 
subject as a coherent whole (otherwise the father of the modern essay could not be 
considered an essayist!); rather, the essay is subjective in its rejection of a god’s-eye 
view or scientific ‘view from nowhere’ that aims at legitimisation through neutrality 
or transparency.  
 The Athenäums-Fragmente, while anonymous, can be distinguished from the 
‘objective’ neutralist view by their reflexivity—they constantly call attention to the 
rhetorical and historical conditions of their own production, according to the 
principle that ‘a philosopher must talk about himself just as the lyric poet does’ (KF 
413) and that a work must be ‘at once Poesie and a theory of Poesie’ (AF 238). 
Schlegel exposes the fiction of neutralism in Athenäumsfragment 226, which stresses 
the need to begin with hypotheses or concepts in order to understand anything at 
all.  
 
Will man es nicht anerkennen, so bleibt die Wahl dem Instinkt, dem Zufall, oder 
der Willkür überlassen, man schmeichelt sich reine solide Empirie ganz a posteriori 
zu haben, und hat eine höchst einseitige, höchst dogmatizistische und transzendente 
Ansicht a priori.  
 
If one refuses to recognise this, then the choice is surrendered to 
instinct, chance, or fate; and so one flatters oneself that one has 
established a pure solid empiricism quite a posteriori, when what one 
actually has is an a priori outlook that's highly one-sided, dogmatic, and 
transcendental (AF 226).  
 
The hermeneutic insight that it is impossible to begin from nowhere can also be 
read as pointing to the dangers of ignoring style or perpetuating the fiction of 
transparent representation. If philosophy proceeds without an understanding of the 
meaning with which language and textual forms are always already imbued, the 
result is not a ‘pure solid empiricism’ or ‘objectivity’ but dogmatism. The anonymity 
of the Athenäums-Fragmente thus has less to do with projecting a flawed notion of 
objectivity than with asserting the autonomy of the text (Kubiak, 1994, pp. 426-
427), or, in Montaigne’s words, recognising how texts write the author (‘mon livre me 
faict’). While the ‘subjective’ dimension of Romantic essayism is clearly different to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   72 ‘On the Inconstancy of our Actions’ in Essays, II. I, 2013, p. 380 and ‘On experience’ 
in Essays, III. I3, 2013, p. 1210. 
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the voice of the writing ‘I’ in Montaigne, this difference can be seen as an 
elaboration of the philosophical critique of identity that was already present in the 
Essais, informed by the debates of 18th-century philosophy and by the emerging 
German language theory of the time, which saw language as constitutive of 
subjectivity and thought.  
 
Fragments of what?  
 We have seen that two features – a sense of lack or incompletion and a 
desire for wholeness – serve as motivation for Romantic philosophy as an activity. 
It is worthwhile to explore in more detail the relationship between these two 
impulses, particularly as they play out in the logic of the fragment. Wholeness, as it 
is conceived and performed in Romantic writing, never entails the dissolution of 
difference or plurality; rather ‘ein System von Fragmenten’ takes the place of a self-
identical unity (AF 77). Difference, even considered sub specie aeternitatis, is not an 
illusion to be transcended.73 Schlegel’s trope of the circle is a rejection of 
foundationalism in favour of a hermeneutic model in which understanding is 
conditioned by time. As a result the whole is not imagined as something that already 
exists for cognition, as it had existed for the Greeks, but as a possibility to be 
realised, even created. The ‘system of fragments’ extends well beyond the bounds of 
the Athenäums-Fragmente or the other Romantic fragment collections; the whole of 
which they are a part becomes an on-going task in which the reader is called to 
participate. As literary critic Christopher Kubiak demonstrates in his thoughtful 
reading of early Romantic fragments, the logic of a fragment entails a relationship to 
a whole, and working out the contours of this relationship yields crucial insights 
into the Romantic vision of philosophical and political collectivity as well as the 
need for and the dangers of thinking wholeness.  
 Critical of Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, Kubiak in his article on the 
Romantic fragment form (1994) sees no philosophical or textual grounds for 
separating the Athenäums-Fragmente from Novalis and Schlegel’s other – intentionally 
or unintentionally – fragmentary writings. He begins by situating the fragments 
within the aphoristic tradition that flourished in 18th-century salon culture, modelled 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 73 Contrast with Hegel, from whom particular actuality and the difference between 
particulars is abstract because the concrete is the whole. ‘What is true is rather found in motion, 
in a process, however, in which there is rest; difference, while it lasts, is but a temporary 
condition, through which comes unity, full and concrete’ (Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 
1955, I, pp. 23-25). 
	  	  
83	  
on Montaigne’s essais and embodying Hume’s imagined ‘league between the learned 
and conversable worlds’. Aphorisms form part of the essayistic in their essentially 
anti-systematic, anti-foundationalist motivation and their interest in the 
psychological and social conditions of human existence, under the umbrella of la 
morale. Dubious of systematic treatments of moral life, the great French moralistes 
such as La Rochefoucauld fashioned themselves after Montaigne to produce a 
portrait of le coeur de l’homme that included self-interest, hypocrisy, sociality, sexuality, 
and embodiment—in short, ‘debunking the autonomy of l’esprit’ (Kubiak, 1994, p. 
414). The aphorism tradition relied on a social framework (the salon) to come to full 
development and which valued wit as a way of grasping complex ideas intuitively.74 
The Romantic fragments share many of these characteristics, and Schlegel depended 
on his contemporary readers’ familiarity with the aphoristic tradition—if only in 
order to more effectively upset reader expectations by departing from this tradition 
in significant ways.  
 One of the consequences of the Romantics’ use of the word ‘Fragmente’, 
rather than, say, aphorisms or pensées is that the relationship of the texts to one 
another and to some larger whole of which they are a part becomes problematic. In 
choosing the title of Fragmente for the collection that appears in the Athenäum, 
Schlegel immediately raises the question: fragments of what? In this way, ‘totality is 
determined – and this is the crucial point – determined from within and in advance 
– unilaterally – as the union of the Fragmente and this missing complement [...] the 
Fragment would reach out to encircle their exterior, naming and appropriating it as 
their own’ (Kubiak, 1994, p. 420). On Kubiak’s reading, the Athenäums-Fragmente 
already point outside themselves to a larger, unrealised totality, and they cannot be 
delimited except arbitrarily. These remarks call to mind Terrence Cave’s reading of 
Montaigne’s Essais and the Renaissance tradition more broadly wherein the 
provisionality of the texts was seen as taking part in a larger Whole or Work, but 
one that would be forever in the process of becoming, forever deferred. For the 
Romantic fragment, one can never be said to have finally achieved or grasped the 
whole; the essence of romantic poetry is ‘daß sie ewig nur werden, nie vollendet sein kann 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 74 Wit was a key philosophical concept for the Romantics. Kubiak provides a fascinating 
analysis of wit as the systematising and unifying feature of the fragment collections, the Blitz that 
offers ‘a network of witty associations that would traverse the entire scope of thought uniting it 
an endlessly fertile process of recombination’ and guaranteeing that the Romantic 
‘Universalsystem der Philosophie’ is always in the making’ rather than dissolving into 
Systemlosigkeit (pp. 443ff). 
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[that it should forever be becoming and never be perfected]’ (AF 116). 
 Kubiak elaborates on the part/whole logic of the fragments, explaining that 
since what is missing from a series of fragments must itself be a fragment, ‘every 
fragment series must always have at least one more member than it is possible to 
count [...],’ making it possible for fragments to ‘possess the paradigmatically organic 
capacity to reproduce their own kind ad infinitum: hence the title Blüthenstaub for 
Novalis’ first published collection and the phrase fermenta cognitionis, which appears in 
Athenäums fragment 259 as a synonym for “fragments”’ (p. 420). The notion of 
fragments as ‘leaven’ or ‘pollen’ points to the tendency – even imperative – of 
fragments to multiply. This open-endedness with regard to the number of 
fragments that would make up a totality is a performative counter-move to the 
reductionist tendency in idealism as well as an assertion of the inherently productive 
and excessive nature of language itself, as Herder and Hamann had conceived it.75 
Alongside the fragments published in the Athenäum, Schlegel’s Kritische Fragmente and 
Ideen and Novalis’ Blüthenstaub, there were a number of other fragment collections 
planned for publication, including Novalis’ Logologische Fragmente, Poetizismen, and 
Teplitzer Fragmente; to these can be added Schelgel’s Philosophische Lehrjahre, an 
unfinished collection of thousands of fragments from 1796-1806, and Novalis’ 
unfinished Allgemeine Brouillon or ‘Universal Draft’, a collection of notes that he 
envisioned as a new kind of encyclopaedia of fragments, ‘not simply a compendium 
of current knowledge but ‘ein lebendiges wissenschaftliches Organon [a living, scientific 
organon]’ that would ‘generate new knowledge by fostering contact between various 
particular sciences’ (Kubiak, 1994, p. 418). The sheer volume of fragments 
produced by Schlegel and Novalis in this brief span testifies to the logic of 
multiplication by which they were governed and to the productivity of deferred 
totality.  	   The disjunctive, heterogeneous, and endlessly multiplying Fragmente are 
meant as examples of ‘collective organization that affiliate without homogenizing, 
that unite individuals without suppressing individual differences, that produce order 
without imposing it’ (Kubiak, 1994, p. 423)—concerns that are manifest not only in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 75 Herder celebrates the excesses of language while mocking the philosopher’s efforts to 
tame and refine it: ‘And where was the philosopher who would have ordered what he saw into 
classes and washed away the excess? New subject matters, new objects, conditions, 
circumstances, yielded new names – and in this way language became only all too rich. Sensuous 
objects were referred to sensuously – and from how many sides, from how many view- points 
they can be referred to! In this way language became full of crazy and untamed word 
transformations, full of irregularity and stubborn idiosyncrasy’ (Herder, 2004 p. 64). 
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Romantic poetics but in their political views as well (see e.g. Novalis’ Blüthenstaub 43 
and 65). Kritische Fragment 65 offers a key analogy between republican political 
structures and the Romantic poetic project: ‘Die Poesie ist eine republikanische Rede ; eine 
Rede, die ihr eignes Gesetz und ihr eigner Zweck ist, wo alle Teile freie Bürger sind, und 
mitstimmen dürfen [Poetry is republican speech: a speech which is its own law and end 
unto itself, and in which all the parts are free citizens and have the right to vote]’. 
This analogy raises the question of whether a ‘republic’ of pure difference is 
possible, or even coherent. Can the fragments, in their multiplication of different 
perspectives, be thought together at all? If they are a ‘law unto themselves’ by what 
order are they held together as parts of a republican collectivity or instances of a 
form? The heterogeneity of the fragments is a performative rejection of any 
antecedent forms that would impose order externally, for example, the division 
between critical and philosophical fragments that Schlegel eventually abandoned 
(Kubiak, 1994, p. 422) or the distinction between philosophy and poetry, which was 
likewise challenged (KF 155, AF 255). The diverse subject matter and the pastiche 
of writing styles employed blur the boundaries between established genres or 
disciplines in order to suggest the blind spots in all established ways of seeing. But 
with the rejection of any order under which particular fragments could be placed, 
there seems to be no distinction between a particular fragment and the concept of 
fragment, leaving the Romantics with the difficult idea of a form that cannot be said 
to exist separately from the instantiation of it, akin to Aquinas’ claim that every 
angel is its own species. Indeed, the idea that every fragment is at the same time a 
theory of the fragment runs throughout the fragment collections. ‘Auch in der Poesie 
mag wohl alles Ganze halb, und alles Halbe doch eigentlich ganz sein [In poesie too every 
whole can be a part and every part really a whole]’ (KF 14). This is reflected in the 
infamous ‘hedgehog’ Fragment, which declares that a fragment ‘muß gleich einem 
kleinen Kunstwerke [...] ganz abgesondert und in sich vollendet sein wie ein Igel [like a miniature 
work of art has to be [...] complete in itself like a hedgehog]’ (AF 206). So what is it 
that makes individual fragments into a ‘system of fragments’, and, by extension, 
individual perspectives or persons into a ‘republic’? Is the ‘manifold unity’ (Novalis, 
2003, p. 188) that Novalis imagined a coherent concept? 
 To answer these questions, it may be fruitful to examine the conceptions of 
unity that the Romantics oppose to their own. While working toward the notion of 
a collectivity of difference, they take pains to guard against false unity of various 
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kinds. Novalis, in his Blüthenstaub (1797-1798) collection, works out two notions of 
Einheit or oneness that prove helpful in this context.  
  
Vor der Abstrakzion ist alles eins, aber eins wie Chaos; nach der 
Abstrakzion ist wieder alles vereinigt, aber diese Vereinigung ist eine 
freie Verbindung selbständiger, selbstbestimmter Wesen. Aus einem 
Haufen ist eine Gesellschaft geworden, das Chaos ist in eine 
mannichfaltige Welt verwandelt.  
 
Before abstraction everything is one – but one as chaos is – after 
abstraction everything is again unified, but this unification is a free 
alliance of independent, self-determined beings. A crowd has become a 
society, chaos is transformed into a manifold world (1978, p. 271: 
95/1997, p. 40).  
 
There are two powerful suggestions in this passage. The first is that chaos is a kind 
of unity, since, in it, nothing has yet been differentiated. Nature beyond the sphere 
of thought can only be conceived in this way, since thought is precisely what 
provides the categories of intelligibility that allow the ‘manifold world’ to become 
manifest. The second suggestion is that the performative strategy of fragments aims 
at something other than the pre-reflective oneness of chaos.76 Instead, the unity of 
fragments is imagined as a ‘free alliance of independent, self-determined beings.’ If 
chaos is like a Haufen (a crowd or mob), fragments are comparable to a Gesellschaft 
(society or fellowship). There is thus a sense of order in fragments, but the order of 
an alliance or an agreed-upon framework rather than simply the fact of existing in 
the same space (which is all that is required of a crowd). In rejecting the notion of a 
‘crowd’ of fragments, Novalis also points to the poetic intention of the fragment 
collections. Like other essayistic texts, fragment collections are a way of 
representing the form or process of thinking. Yet the appearance of free associative 
thought that the fragments convey is achieved through literary craft and design, 
rather than by chance (KF 37).   
 Keen to avoid the undifferentiated unity of chaos and the accidental unity of 
the crowd, the Romantics also sought to interrupt the natural hermeneutic impulse 
to create unity by ignoring difference.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 76 This argues against Fred Beiser’s argument that the Romantics thought it possible to 
grasp the whole in moments of intellectual intuition. See Benjamin (1974, I: 1: pp. 7-122) for an 
account of Schlegel and Novalis’ rejection of Fichte’s reliance on intellectual intuition. 
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Viele Werke, deren schöne Verkettung man preist, haben weniger Einheit, als ein 
bunter Haufen von Einfällen, die nur vom Geiste eines Geistes belebt, nach Einem 
Ziele zielen. Diese verbindet doch jedes freie und gleiche Beisammensein, worin sich 
auch die Bürger des vollkommenen Staats, nach der Versicherung der Weisen, 
dereinst befinden werden [...] Manches Erzeugnis hingegen, an dessen 
Zusammenhang niemand zwiefelt, ist, wie der Künstler selbst sehr wohl weiß, kein 
Werk, sondern Bruchstück, eins oder mehre, Masse, Anlage. So mächtig ist aber 
der Trieb nach Einheit im Menschen, daß der Urheber selbst, was er durchaus nicht 
vollenden oder vereinigen kann, oft gleich bei der Bildung doch wenigstens ergänzt ; 
oft sehr sinnreich und dennoch ganz widernatürlich. Das Schlimmste dabei ist, daß 
alles, was man gediegenen Stücken, die wirklich da sind, so drüber aufhängt, um 
einen Schein von Ganzheit zu erkünsteln, meistens nur aus gefärbten Lumpen 
besteht. Sind diese nun auch gut und täuschend geschminkt, und mit Verstand 
drappiert : so ist’s eigentlich um desto schlimmer.  
 
Many works that are praised for the beauty of their coherence have less 
unity than a motley heap of ideas simply animated by the ghost of a 
spirit and aiming at a single purpose. What really holds the latter 
together is that free and equal fellowship in which, so the wise men 
assure us, the citizens of the perfect state will live at some future date 
[...] On the other hand, many a work of art whose coherence is never 
questioned is, as the artist knows quite well himself, not a complete 
work but a fragment, or one or more fragments, a mass, a plan. But so 
powerful is the instinct for unity in mankind that the author himself will 
often bring something to a kind of completion which simply can't be 
made a whole or a unit; often quite ingeniously and yet completely 
unnaturally. The worst thing about it is that whatever is draped about 
the genuine fragments that are actually there, in the attempt to 
artificially produce a semblance of unity, consists largely of dyed rags. 
And if these are made up cleverly and deceptively, and draped in 
reason, then that's all the worse (KF 103). 
 
This is a puzzling fragment, not the least because the ‘free and equal fellowship’ that 
receives a sardonic treatment here, is elsewhere held up as the model to which the 
fragments aspire. But the warning is clear: the urge to unify what is in essence 
discontinuous and disparate is so powerful that the critical (Romantic) author must 
always be on guard against it, in both form and content. A false unity that covers 
over differences and freezes dialectical thinking into an idea is a constant 
temptation, one to which idealism succumbed in its positing of an absolute 
Grundsatz. Given that, in the Romantic view, ‘Jedes System kann nur Approximation sein 
[Every system can only be an approximation]’ (KFSA XVIII, 2006, p. 413: 1106), 
texts which strive to cover over their necessarily fragmentary or approximate nature 
fail in an acknowledgement of their own conditions of possibility and thus place 
themselves at a remove from philosophical truth. The diction in the last two 
sentences of KF 103 suggests an actor (or perhaps a prostitute) in costume and 
	  	  
88	  
heavily made up, emphasising artifice and deceit. The more technical term 
‘Fragmente’ is not used in the above fragment but instead the more general terms 
Bruchstücke and Stücke, which translate to bits, pieces, parts, or scraps. This may be 
an attempt to separate the consciously and openly fragmentary nature of a Romantic 
fragment collection – which does not attempt to ‘cleverly and deceptively’ disguise 
its discontinuity– from texts that are only accidentally fragmentary: ‘ein bunter Haufen 
von Einfällen’.   
 The decision to compose the Athenäums-Fragmente collectively and to publish 
them anonymously is one of the ways in which the Romantics defended themselves 
against the ‘Trieb nach Einheit’, since it removes the possibility of uniting the texts as 
the product of a single mind. Schlegel in fact urged the other members of the group 
to find or excerpt fragments from letters they had written or from dinner table 
conversation, suggesting that fragments need not even be intentionally composed as 
such (Kubiak, 1994, p. 426). In this way the fragment collections could avoid the 
‘Schein von Ganzheit’ that is little more than ‘gefärbten Lumpen’. The Romantics use a 
variety of other textual strategies to interrupt the hermeneutic process and introduce 
points of contradiction or incomprehensibility to thrust readers back on themselves. 
The prevalence of the ‘göttlichen Hauch der Ironie [divine breath of irony]’ (KF 42) in 
the fragments exploits the power of paradox (KF 48) to keep alive tension and 
fruitful ‘antagonism’ between the finite and the infinite, between the impossibility of 
communicating ‘completely’ and the pressing need to do so (KF 108). Kierkegaard 
will adopt these same disjunctive strategies in his writings for similar epistemological 
and ethical ends.  
 
Systemlosigkeit, in ein System 
 In his third Kritik Kant conceives of nature as analogous to a work of art:  
‘Their structure is the same since both involve the idea of an organic whole, where 
the identity of each part is inseparable from the whole, and where the identity of the 
whole is inseparable from each of its parts’ (Beiser, pp. 81-82). The Romantics were 
inspired by this analogy and by Kant’s attempt to think a whole, which also 
motivated the German idealists. Though it may seem counter-intuitive, the 
Romantics worked toward organicity in the first place by insisting on the difference 
and autonomy of the constituent fragments, rejecting any existing forms that would 
impose order externally. In conceiving of fragment collections as a ‘law unto 
themselves’ or, in Kantian language, as giving the law to themselves, the Romantics 
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saw in fragments a capacity to enact and affirm the human capacity for spontaneity. 
The fragments were seen as the only possible vehicle for constructing a 
philosophical system that possessed any kind of spontaneous, organic unity, rather 
than a unity merely imposed from the outset. A number of essayistic genres are 
described and discarded in AF 77 before the ideal fragmentary form that would take 
part in a System aller Wissenschaften is posited.  
Ein Dialog ist eine Kette, oder ein Kranz von Fragmenten. Ein Briefwechsel ist ein 
Dialog in vergrößertem Maßstabe, und Memorabilien sind ein System vom 
Fragmenten. Es gibt noch keins was in Stoff und Form fragmentarisch, zugleich 
ganz subjektiv und individuell, und ganz objektiv und wie ein notwendiger Teil im 
System aller Wissenschaften wäre.  
A dialogue is a chain or garland of fragments. An exchange of letters is 
a dialogue on a larger scale, and memoirs constitute a system of 
fragments. But as yet no genre exists that is fragmentary both in form 
and content, simultaneously completely subjective and individual, and 
completely objective and like a necessary part in a system of all the 
sciences (AF 77). 
In an age that saw the rapid rise of science, industry, and various nationalisms, the 
organic whole comprising the subjective and objective and understood as a creative 
task was important for ethical and political reasons, as Andrew Bowie explains in 
Aesthetics and Subjectivity:  
The dissecting capacity of the Understanding in analysing an organism 
destroys the integrity of what it analyses. The plant which has become 
an object of scientific dissection can no longer exist as an organism 
because it has been taken apart as an object in terms of its other, the 
subject. Similarly, the procedures of scientific analysis of nature do not 
make nature into a coherent whole. Instead, nature is threatened with 
disintegration into endless difference. Applying such a conception to 
society means that the goals of society can only be legitimate if they 
sustain the integrity of all members of that society (1990/2003, p. 24). 
 
Without some concept of a whole, philosophy can offer no alternative to the 
analytical discourse of the sciences, yet the whole as such cannot be grasped 
cognitively, since, as the Romantics argued, it forms the horizon or condition of 
possibility of thought. The divinely given whole that had provided consolation to 
sceptics like Montaigne and Descartes in previous centuries was no longer available 
in the tumultuous period of the long 19th century. The lack of any whole, of a 
reckoning of the place of the human in nature or an understanding of nature as 
‘home’ (the site of our being) threatened – as Schelling and Heidegger would later 
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make clear – to turn all of nature into ‘goods’ to be used and likewise to turn human 
beings into nothing more than finite objects.77 Though the Romantics were 
interested in a collectivity that would maintain difference, they did not want 
difference to spin out into meaningless repetition or ‘bad infinity’.78 The 
multiplication of fragments was still intended as part of a singular endeavour or 
work, a new Bible (‘a system of books’ or ‘an infinite book’), even if this work was 
conceived as endlessly in the process of becoming.79 Having a system and not 
having a system are, for the Romantics, equally dangerous alternatives.  
 
Das eigentliche Philosophische System muß Freyheit und Unendlichkeit, oder, um es 
auffallend auszudrücken, Systemlosigkeit, in ein System gebraucht, seyn. Nur ein 
solches System kann die Fehler des Systems vermeiden und weder der 
Ungerechtigkeit, noch der Anarchie bezogen [bezichtigt] werden.  
 
An authentic philosophical system must systematize freedom and 
unendingness, or, to express it more strikingly, it must systematize 
systemlessness. Only such a system can avoid the errors of system and 
be accused of neither injustice nor anarchy (Novalis, 1978, p. 200: 
648/2003, p. 187: 648). 
 
Contrasting a systematised systemlessness with anarchy again suggests that the 
union the Romantics set out to perform in the writing of fragments was one of a 
republican fellowship in which different members could work together toward 
some common goal.  
 A ‘rigid system’ (KF 41) risks imposing a structure external to experience and 
so radically altering what one sets out to understand. In a prescient analogy, AF 46 
likens conceptual systematicity to ‘a march of soldiers on parade’. On the other 
hand, systemlessness threatens to simply leave one with the arbitrariness of 
unreflected experience. In the activity of systematising that never reaches a final 
system, akin to the ‘Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zweck’ structure of aesthetic experience in 
Kant’s third Kritik, the contigent or arbitrary is given meaning by becoming the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   77 This is precisely the flaw of idealist self-reflection; the absolute I that is doing the 
reflecting only encounters the finite I as an object. ‘Everywhere we seek the unconditioned, but 
find only things’ (l.c., 412: 1). 
 78 ‘Als vorübergehender Zustand ist der Skeptizismus logische Insurrektion; als System 
ist er Anarchie. Skeptische Methode wäre also ungefähr wie insurgente Regierung [As a 
temporary condition scepticism is logical insurrection; as a system it is anarchy. Sceptical method 
would therefore more or less resemble a rebellious government]’ (KFSA II, 1967, p. 179: 97).	  
 79 Ideen 95. 	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point from which to access and take part in the infinite. This is clearly carried over 
into the Romantic concept of Bildung—the formation of an entire person that made 
living into an artistic production of oneself. The hermeneutic structure of the 
fragment provides a performative engagement with the idea of creating oneself as 
an organic whole, a ‘manifold unity’; in so doing, as Sartre would later claim, the 
subject transforms being into meaning (Sartre, 1974, p. 160).  
 Romantic fragments thus exist between twin poles of temptation. On the 
one hand stands the false unity and coherence that is the risk of any systematising 
effort; on the other: the risk of the essayistic to dissolve into absolute discontinuity, 
meaninglessness, or sceptical aporia. The latter became a concern for the Romantics 
in a way that it had not been for earlier philosophers, who could still look to a 
divinely established order or at the very least to shared societal conventions for a 
coherent sense of the human. The Romantics signal a shift in the practice of 
therapeutic scepticism. Like previous essayistic authors, they make gestures to widen 
philosophy’s scope to include features of experience that get covered over in 
deductive or systematic accounts. They accept the basic sceptical argument, 
formulated by the Pyrrhonians and revived by Jacobi, that infinite regress is an 
inevitable part of the justification of knowledge claims. They seek a therapeutic 
remedy to this problem by removing the need for absolute justification, or at least 
the possibility of absolute justification at the beginning of a philosophical system. 
Schlegel proposes the trope of a circle rather than a vertical trope of uncovering the 
absolute as a ground. Novalis posits the impossibility of an absolute justificatory 
principle as the motor for philosophy as an endless activity. Like Montaigne and 
Hume, they embrace difference, the exception, and the individual. But in choosing 
the specific essayistic form of the fragment, they bring into focus the notion of a 
whole, of absolute knowing, toward which their various attempts are directed and as 
part of which they gain their meaning. By raising the possibility of the Whole as an 
impossible but at the same time necessary point of orientation – perhaps as a 
necessary fiction – the Romantics refuse to accept doubt as an ultimate position and 
keep alive a positive principle of hope, which infuses each attempt or fragment with 
meaning. Knowledge of the whole, an entirely classical notion of philosophy’s task, 
looks very different in the Romantics because the thinking of difference or non-
identity is crucial to the kind of whole they imagine: a manifold unity. It is a whole 
of examples, but the usual relationship between a form and an example of a form is 
	  	  
92	  
skewed because each example is said to already contain the form in itself, yet the 
form does not pre-exist as such to give meaning to these examples. The Romantic 
model strains the limits of thinking about part to whole, provisionality to 
completion. Schlegel describes Romantic philosophy as an alternation between self-
creation and self-destruction (KF 37), the production of meaning and the freedom 
of irony that enables, or perhaps forces, one to deconstruct and think against 
oneself in order to avoid the freezing or reification of experience. Philosophy thus 
becomes the art of alternating between hope and doubt. 
 Despite the nearly univocal optimism and lightness of tone of the 
fragments, one can read, as Kubiak does, a lurking anxiety in their insistence that 
fragmentary writing fit into some larger but always receding whole, as if absolute 
fragmentation were an ever-present spectre that needed to be warded off. Consider 
the following orgiastic description from Schlegel’s Ideen:  
 
Als Bibel wird das neue ewige Evangelium erscheinen, von dem Lessing geweissagt 
hat: aber nicht als einzelnes Buch im gewöhnlichen Sinne. Selbst was wir Bücher 
nennen ist ja ein System von Büchern [...]Und es ist ja wohl ein ewig wesentlicher 
und sogar praktischer Unterschied, ob ein Buch bloß Mittel zu einem Zweck, oder 
selbständiges Werk, Individuum, personificierte Idee ist. Das kann es nicht ohne 
Göttliches, und darin stimmt der esoterische Begriff selbst mit dem exoterischen 
überein; auch ist keine Idee isolirt, sondern sie ist was sie ist, nur unter allen Ideen 
[...] Auf eine ähnliche Weise sollen in der vollkommnen Litteratur alle Bücher nur 
Ein Buch sein, und in einem solchen ewig werdenden Buch wird das Evangelium der 
Menschheit und der Bildung offenbahrt werden. 
  
The new, eternal gospel that Lessing prophesied will appear as a bible: 
but not as a single book in the usual sense. Even what we now call the 
Bible is actually a system of books [...] And surely there is an eternally 
essential and even practical difference if a book is merely a means to an 
end, or an independent work, an individual, a personified idea. It cannot 
be this without divine inspiration, and here the esoteric concept is itself 
in agreement with the exoteric one; and, moreover, no idea is isolated, 
but is what it is only in combination with all other ideas [...] in a perfect 
literature all books should be only a single book, and in such an 
eternally developing book, the gospel of humanity and culture will be 
revealed (Novalis, 1978, p. 726: 95). 
 
While Schlegel makes the philosophically significant observation that the sense of 
any single idea or concept relies a web of signification, and so in some sense all 
ideas are connected, this insight alone does not do the work of guaranteeing a 
unified ‘gospel of humanity and culture’.  Furthermore, the claim that the Bible – as 
absolute book – is itself a ‘system of books’, simply reiterates the fragmentary nature 
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of any literary or philosophical effort, begging the question of how to understand 
these efforts as unified. The appeal to a vague notion of ‘divine inspiration’ is 
unsatisfying. For Kubiak, such moments represent the staging of a conflict that the 
Romantic fragment collections ‘ultimately fail to resolve’ (Kubiak, 1994, p. 447). 
 
On the one hand, the Romantics insist that the ground that reflection 
seeks for itself is forever lacking [...] This insight in turn opens up any 
writing with philosophical ambitions to the prospect of radical 
fragmentation. Philosophical writing, as the ‘result’ of reflection, can 
‘begin’ and ‘end’ only with an arbitrary interruption of this endless 
activity, when the desire that inhabits it is temporarily satisfied. But for 
this desire to be satisfied – even temporarily – requires precisely that 
reflection forget or repress the knowledge that its satisfactions can only 
be temporary (Ibid.). 
 
The suppression of the truth that any philosophical effort can be no more than 
what Schlegel calls ‘a pile of notes’ is in some sense necessary to continue to engage 
in the practice of philosophy; the Romantics translate the ultimate absence of 
ground for reflection into a motivating force—Novalis’ philosophy as ‘infinite free 
activity’, part of the endless process of philosophy and of self-formation. Yet the 
youthful enthusiasm in this passage perhaps too neatly glides over the real threat of 
dissolution that it seeks to dispel. The Athenäum group disbanded after three years 
and Novalis died an untimely death just one year later at the age of 31. As the 19th 
century wore on, optimism for the self-created, unified life that Romantic fragments 
were meant to represent waned in the face of industrialism, the ugly consequences 
of the French Revolution, and the expansion of the bureaucratic structures of 
modern capitalism. The spectre lurking on the margins of the Romantic fragments 
became harder to repress and the poetic unity-in-difference these works strove to 
achieve was overcome by more totalitarian structures of unification or by real, social 
mechanisms of fragmentation. Søren Kierkegaard’s response to the levelling 
political, philosophical, and theological structures that he recognised in his 
contemporary Denmark was to continue in the critical vein of therapeutic 
scepticism, but in a way that refused a purely immanent, poetic solution to the loss 
of given meaning. His solution is akin to Jacobi’s salto mortale. There has to be a 
passing out of the everyday and the horizontal in order to recover the world as 
something lost. Kierkegaard can be read as a way of thinking through some of the 
tensions in Romantic essayism and reviving doubt as a genuine existential crisis.  
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  Chapter	  5:	  Possibility	  in	  Kierkegaard’s	  imaginative	  discourses	  	  
 
Belief and doubt are not two different types of knowledge that can be determined in 
continuity with each other, because neither of them is a cognitive act; they are 
opposite passions.  
 
-Johannes Climacus, Philosophical Crumbs, 1843-480 
 
From what does pure thinking abstract? From existence, consequently from what it 
is supposed to explain. 
 
-Johannes Climacus, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Crumbs, 184681 
 
 When Lukács includes Kierkegaard’s imaginary diaries and short stories in 
his pantheon of the great ‘essays of life’ one cannot help but think that Kierkegaard 
would have been pleased to find himself in the company of ‘Plato’s Dialogues, the 
texts of the mystics, [and] Montaigne’s Essays’ (1974, p. 3). Certainly, Kierkegaard 
saw himself as a Socrates for his age, and a brief glance at his pseudonyms – 
Johannes de Silentio, Johannes Climacus, Anti-Climacus – reveals the influence of 
the Christian mystical tradition on his writings. Though scholars disagree about the 
level of Kierkegaard’s direct engagement with Montaigne,82 the similarities in form 
and sceptical method are undeniable. Yet Kierkegaard’s writings also stand apart 
from the rest of the cited authors in his use of pseudonyms and fictional characters 
to advance his ideas. Might this move into the literary disqualify Kierkegaard as a 
philosophical essayist? As Lukács reminds us, essayistic writings as such already 
involve a literary element, which he calls, by turns, art or poetry—defined by a 
concern with the form of the text that is not shared by the scientific neutrality to 
which he opposes the artistic.83 Claire de Obaldia argues further that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   80 Kierkegaard, 1985, p. 84. 
 81 Kierkegaard, 1992, p. 328.  	   82 See Grimsley (1966) and Landkildehus (2009) for more on Kierkegaard’s engagement 
with Montaigne. Grimsley makes a stronger case for Kierkegaard’s close study of the Essais, 
especially ‘Apology for Raimond Sebond’, while Lankildehus interprets the existing evidence to 
suggest that Kierkegaard was a more casual reader of Montaigne. Both acknowledge the 
similarities of theme and form in the two authors.  
 83 While Lukács’ distinction between the scientific and the artistic on the level of form is 
convincing, his too-neat division of artistic creation and the scientific truth both makes too little 
of the artist’s claim to truth and too much of the scientist’s, as Adorno notes in ‘Essay as Form’. 
Lukács claims that although the essay is of necessity artistic or poetic, it is nevertheless 
distinguished from art by its concern with linking life as lived to life as such, moving from 
occasions and concrete images to the ‘true life of the soul’ or the ‘ultimate questions’. However, 
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‘occasional’, polyphonic, and anti-systematic nature of the essay leads to the 
historical development of the novel, which transforms the multiple voices of a 
singular writing ‘I’ into fully-fledged fictional characters, dialogues, and situations. In 
their wholly imaginative frame, novels are a natural extension of the essay’s refusal 
to adjudicate in advance different ways of seeing. One recognises the seeds of this 
development in Plato’s dialogues, especially the more rhetorically complex dialogues 
like the Symposium that include frame narratives and other recognisable literary 
devices. F. Schlegel calls novels ‘the Socratic dialogues of our time’ (KF 26), and 
indeed, through a series of analogies, treats dialogues, novels, and fragment 
collections as a single generic family of Romantic poetry (e.g. AF 77). Schlegel’s 
Lucinde and Novalis’ Heinrich von Ofterdingen were experimental novels of ideas that 
staged the philosophical insights of German Romanticism in a dramatic way, 
offering an imaginative mode of reader engagement. Kierkegaard’s quasi-novelistic 
writings take part in this tradition of literary-philosophical hybrids that seem 
calculated to defy classification. By creating fictional ‘authors’ who embody 
particular life views, Kierkegaard advances existing strands of the essayistic, 
particularly polyvocality. The multiplicity of voices and the profusion of ironic, 
disjunctive structures within his texts furthers the anti-systematic, sceptical agenda 
of the texts we have already studied. 
 Kierkegaard is well-known for his critique of ‘the System’—a term that 
targets Hegelian idealism and the metaphysical tradition more broadly in its 
tendency to privilege being over existence or becoming, or to cover over the gap 
between the two. Like Montaigne and Hume, Kierkegaard worries that the temporal 
structure of everyday life is supressed by certain ways of speaking (philosophically), 
that the imposition of a conceptual structure onto lived experience can distort what 
one sets out to understand. Kierkegaard’s stated aim of combatting the System ‘by 
means of form’ (1985, p. 117) works to exploit the literary possibilities of the 
essayistic in order to gesture toward those features of existence that escape 
conceptualisation: motion or becoming or possibility, the particular or subjective, 
and religious faith. Like the other authors in this study, especially the Frühromantik 
who (along with 18th-century ironists such as Lessing and Hamann) inspired his 
ironic-polemical tone, Kierkegaard took form to be a matter of the utmost concern 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Lukács fails to appreciate that this same dynamic can be operative in any example of poetic or 
pictorial representation.  
	  	  
96	  
for the project of philosophy, seeing the choice of presentation as both an assertion 
of the conditions under which philosophy ought to begin and, implicitly, an ethical 
judgement of whether and how the truth can be learned or communicated. 
Kierkegaard emphatically rejects the notion that philosophical truth ought to be 
neutral or indifferent to the individual in the manner of scientific truth; like the 
great essayists and moralistes who precede him, he affirms that a subject’s knowledge 
of himself in relation to his own historical moment – 
including existing conventions, structures, and texts – must form the basis for 
philosophical enquiry. Likewise, he rejects objective or neutral discourse, the 
discourse of disembodied, de-subjectivised authority, which covers over 
communication as a problem and denies the hermeneutic insight that all 
communication is interested, defined in advance by the cultural parameters of 
language use and by the commitments of an individual author/reader. For 
Kierkegaard as for the Frühromantiker, a philosophical writer who fails to recognise 
these commitments is left in a default position of dogmatism,84 an offence for which 
he takes 19th-century Hegelian philosophy to task. Kierkegaard turns away from the 
project of establishing objective truth, the truth of ‘the System’, and instead asks the 
question of the significance of truth for the finite, existing subject, the ancient 
question of the value of knowledge for life. Rather than accept the false 
transcendence of abstraction or speculation, which achieves the eternal by removing 
the subject from time, he attempts to clear the way for a genuine opening or 
transcendence within the everyday.  
 
Doubt and faith 
 Kierkegaard is a writer preoccupied with the consequences of a tendency in 
both philosophy and in the prevailing religious attitudes of his time to ignore the 
fact of becoming, the subject as a possibility to be realised. In the preface to Fear 
and Trembling, Kierkegaard, writing under the pseudonym Johannes de Silentio, 
mounts an attack against those who would attempt to ‘go further’ than doubt or 
faith. He attributes this desire to ‘go further’ to a failure to appreciate the difficulty 
of both doubt and faith in the contemporary intellectual and cultural climate of 19th-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 84 Kierkegaard’s rejection of the possibility of neutral discourse also takes to heart 
Jacobi’s suggestion that non-conceptual conviction is a precondition for orienting oneself in the 
world, since it is only this kind of basic interest or passion that allows one to break free from the 
infinite regress of rational reflection. 
	  	  
97	  
century Denmark, which he describes as a ‘regular clearance sale’ of ideas (1994, p. 
3). He saw a culture of scientific optimism, quick to treat the problems of 
philosophy and religion as if they had already been worked out and needed just ‘one 
more stone’85 or one more commentary to reach completion; perhaps next Sunday 
the System – the total understanding of subject and world – would be finished 
(1992, p. 106).86 In a move that is typical of Kierkegaard’s approach to philosophical 
questions, de Silentio translates the question of doubting to the level of the 
individual and asks how doubt is ever to be overcome – or even entered into – by 
the existential subject. Posing the same question about faith, de Silentio remarks, 
‘Even though one were capable of converting the whole content of faith into the 
form of a concept, it does not follow that one has adequately conceived faith and 
understands how one got into it, or how it got into one’ (Ibid.). The equivalence of 
doubt and faith that runs through the preface, though never explicitly stated, is a 
significant rhetorical feature. De Silentio begins by considering the philosophical 
cheapening of doubt as an intellectual curiosity rather than a way of inhabiting the 
world, and proceeds to take up parallel discussion of faith in the same terms. The 
rationale for treating doubt and faith as twin movements is hardly self-evident from 
a philosophical perspective, since the foil of doubt is generally imagined to be 
certainty, certain knowledge. What Neil Gascoigne terms the ‘heroic’ response to 
scepticism purports to dispel sceptical doubt by establishing an ultimate ground for 
knowledge claims either in some rational principle or in direct access to sense data;87 
the assumption is that the problem of doubt could be solved by agreement on the 
proper criteria of justification.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 85 In the preface to Johannes Climacus, the unnamed author declares, ‘Someone who 
supposes that philosophy has never in all the world been so close as it is now to fulfilling its task 
of explaining all mysteries may certainly think it strange, affected, and scandalous that I choose 
the narrative form and do not in my small way hand up a stone to culminate the system’ 
(Kierkegaard, 1985, p. 117). 
 86 As a religious thinker, Kierkegaard specifically rejected the notion that one could be 
born into the Christian faith by virtue of being born in a Christian country (Denmark), as opposed 
to ‘working out [one’s] salvation in fear and trembling’. The immediate philosophical target of de 
Silentio’s remarks is H.L. Martensen, a prominent Danish Hegelian who taught that the Hegelian 
dialectic represented a triumph over doubt, thus reducing scepticism to a mere moment in the 
system; within this framework ‘going further’ was conceived as integral to the practice of 
philosophy. See H.L. Martensen’s review of J.L. Heiberg’s ‘Introductory Lectures to Speculative 
Logic’, Danske Maanedskrift, No. 16 for 1836, pp. 515ff. For a discussion of Kierkegaard’s 
critique of Martensen, see Stewart, 2003, pp. 261ff.   
 87 Hegel, influenced by the Frühromantik critiques of idealism, saw the absolute 
principle as progressive, as the end toward which philosophy would strive, rather than something 
given at the beginning. But unlike the Romantics, he conceived of this end of absolute knowing 
as not only achievable but logically necessary.  
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 De Silentio’s performative aim in treating doubt and faith as interchangeable 
is to suggest that the philosophical understanding of doubt as a problem of 
knowledge is hopelessly skewed: the way to recover from doubt is not through 
more certain knowledge, nor through the progressive acquisition of knowledge, but 
through the twin movement of acknowledgement of the inevitable fracture between 
thought and being, and faith or radical openness, akin to Jacobi’s salto mortale. 
Moreover, it is suggested that rather than ‘going further’ than doubt, we (readers) 
would be wise to attempt doubting in earnest. De Silentio admires Descartes and 
the ancient sceptics, for whom doubting was not only an achievement but also the 
task of a lifetime, requiring constant renewal in the face of what Kierkegaard in his 
journals describes as ‘the inveiglements of cognition’ (1985, p. 262/Pap. IV B 10: 18 
n.d.).88  
 As Danish bishops such as Kierkegaard’s former tutor H.L. Martensen were 
claiming victory over religious doubt as a mastered historical moment, as Hegel had 
done for scepticism, De Silentio proclaims that he ‘has not understood the System, 
does not know whether it actually exists, whether it is completed’ and insists that his 
own text ‘has nothing whatever to do with the System.’89 He denies readers a 
conceptual treatment of doubt or faith that would add to their knowledge and 
instead asks the question of what is at stake for the subject in these positions, or 
rather, movements. The worry with both doubt and faith is that one mistakenly tries to 
‘quantify oneself into’ them and so changes what must be continually renewed ‘into 
something else, into another kind of certainty’ (1992, p. 11). In a move that is 
indicative of Kierkegaard’s turn toward the subject as possibility, De Silentio aims to 
‘raise the price’ of both doubt and faith by using a variety of rhetorical means to 
present them as live existential possibilities.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 88 Kierkegaard takes up this subject in his 1842-1843 journals, the period during which 
he was composing Johannes Climacus, his most targeted treatment of sceptical doubt. ‘It was 
life’s task to keep on doubting despite all the inveiglements of cognition. Therefore, in a certain 
sense they were never finished [...] it is different when this doubting everything is supposed to be 
the beginning’ (1992, p. 262). In an journal entry from the same period, Kierkegaard indirectly 
accuses philosophy of trying to wheedle its way out of the anxiety of doubt: ‘has Descartes done 
it for all of us in the same way that Christ was crucified?’ (1985, p. 246/Pap. IV B 2: 16).  
 89 This remark should be read in light of Johannes Climacus’ critique of Hegel in 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript: ‘[I]f the conclusion is lacking at the end, it is also lacking at 
the beginning [...] but if the conclusion is lacking at the beginning, this means that there is no 
system. A house can indeed be finished even though a bell pull is lacking, but in a scholarly 
construction the lack of a conclusion has retroactive power to make the beginning doubtful and 





 The treatment of doubt and faith as poles of the same existential activity – 
which is consistent across the pseudonymous works and the journals – gives 
Kierkegaard’s writing a therapeutic shape. While his writings do not, like the therapy 
of the ancient Pyrrhonians, recommend falling back on the conventional practices 
of the everyday, or living ‘naturally’, both Kierkegaardian and Pyrrhonian therapy 
work to disabuse readers of the notion that there is any conceptual or philosophical 
solution to the question: when does one know enough to really know? Put another 
way, Kierkegaard shares with Pyrrhonism the insight that knowledge is inadequate 
to address the problem of how to orient oneself in the world.  
 Kierkegaard – both in the journals and through his meta-pseudonym 
Johannes Climacus – accepts the basic sceptical argument that positive knowledge 
claims are ultimately groundless, since ‘sense certainty’ is a ‘delusion’ (1992, p. 81) 
and, as Jacobi had argued, foundationalism does not offer a way of halting the 
infinite regress of rational reflection (Ibid., p. 116, pp. 328ff). As a result, suspension 
or withholding of judgement is the only rational conclusion of philosophical 
investigation. Climacus adds to these critiques his own thesis that positive 
knowledge claims – sense certainty, historical knowledge, or speculative knowledge 
– are illusory because they ‘fail to express the state of the knowing subject in 
existence’ (1992, p. 81). Climacus’ objection centres on the temporal dimension of 
subjectivity as explored by Montaigne and the Romantics: the subject never exists as 
a fully realised actuality, is never fully present to itself, but is only in the process of 
becoming. Positive knowledge claims, which assert a truth about being or what is, 
thus stand in contradiction with the negative state of becoming that characterises 
subjectivity. In order to claim certain knowledge of anything90, one must transform 
oneself into a ‘fictitious object subject, and to mistake oneself for such a subject is 
to be fooled and to remain fooled’ (1992, p. 81). Transforming the I of the existing 
subject into an I that is an object for itself (an object for thought) is precisely the 
error for which Novalis and the Frühromantiker criticise Fichtean idealism;91 this 
error is perpetuated in any system that locates its ground in the I of self-reflection 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 90 Climacus makes an exception for the claim ‘I exist’, which he finds consistent with 
subjectivity, but asserts that one cannot extrapolate from this claim a speculative I or a necessary 
I as various species of idealism attempted to do (1992, p. 81).  
 91 Novalis, 1978, II: p. 9 
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but forgets that self-reflection is a process of ‘reciprocal determination 
[Wechselbeweis]’92 and so forgets that the I is always doubled, never self-identical.93 
The consequence of the non-identical, deferred status of the I for the Frühromantiker 
is that any hope of a closed philosophical system must be replaced with infinite 
striving or infinite approximation toward a poetic-philosophical Book of Books 
made of accumulated fragments. Kierkegaard is in some ways more radical – and far 
less optimistic – than his Romantic forebears, displacing the hope for a supreme 
Work with a more resolutely negative literary strategy of taking away knowledge, 
leading his readers to aporia. Infinite striving remains an apt characterisation of the 
subject’s position, but in Kierkegaard this requires a rupture from philosophy and 
an opening toward faith.   
 As we have already seen, the Romantics developed a heterogeneous ‘system 
of fragments’ to represent the necessarily open-ended structure of existence. 
Rhetorically, they used irony as a way of resisting the ‘urge to unity’ that would 
smooth over the real differences between the absolute and the existing subject. 
Kierkegaard too develops his style with the aim of keeping alive the tension of 
possibility and striving that defines existence. In praise of the 18th-century 
playwright and philosopher (and notorious ironist) Lessing, Kierkegaard’s Climacus 
declares that ‘Lessing and the systematician94, both speak of a continued striving—
the only difference is that Lessing is obtuse or truthful enough to call it a continued 
striving, the systematician sagacious and untruthful enough to call it a system’ (1992, 
p. 108). To better illustrate the bad faith existential position of the systematician, 
Climacus offers a joke about a man who loses a silk umbrella and, in order to have 
the best chances of reclaiming it, advertises that he has lost a cotton umbrella 
instead. Climacus provides his own gloss on the joke: perhaps the ‘systematising’ 
philosopher hopes to sell more copies by advertising his work as an ‘absolute 
system’ rather than what it really is: the attempt at or approximation of a system.95 
In this case the parable is an odd fit, since the man with the missing umbrella 
advertises something cheaper than what he actually owns, whereas the philosopher 
advertises something more than he is able to deliver. However, the apparent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 92 Schlegel, KFSA XVIII, 1963, p. 518: 16 
 93 ‘Principien sind immer im Plural, konstruiren such unter einander; nie nur Eins, wie 
die Grundwüthigen wähnen’ (KFSA XVIII, 2006, p. 395: 105).   
 94 Kierkegaard does not give his ‘systematician’ a name, but Hegel, or some 
contemporary Danish Hegelian, is the most likely target.  
 95 Kierkegaard had come to the same conclusion as F. Schlegel: ‘Jedes System ist nur 
Approximation seines Ideals. Die ‘Skepsis ist ewig’ (KFSA XVIII, 2006, p. 417: 1149). 
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discrepancy disappears when it is borne in mind that for Kierkegaard the object of 
greater worth is not ‘the System’ but the continual striving of the existing subject. 
Read on this level the systematic philosopher has ‘lost’ himself and has erroneously 
tried to recover the subjectivity that he has lost by transforming it into a speculative 
‘I-I’; the latter is much cheaper and requires far less effort than the task of becoming 
or realising oneself in existence, for ‘to think abstractly is easier than to exist’ (1992, 
p. 308). The joke is an illustration of the danger of systematic thought that replaces 
what it sets out to explain with an inferior substitute. The very terms of the 
investigation ensure that the object sought will never be recovered. 
 For Kierkegaard as for Jacobi and the Romantics, non-conceptual 
conviction or what Kierkegaard calls interest [Interesse] is a precondition for acting in 
the world. Climacus compares his understanding of the existential leap required for 
action to Jacobi’s salto mortale and Schelling’s notion of intellectual intuition 
(intellektuelle Anschauung). All three notions point to the need for a category of 
immediate existential awareness or decision to put an end to infinite regress, or, 
what amounts to the same thing, to enable one to begin (acting).96 The gap between 
possibility and action, for which the leap is required, is described by Climacus as 
infinitely wide. Since rational reflection, as Jacobi demonstrated, can continue 
indefinitely, acting or beginning cannot be considered the result of reflection but 
only come about as the result of arbitrarily cutting off reflection: an act of will 
(1992, p. 116). Scepticism itself is, for Kierkegaard, a version of the interested 
commitment exemplified by faith. In his 1842-1843 journals, he distinguishes 
between ignorance, uncertainty, and doubt in order to establish the element of 
willing in doubt and to suggest that doubt, properly understood, cannot be insulated 
from the sphere of practical action. Doubt is described as ‘a higher element of 
uncertainty’ in that ‘I determine my relation to a thing—[and] I do not determine it 
in uncertainty’ (1985, p. 262). As a decisive orientation, doubting implies 
responsibility for my own possibility, giving meaning to contingency. ‘Doubt is the 
beginning of the ethical, for as soon as I am to act, the interest lies with me 
inasmuch as I assume the responsibility and thereby acquire significance’ (Ibid, p. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 96 Climacus ultimately sees his conception of the ‘leap’ as prefigured in a passing 
remark by Lessing. Schelling’s intuition lacks the notion of decisiveness or will that Climacus 
wishes to maintain, and Jacobi commits the error of trying to convince others to make the leap 
and thus of unwittingly becoming a stumbling block. See Climacus’ touching account of 
Lessing’s final hours when his friend Jacobi encouraged him to give up his Spinozism and 
embrace the Christian faith (1992, p. 101). 
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265). As it relates to communication, this insight leads to the conclusion that the 
object of philosophical writing is not to provide knowledge or to guarantee the 
truth of what is said by the elaboration of a method; rather, it is to address the 
subject’s relationship or commitment to what is known. For ‘even if the system 
were absolutely perfect, even if the actuality [Virkelighed] exceeded the advance 
reports, doubt would still not be overcome – it only begins – for doubt is based on 
interest, and all systematic knowledge is disinterested’ (1992, p. 170).97 This focus on 
the subjective and on doubt as an expression of interest is meant as a reaction 
against the notion that sceptical doubt could be overcome by a more philosophically 
rigorous process of justification that would ensure that one were ‘getting reality 
right’. In opposition to this tendency, Kierkegaard’s rhetorical strategy often takes 
the form of Socratically leading his readers to doubt, since doubt at the very least 
requires staking one’s claim, which for Kierkegaard is the precondition for any kind 
of genuine philosophical or ethical engagement.    
 As the pseudonymous Climacus explores in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 
the gap between a neutral mathematical proposition such as 2+2=4 and an account 
of existence is a gap of interest, of something at stake for the subject; thus in the 
latter case, ‘the object of communication is consequently not a knowledge but a 
realisation’ (1967, p. 272: 649). The question of the how of truth raised by essayistic 
writing and, more proximately, by Jacobi and the German Romantic tradition, is 
paramount for Kierkegaard and his task of making readers aware of the 
commitments that shape their way of being in and interrogating the world. The 
same concerns about the existential significance of truth that led the Romantics to 
reject a Grundsatz for philosophy and to orient themselves toward a whole98 leads 
Kierkegaard to emphasise the subjective appropriation of truth. Both recognised 
that idealism – in the case of the Romantics, that of Fichte and Reinhold, and in 
Kierkegaard’s case that of Hegel – sacrificed an existential subject for a conceptual 
I, unwittingly giving up on the possibility of a philosophy grounded in and able to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 97 See Johannes Climacus: ‘In this respect he considered the conduct of the Greek 
sceptics far more consistent than the modern overcoming of doubt. They were well aware that 
doubt is based on interest, and therefore with perfect consistency they thought they could cancel 
doubt by transforming it into apathy (ataraxia). In this method there was a consistency, whereas 
it was an inconsistency [...] that motivated modern philosophy to want to conquer doubt 
systematically. Even if the system were absolutely perfect, even if the actuality [Virkelighed] 
exceeded the advance reports, doubt would still not be overcome –it only begins – for doubt is 
based on interest, and all systematic knowledge is disinterested’ (1992, p. 170).   
 98 See Chapter 4. 
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address itself to the existing person and unwittingly eliminating freedom or 
possibility. ‘For Kierkegaard, metaphysics, ethics, and theology – in short the length 
and breadth of the “onto-theo-logic” – shatter against the rocks of [subjective] 
“interest”’ (Caputo, 1987, p. 33).99 The unity and coherence that Fichte and Hegel 
were able to achieve was for their critics nothing more than a philosophical sleight 
of hand; the ethical-aesthetic project of Bildung – in Kierkegaard the project of 
opbyggelige (edifying or upbuilding) – sought to redress this wrong with a philosophy 
that would acknowledge the open structure of existence and its absolute difference 
from conceptual thought. 
  
Plurality and irony 
 Kierkegaard realises the literary possibilities of the essayistic mode, 
developing the characteristic multiplicity of perspectives and voices into fully-
fledged fictional characters—both his pseudonyms and the fictional characters 
within his works. The shift from discursive writing to fictional narratives is an 
example of the continuum of possibilities for essayistic writing and the ease with 
which the imaginative consideration of different points of view in authors such as 
Montaigne and Hume can be developed into novelistic techniques. Though 
Kierkegaard is the first of the authors examined in this study to use pseudonymous 
characters,100 his motive for this development is familiar. Montaigne featured as a 
character in his essays in order to show the multiplicity or non-identity of the 
individual subject. The heterogeneous unity of the Romantic fragments was an 
attempt to represent the successive unfolding of truth for the subject in time. 
Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous characters allow for a polyphony of voices and a 
heterogeneity of perspectives on the same themes of non-identity and temporal 
existence. Furthering the Romantic move to combat the ‘Trieb nach Einheit’ (Schlegel, 
KF 103) or the appeal to objective authority by removing an author, Kierkegaard 
invents multiple authors, multiple personalities, none of whom claim any final 
authority. His richly conceived pseudonyms are an example of the focus on the 
subject as the site of truth; through heterogeneous perspectives, Kierkegaard raises 
the question, not of how we can know enough to be sure of what we know, but of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 99 See Repetition, 2009, p. 19.  
 100 As noted in the beginning of this chapter, Schlegel and Novalis had already 
experimented with writing philosophical novels.  
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how we come to see the world under a certain aspect, as well as how we might learn 
to see in a new way.  
 Each of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms speaks in the first person, enacting his 
commitment to placing ‘I’s into the middle of life’ since it is ‘completely lacking in 
our age for someone to say: I’ (1967, p. 302: 656/Pap. VIII. 2 B 88 n.d.). Yet it 
would be a mistake to read the pseudonyms as embodiments of stable identities or 
fixed ways of life, e.g. the aesthetic, ethical, and religious. Rather, in every case, 
Kierkegaard uses the pseudonyms to explore a certain kind of movement: the 
possibility of becoming other than one is, which is a live possibility for the subject 
qua subject. Kierkegaard is above all a philosopher of becoming, for whom timeless, 
eternal categories such as identity can be of use only to logic, not to the existing 
subject.  
 
As long as I live in time, the principle of identity is only an abstraction. 
Therefore nothing is easier than to delude oneself and others into 
thinking the identity of all by abandoning diversity. Nevertheless, one 
might ask such a person how he conducts himself with regard to living, 
since in identity I am beyond time [...] The confusion arises only from 
living in categories different from those used in writing books—O 
wretched book-writing! (1967, p. 329: 705). 
 
The concerns about identity in this passage – both the identity that comes from 
transforming a subject into an object ‘beyond time’ through reifying reflection, and 
the dangerous urge to unify everything in thought by ignoring difference – resonate 
with those of the essayists we have already considered. As a means of combatting 
philosophy’s tendency to abandon diversity and think everything under the category 
of an eidos, Kierkegaard adopts a rhetorical strategy of plunging the reader into the 
tension of temporal life and becoming through the use of conflicting perspectives 
(within and across works) and through gestures of ironic reflexivity. The inherent 
comedy of writing books to combat book writing does not escape Kierkegaard, who 
sometimes suggests that keeping silent would be the best response of all. Yet his 
version of ‘book writing’ is an attempt to maintain difference and to heighten, 
rather than level out, a sense of the self as possibility. The dialectical movements 
within each text strain the boundaries of how each pseudonymous author 
understands himself. As the characters end up revealing the limitations of their own 
perspectives, the reader is given a model for transformative self-reflection. Though 
Kierkegaard’s ultimate aim as an author is to open the possibility of Christian 
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truth,101 this takes place primarily through negative gestures of subtraction or 
breaking down, which strip away the illusions of self-presence and certainty that 
prevent genuine opening or transcendence.  
 The novelistic strategy of fictional characters involves what Kierkegaard 
describes as an ethical deception—a kind of lie that tells the truth or can lead to the 
truth. ‘”To deceive into the truth.” [...] Ethical communication in character begins 
with placing a “deception” in between [the teacher and the learner], and the art 
consists in enduring everything while remaining faithful to character in the 
deception and faithful to the ethical’ (Kierkegaard, 1967, 1: p 288: 24). The 
development of characters that do not represent the author’s actual position but 
that may be able to help the reader to a moment of recognition reflects 
Kierkegaard’s heightened awareness of the hazards of communication, and written 
communication in particular. He conceives of communication as an art, in which 
truth or untruth resides in the form.102 For Kierkegaard, in addition to the dangers 
of language, which as the medium of the universal threatens to erase the particular, 
an author faces the additional difficulty that ‘there is really nothing people want to 
do more than to mimic’ (1967, p. 274: 649: 24). In order to make philosophical 
writing existentially significant for the reader, Kierkegaard resorts to the art of irony, 
championed by the Frühromantiker.  
 Romantic irony, as it relates to the practice of writing, denotes gestures of 
self-consciousness or self-reflection in which an author goes beyond the established 
frame of the work. Texts like Tristram Shandy or Don Quixote that constantly 
comment on their own composition are frequently cited by the Romantics as the 
paradigm of romantic or ironic writing. The ability to abstract from one’s immediate 
circumstances is considered a measure of aesthetic and intellectual refinement. In 
the Kritische Fragmente, Schlegel cautions against the enthusiasm that simply wants to 
‘blurt out everything’ and recommends aesthetic distance: ‘in order to write well 
about something, one shouldn’t be interested in it any longer’ (KF 37). Schlegel uses 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 101 See the posthumously published Point of View for my Work as an Author, in which 
Kierkegaard claims: ‘that I am and was a religious author, that the whole of my work as an author 
is related to Christianity, to the problem “of becoming a Christian”, with a direct or indirect 
polemic against the monstrous illusion that we call Christendom, or against the illusion that in 
such a land as ours we are Christians of a sort’ (Kierkegaard, 1998, pp. 5-6). 
 102 ‘The man who says what is true can act as foolishly as the one who says what is 
untrue: we are talking about the way you say it not what you say. My humour is to consider the 
form as much as the substance, and the barrister as much as his case, as Alcibiades told us’ 
(Montaigne, 1992, p. 370, III: 8). 
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the more direct terms ‘deception’ and ‘dissimulation’ (KF 108) to describe the shape 
that Romantic works ought to take. For Kierkegaard as for Schlegel, irony is a 
licensed form of ‘deception’ because, as Schlegel explains, ‘it is meant to deceive no 
one except those who consider it a deception and who either take pleasure in the 
delightful roguery of making fools of the whole world or else become angry when 
they get an inkling they themselves might be included’ (KF 108). The deception 
involved in irony – the breaking of the narrative illusion in a fictional work or the 
humorous or disorienting introduction of incongruous perspectives in a discursive 
work – is thus a way of challenging the accepted terms of a discourse, since the 
opening up of a new perspective casts into doubt or relativises the existing frame. 
For both Kierkegaard and the Romantics, Socrates –‘playful and serious, guilelessly 
open and deeply hidden’ (Schlegel, 1971, p. 155) – was the model for how irony 
could enrich the practice of philosophy, constantly shifting the terrain to take away 
the possibility of certainty or complacency.   
 In Kierkegaard’s works, the author – whether a pseudonym or Kierkegaard 
as a fictionalised writing subject in his ‘direct’ works – is present both in the use of 
the first person and in various narrative techniques of what Schlegel calls permanent 
irony or parabasis: intrusions of the author or ‘interruption[s] of a discourse by a shift 
in rhetorical register (de Man, 1996, p. 169, 178)’ that break up a unified reading of 
the texts and alienate text from reader. The philosophical import of such ironic 
gestures is that they demonstrate the freedom of self-reflection to always go beyond 
itself while at the same time exposing the necessarily limited nature of any given 
frame of reference. The ironist ‘remains faithful to the ethical’ in that the ultimate 
goal of irony is to make the reader aware of her own freedom. For Kierkegaard, this 
is the ‘highest relationship one human could have to another’ (1985, pp. 10-11). 
When Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous authors lack the appearance of earnestness (the 
author ‘first and foremost does not seem to be an earnest man’ (1967, p. 274: 649: 
24)) and present perspectives that are ultimately limited or erroneous, the reader is 
put at a distance from the text, in much the same way as an unreliable narrator 
complicates the reading of a novel. The discerning reader cannot remain passive but 
is forced into an active role of determining the meaning of the text in a dialectical 
relationship with the narrator, who cannot be relied upon as an authority. 
Kierkegaard declares that ‘one can never mimic an ironist, for he is a Proteus who 
incessantly alters the deception’ (1967, p. 274: 649: 24). This Protean quality is 
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characteristic of the way in which he approaches his authorship: changing masks, 
alternating perspectives and rhetorical modes in order to force the reader into 
activity. Kierkegaard’s preoccupation with form suggests the ethical impossibility of 
bringing another person along in any direct sense and the simultaneous impossibility 
of giving up on the task of communicating. According to F. Schlegel, irony, in 
constantly opening the possibility of other perspectives, ‘contains and arouses a 
feeling of indissoluble antagonism [...] between the impossibility and the necessity of 
complete communication’ (KF 108).  
 Kierkegaard’s use of multiple perspectives, a feature of all essayistic texts, 
functions as parabasis in disrupting the possibility of a unified reading. One of the 
most distinctive features of Kierkegaard’s style is the division of his texts into 
numerous sections that approach a problem from either a different philosophical or 
a different rhetorical angle and break with what came before, sometimes in the form 
of an explicit retraction.103 Either/Or (1843), perhaps the work in Kierkegaard’s 
oeuvre that most resembles a book of classical essays, exploits this disjunctive mode 
of presentation to great effect. The work offers no fewer than nine autonomous 
texts—in the ‘Either’ half of the work alone. From the aesthetically-minded author 
known only as ‘A’ or ‘The Young Man’, there are thematic essays on boredom (‘The 
Rotation of Crops’) and the role of chance in artistic production (‘First Love’), a 
series of fragments after the fashion of the Frühromantik (‘Diapsalmata’), and an 
essay of musical criticism on Mozart’s Don Giovanni (‘The Musical Erotic’). Also 
included in this half of the work is a series of letters and journal entries from a 
second character called Johannes and his lover Cordelia (‘The Seducer’s Diary’). 
Like the Young Man, Johannes embodies the aesthetic life, but in the more 
calculated form of a seducer, for whom actuality – and flesh-and-blood women – 
are valued only as material for aesthetic contemplation. The ‘Or’ half of the work 
presents a defence of marriage and the ethical life from a Judge Wilhelm, in 
response to the young man of the first half of the work. The last subdivision of ‘Or’ 
is a sermon, written by an unnamed pastor friend of the Judge, which introduces a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 103 Kierkegaard’s works include an excessive amount of paratextual material – prefaces, 
introductions, ‘attunements’, preambles, and ‘preliminary expectorations’ – that identify the 
author’s point of view (‘I am a poet’ ‘I am a midwife’ ‘I am not philosopher’ ‘I am not a 
Christian’) and sometimes threaten to swallow up the whole of a work. In 1844 Kierkegaard 
published an entire book of prefaces entitled Prefaces: Light Reading for People in Various 
Estates According to Time and Opportunity. Elaborate subtitles – ‘a mimical-pathetical-
dialectical compilation’, a ‘Christian psychological exposition for edification and awakening’ – 
also reflect an interest in experimenting with different generic approaches.  
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religious perspective into the work that departs from both the aesthetic and the 
ethical. Finally, the whole work is framed by an introduction from the editor Victor 
Eremita, who, having found the assembled papers in the drawer of an antique desk, 
offers his own interpretation of the good life, in tune with the Judge. Kierkegaard 
includes an additional frame narrative in the work, as ‘A’ accidentally discovers and 
then decides to publish the diary of his friend Johannes (the ‘seducer’). The frame-
within-frame structure is typical of the kind of highly reflexive novels that the 
Frühromantiker celebrated,104 whose narratives are interrupted with digressions at 
every opportunity. The excessive multiplication of frames gives the reader a 
heightened awareness of points-of view without providing any direction for how to 
navigate or resolve the perspectives, thus reproducing the tension of lived 
experience and providing a fictional space within which to ‘assay’ different points of 
view. Kierkegaard’s meta-pseudonym Climacus comments on the form of 
Either/Or: ‘That there is no conclusion and no final decision is an indirect 
expression for truth as inwardness and in this way perhaps a polemic against truth 
as knowledge’ (1992, p. 252). As with all instances of irony, and particularly the 
species of pervasive irony or parabasis in Kierkegaard’s texts, the ‘inward’ work of 
appropriation is left to the reader. Climacus’ separation of truth from knowledge in 
this remark reflects the overall therapeutic shape of Kierkegaard’s project, which 
forms a part of the wider shift away from truth as certain knowledge in the tradition 
of essayistic writings.  
 Eremita’s frame narrative is worthy of further attention, as it provides 
additional insight into Kierkegaard’s authorial strategy. The frame narrative is a 
classic technique of epistolary, another genre in the essayistic mode; like his 
counterpart in Les Liaisons dangereuses, Eremita claims to have organised the papers 
he discovered in what he takes to be chronological order, but he otherwise leaves 
them unedited. Kierkegaard’s use of the frame device is twofold. Firstly, he seeks to 
prevent the reception of Either/Or as a systematic, or even recognisable, work of 
philosophy. The reader is encouraged to see the text as the product of a chance 
series of events: ‘A’ saving the original papers, Eremita choosing to buy this desk 
and not another, finding a secret drawer, etc.. There is no attempt to fashion the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 104 These are also the effects favoured by postmodern authors such as John Barthes, 
Jorge Luis Borges, and Thomas Pynchon.  
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‘dyed rags’105 of textual integrity. In this, the work resembles Romantic fragments, 
which were also designed with a deliberately anti-systematic structure, and 
Montaigne’s Essais, which are peppered with declarations of their own décousu 
structure. Of course, as in these works, Eremita’s deflection from the artifice of the 
work is part of a highly sophisticated rhetorical strategy to incorporate contingency 
into the structure of the work.  
 Reflecting on the structure of essayistic texts, a rubric under which he 
includes Kierkegaard’s imaginative discourses, Adorno remarks that an essay is 
always constructed such that it could break off at any point.  
 
It thinks in fragments just as reality is fragmented and gains its unity only by moving 
through the fissures, rather than by smoothing them over. The unanimity of the 
logical order deceives us about the antagonistic nature of that on which it was 
jauntily imposed. Discontinuity is essential to the essay, its concern is always a 
conflict brought to a standstill’ (1984, p. 164).  
 
In this view, Kierkegaard’s ironic interruption of his texts through different 
existential perspectives or rhetorical/generic registers functions as an alternative to a 
logical or deductive ordering of life, in which order is imposed externally on 
processes which are essentially ‘antagonistic’ ‘fissured’ or conflictual.106 Lukács 
suggests an additional way of understanding the significance of these gestures of 
interruption. After an essayistic text poses its essential question,  
 
something comes from outside – from a reality which has no 
connection with the question nor with that which, as the possibility of 
an answer, brings forth a new question to meet it – and interrupts 
everything. This interruption is not an end, because it does not come 
from within, and yet it is the most profound ending because a 
conclusion from within would have been impossible. Such an 
interruption, however, can only be viewed humouristically. It has so 
little connection with that which it interrupts [...] But it is also a 
profound life-symbol – and, for that reason, still more profoundly 
humorous – that the essential is always interrupted by such things in 
such a way (1971, p. 14). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   105 F. Schlegel, Critical Fragment 31: ‘many a work of art whose coherence is never 
questioned is, as the artist knows quite well himself, not a complete work but a fragment, or one 
or more fragments, a mass, a plan. But so powerful is the instinct for unity in mankind that the 
author himself will often bring something to a kind of completion which simply can't be made a 
whole or a unit; often quite imaginatively and yet completely unnaturally. The worst thing about 
it is that whatever is draped about the solid, really existent fragments in the attempt to mug up a 
semblance of unity consists largely of dyed rags.’ 




As in Montaigne’s Essais, the disjunctive, apparently random structure of 
Kierkegaard’s texts is a deliberate strategy meant to highlight the role of contingency 
in temporal existence. Lukács suggests that the structure of lived experience, which 
the essay attempts to preserve in its form, is one in which an organic conclusion or 
a reconciliation of antagonisms is impossible. Thus the way in which the various 
discussions or perspectives in Kierkegaard’s texts come to an end without 
resolution is in fact ‘the most profound ending’ because this disjunction offers 
readers the occasion to reflect on the open-ended structure of experience in its 
difference from the structure of a conceptual system. Kierkegaard’s ironic 
interruptions function more specifically as a polemical contrast to the Hegelian 
‘system’, particularly the movement of the Aufhebung, which Kierkegaard viewed as 
logically and existentially incoherent. In Hegelian logic, particular actuality is 
conceived of as abstract and the whole is considered concrete, which renders 
difference an illusion. ‘What is true is rather found in motion, in a process, however, 
in which there is rest; difference, while it lasts, is but a temporary condition, through 
which comes unity, full and concrete’ (Hegel, ‘Lectures on the History of 
Philosophy’, 1955, I, pp. 23-25). The system reaches its conclusions only by 
‘smoothing over’ the difference between thought and being and ‘abandoning 
diversity’.107  
 There is much in Kierkegaard’s work to suggest that he shared Lukács’ view 
of the comedy of disjunctive structures deriving from the observation of these same 
structures in experience. Lukács opposes essays to works of tragedy, which function 
according to a logic of reconciliation that provides the meaning of the whole at the 
end. By contrast, the structure of the essay is occasional, with external accidents 
rather than an a priori fate or design determining its progression; the ‘occasion’ 
(anledning—that which leads to) is a major theme in Either/Or and appears in a 
number of Kierkegaard’s works. The character Johannes laments in his diary the 
lack of opportunity to carry out his plans to seduce the young Cordelia because she 
rarely leaves the house of her aunt. In one journal entry, he pleads with chance, 
declaring:  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 107 While Hegel and Kierkegaard are both thinkers of motion, Kierkegaard, influenced 
by the readings of the Danish Hegelians, viewed Hegel’s dialectic as effectively arrested by an 
overarching system. Hegel, for Kierkegaard, denied any distinction between thought and being 
and so failed to take seriously the structure of becoming.   
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You whom I love with all my soul, in whose image I form myself [...] I 
challenge you to a fight—why do you not make your appearance? 
Cursed chance, I am waiting for you! Just as a temple dancer dances to 
the honour of the god [Guden], so I have consecrated myself to your 
service; light, thinly clad, limber unarmed, I renounce everything. I own 
nothing; I desire nothing; I love nothing; I have nothing to lose [...] 
Surprise me—I am ready. (1987, p. 327). 
 
Johannes declares himself ‘ready’ to be surprised by fate, having lightened himself 
through the renunciation of all desires and possessions. In this case, the chance 
occasion for which he waits is a poetic one, since Johannes relies on actuality as 
‘material’ for his poetic reflections. Indeed, Either/Or links poetic composition in 
general to the ‘occasion,’ defined as ‘the nothing that lets everything come forth’ 
(1987, p. 236), ‘the extra element for an inner decision to become an outer decision’ 
(1987, p. 234). Within this framework, that which allows possibility to be actualised 
is entirely out of the subject’s hands, since chance, by definition, simply happens 
and cannot be willed. ‘This is a secret implicit in actuality—an offense to the Jews 
and a foolishness to the Greeks. The occasion is always the accidental, and the 
prodigious paradox is that the accidental is absolutely just as necessary as the 
necessary’ (1987, p. 234). The notion of the accidental as necessary is a formulation 
of the contingency of experience, as expressed by Lukács and Adorno, the comic 
element of existence that is reduplicated in the essay’s discontinuous structure. 108 
Johannes describes it as God’s joke on mankind to have ‘something so insignificant 
and inferior, something people are almost ashamed to talk about in polite society, be 
absolutely part of it all’ (1987, p. 328). Thus Kierkegaard seems to suggest that 
Johannes’ preparation and readiness to be surprised, though in some sense 
paradoxical and comic, can also be read as a healthy openness toward the 
contingency of existence. 
  Johannes’ discussion of the occasion may also contain a clue, albeit in 
parodic or negative form,109 about the role of grace in Christian faith and about the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 108 The language of Johannes’ description of the occasion also makes it clear that 
Kierkegaard is targeting Hegel’s handling of possibility in the Logic, which Kierkegaard rejects 
in favour of an Aristotelian view.  
 109 There is ample evidence within the text to suggest that Johannes’ openness to chance 
is intended to be parodic of the receptivity to divine grace in Christianity. Johannes’ plea is 
specifically a parody of Job’s conversation with God, a moment that receives parodic treatment 
in another of Kierkegaard’s 1843 writings: Repetition. Parody in Kierkegaard’s work tends to be 
used to express a partial truth from within the limited perspective of a particular life view. We are 
given clues in E/O that Johannes’ aesthetically orientated remarks are meant to open up a 
comparison with the parallel Christian notion of grace. Johannes, tellingly, links the occasion to 
the teacher/learner relationship (p. 258) in addition to associating it with composition. This 
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nature of Kierkegaardian communication. Across his signed and pseudonymous 
works, Kierkegaard insists that he cannot directly bring another to the truth or to 
faith, that this exceeds the bounds of what one person can do for another. But he 
nevertheless frequently refers to his work as an ‘occasion’. If one were to apply 
Johannes’ notion of the occasion to this disclaimer in other texts, it would seem that 
Kierkegaard in fact gives his texts quasi-divine status as the arbitrary yet necessary 
element that catalyses the subject as possibility into decisive action. However, this 
reading relies on Johannes getting the concept of the occasion right, and it is more 
plausible that, like Kierkegaard’s other pseudonyms, Johannes the Seducer grasps 
some, but not all of the truth of his subject. This partial failure is suggested by the 
fact that the aesthete suffers from his dependence on chance, forced to receive from 
the outside what is essential to his being.110 In the Christian framework by contrast, 
the ‘extra element’ of grace required for self-realisation is not wholly external to 
oneself, since it issues from the absolute in which the self is grounded, enabling one 
to become what one truly is (1983, p. 16). This is why, in Fragments, Kierkegaard 
replaces the aesthetic notion of ‘occasion’ with the Christian category of the 
‘moment’—in which the eternal enters time. What Kierkegaard’s notion of 
communication seems to share with Johannes’ understanding of the occasion is a 
sense that a subject’s receptivity or openness to that which is beyond her ability to 
control or conceptualise functions as a necessary preliminary step to existential 
‘actualisation’. Though in the Christian framework only divine grace can help the 
subject to realise herself through faith, Kierkegaard’s negative gestures help the 
reader to become ‘light, thinly clad, limber’ enough to receive the grace required to 
make the leap. The underlying dialectic seems to involve giving up in order to be 
given to, a ‘double movement’ that is also present in the Abraham story in Fear and 
Trembling.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
constellation of concepts will be familiar to readers of Fragments and the Postscript, as well as 
Kierkegaard’s journal entries on the subject of communication. In Fragments, Kierkegaard 
makes a crucial distinction between the Socratic and the Christian. In a purely immanent Socratic 
picture, one human being can serve as an occasion (and no more) for another to come to the truth, 
since all subjects possess the capacity to ‘unforget’ the truth. In the Christian picture, the subject 
exists fundamentally in untruth, so an ‘extra element’ is required before one is in a position to 
recognise the truth or make the ‘leap’ of faith. The Christian category for the external power that 
makes the faith possible is grace. Johannes makes a direct analogy between the occasion and 
grace in his declaration that anyone who denies the importance of the occasion in poetic creation 
is a ‘Pelagian autocrat’—a reference to the heretic Pelagius who emphasised free will to the 
extent of denying the role of grace in Christian salvation.  
 110 This is why Kierkegaard identifies boredom as the ultimate existential risk or 
temptation of the aesthetic life.  
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 Returning to Victor Eremita’s frame narrative of Either/Or, one sees yet 
another example of the negative strategy of flawed perspectives, as Eremita’s 
preface provides an additional – reflective – point of view on the essays that make 
up the work. Before the reader is able to begin, Eremita performs an initial ‘reading’ 
of the bundle of texts and, specifically, of the relationship between the aesthetically-
orientated ‘Either’ reflections with the ethical advice of Judge Wilhelm that makes 
up the ‘Or’ part of the work. He offers what those familiar with Kierkegaard’s other 
works, or those alive to the irony in the text, will recognise as a ‘bad’ reading, 
wholeheartedly endorsing the Judge’s ethical perspective and recommending that 
subsequent readers follow his advice and get married. The irony in the text entails 
leaving open a possibility for the naive reader to think that the work of 
interpretation has already been carried out by the editor.111 For the reflective reader, 
this device opens up a gap of understanding that can be overcome only by the 
reader’s active involvement in the construction of textual meaning. Eremita’s 
reading, dialectically qualified by the numerous other points of view presented in the 
work, functions as a via negativa that leads readers to a higher perspective not 
specified within the bounds of the text itself. This strategy is in fact characteristic of 
Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous works, all of which involve degrees of ‘getting it 
wrong’ as part of what Kierkegaard deems a ‘continual striving’ toward the truth.112  
  
A via negativa to faith 
 Kierkegaard’s negative gestures and intentional misreadings are part of a 
wider textual strategy in the pseudonymous works, described in Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript as the art of ‘taking away.’ Addressing himself to the upright bourgeois 
society of 19th-century Denmark, Kierkegaard points to the bounties of knowledge 
– scientific, medical, philosophical, historical, technological – achieved in his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 111 ‘It is a very good sign when the harmonious bores are at a loss about how they should 
react to this continuous self-parody, when they fluctuate endlessly between belief and disbelief 
until they get dizzy and take what is meant as a joke seriously and what is meant seriously as a 
joke’ (Schlegel, CF 108). 
 112 Fear and Trembling (1843) follows a similar negative strategy, presenting the limited 
perspective of de Silentio who admits to being unable to understand Abraham. Though the text 
fails in its stated aim of making faith comprehensible to thought, it does so in a way that brings 
the reader closer to faith, even if getting closer takes the form of acknowledging that one does not 
understand or does not feel capable of the leap. Likewise in Repetition (1843), Constantine 
Constantius tries and fails to achieve ‘repetition’ in attempting to recreate à la lettre a trip to 
Berlin he took years earlier. Though neither of the two main characters in the narrative fully 
grasps what is at stake in repetition, which is ultimately a Christian and not an aesthetic category, 
their attempts put the movement into relief by showing what it is not: irony, recollection, 
mediation, hope, Heraclitian flux, Eleatic stasis. 
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lifetime but confronts the nagging sense that it hasn’t been appropriated, that 
knowledge has piled up in a rapid and fragmented fashion.  
 
When a man has filled his mouth so full of food that for this reason he 
cannot eat and it must end with his dying of hunger, does giving food 
to him consist in stuffing his mouth even more or, instead, in taking a 
little away do that he can eat? Similarly, when a man is very 
knowledgeable but his knowledge is meaningless or virtually 
meaningless to him, does sensible communication consist in giving him 
more to know […]? [...]When a communicator takes a portion of the 
copious knowledge that the very knowledgeable man knows and 
communicates it to him in a form that makes it strange to him, the 
communicator is, as it were, taking away his knowledge, at least until 
the knower manages to assimilate the knowledge by overcoming the 
resistance of the form [...] taking away is precisely communication . . . 
(1992, p. 275). 
 
This remarkable passage elaborates a therapeutic textual strategy of writing as a kind 
of subtraction, set within the context of excessive knowledge or knowledge drained 
of significance. The critical tradition of the essay to which I argue Kierkegaard 
belongs is uniquely positioned to reflect this shift in focus from the content of 
knowledge to one’s relationship to knowledge – with the characteristic first-person 
perspective and the variety of ironic strategies employed to call any discursive frame 
into question. Looking back to Socrates113 and anticipating 20th-century modernist 
and surrealist strategies of Verfremdung, Climacus describes his procedure as ‘making 
strange’ the knowledge to which one has become indifferent, presenting knowledge 
in a form that is unfamiliar and so forcing the subject to repeat or appropriate that 
knowledge, (as if) for the first time. The aim of digestion, appropriation, repetition 
then takes the place of the aim of discovery, penetration, and acquisition. Reckoning 
with one’s actual position or condition, rather than ‘going further’ serves as a 
precondition for any genuine conversion or opening toward the future.  
 The description of communication as ‘taking away’ occurs within a work 
that takes as its central concern the question of how a finite subject can enter into a 
relationship with infinite Being, or how the finite can gain eternal significance. 
Cautioning against a world-denying transcendence, Kierkegaard faces the historical 
and temporal as a necessary part of the Christian dialectic, evidenced by the event of 
God entering time. Kierkegaard makes it his task to address his own historical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 113 That Kierkegaard took the ironic Socrates as a model of communication is evident 
across the whole of his authorship, with Fragments proclaiming that midwifery ‘remains highest 
relationship between human beings’ (1985, pp. 10-11). 
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moment—in comic, sometimes bitter polemics—as a way of helping readers to 
begin where they are, to ‘digest’ or to acknowledge their position. Thus Climacus 
declares in the opening of Concluding Unscientific Postscript that in contrast to the 
systematisers: ‘I remain where I am’ (1992, p. 16). This kind of contingent starting 
point, rather than a speculative beginning from first principles, is typical of the 
essayistic, which seeks to relate itself to existence and so can only ever begin in 
medias res. In a complacently Christian society, the task facing Kierkegaard was to 
help his readers to remember what it was to be a Christian, as ‘the only 
unforgiveable high treason against Christianity is the single individual’s taking his 
relation to it for granted’ (Ibid). In such an environment, delivering the knowledge 
of Christianity in the unfamiliar form of an imaginative discourse on the 
relationship between Socrates and Christ (Fragments), a dialectic between the tragic 
hero and the knight of faith (Fear and Trembling) or a psychological study (The 
Sickness unto Death, The Concept of Anxiety) was a way to make readers acknowledge 
their own starting point and thus to open up the question of their relationship to 
the infinite, which familiarity and convention had closed off.  
 Fear and Trembling is exemplary of this strategy of reorienting the vision of 
readers so that they might see themselves anew as possibility, stripped of the usual 
pretensions and assurances. The work’s author, Johannes de Silentio, turns to the 
subject of Abraham as the father of faith, trying and failing to make the movement 
of faith comprehensible to thought. His initial Socratic admission that he is 
incapable of understanding Abraham offers readers an opportunity to likewise 
suspend – or at least re-evaluate – what they believe they know about one of the 
central figures in Judeo-Christian history. Rather than beginning from the position 
of the pastor’s sermon, in which doubt is condemned as failing to accept what ‘only 
the most ignorant would dare to deny’ (1992, p. 12), De Silentio’s rhetorical position 
actively encourages doubt, inviting readers to join the author in admitting to 
themselves their inability to understand the matter of faith. To reinforce this aim of 
suspension or questioning, de Silentio offers a number of conflicting perspectives in 
the text. The ‘Attunement’ section that opens the book presents imaginative 
versions of the biblical Abraham and Isaac story, each emphasising a different 
aspect of the narrative and a different way of understanding Abraham’s actions. In 
one moving version, Isaac sees the knife tremble in Abraham’s hand and is unable 
to ever have faith again, understanding that God has commanded his murder. In 
	  	  
116	  
another, Abraham goes through the motions of faith, offering up Isaac, but in his 
soul he ‘becomes old’ and loses his taste for life as a result of the strain of God’s 
trial. This strategy of different perspectives carries through the whole of the work, 
which unfolds as a series of assays to get closer to the reality of faith, each attempt 
ultimately failing.  
 In this way, as Climacus describes in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, the 
reader is brought ‘as close as possible’ to the question of how to live. 
 
Instead of presenting the good in the form of actuality, as is ordinarily 
done, that this person and that person have actually lived and have 
actually done this, and thus transforming the reader into an observer, an 
admirer, an appraiser, it should be presented in the form of possibility. 
Then whether or not the reader wants to exist in it is placed as close as 
possible to him (1992, pp. 358-359, my emphasis). 
 
 We have seen a number of strategies by which Kierkegaard develops the 
inherent openness of essayistic writing, particularly with respect to the subject 
viewed as possibility rather than as a fixed identity or as part of a conceptual system. 
Possibility is for Kierkegaard the logical category of temporal existence or 
becoming, and part of his task as a writer is to actively engage his audience’s sense 
of the anxiety or uncanniness of becoming, since one is never fully present, fully at 
home; as long as one stands in medias res, rather than at the end, the significance of a 
life is always being worked out. Doubt – in Fear and Trembling – is the recognition of 
this uncanny feature of the human, a premonition that human existence is not 
merely finite but contains the possibility of the infinite or unconditioned. 
 
The sublime in the everyday 
 Finally, Kierkegaard’s essayism offers the possibility of the existential –
though not conceptual – reconciliation of finite and the infinite. The pseudonymous 
author of Fear and Trembling considers the leap into faith impossibly difficult, as it 
involves staking one’s life on that which is beyond conceptualisation, or, as 
Climacus later describes it in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, on an ‘objective 
absurdity’. Yet, from the outside, the extraordinary knight of faith looks entirely 
pedestrian—so much so that De Silentio asks in amazement, ‘can that really be him? 
He looks just like a tax collector!’ The image of the faithful one chatting with 
shopkeepers and looking forward with relish to the humble domestic scene of 
dinner at home with his wife is certainly at odds with the arduous and angst-ridden 
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psychological effort that Kierkegaard, in his polemical attempt to ‘raise the price’ of 
faith, attributes to the process of becoming a subject. But the contradiction in 
Kierkegaard’s account of faith is a reminder that the leap of faith he envisions is not 
a leap into another world or a choice by which the subject, like the systematic 
philosopher, denies the conditions of temporal existence. On the contrary, the 
portrait of the knight of faith in Fear and Trembling suggests that faith, unlike doubt 
or ‘infinite resignation’, is a movement of coming to terms with one’s own finitude 
in a way that allows one to live fully in the everyday, to evidence ‘the sublime in the 
pedestrian’ (1994, p. 52). Thus Abraham comes to resemble something like the ideal 
philosopher of the ancient sceptics, who, having questioned everything, is able to 
achieve tranquillity in common life. But where the ancient sceptic actively works to 
maintain his withholding of assent, Abraham maintains his passionate interest in or 
desire for the finite—embodied in the person of Isaac.114 Like the sceptics though, 
whom De Silentio praises for maintaining doubt as a lifelong task, Abraham’s 
apparently effortless pedestrianism requires the everyday work of rejecting the 
inveiglements of cognition, an on-going dance of the temporal and eternal.  
 Crucially, the leap exemplified by Abraham does not come as a result of 
effort alone, though is indeed takes effort to become ‘light’ enough for the leap—
that is, to renounce one’s own understanding. Kierkegaard helps in this task through 
his negative writing strategies of ‘taking away’. There are no guarantees in this 
approach that the reader will be led to faith, rather than to sceptical withholding of 
judgement or even to despair. The negative project can, at best, lead to a positive 
orientation of receptivity or radical openness, whereby I as a subject am able to take 
the leap and to accept otherness into myself. In purely immanent sense, this means 
accepting that I am always other than myself in time or becoming. In a spiritual 
sense it concerns relating myself to something radically other, something 
unthinkable and yet something that grounds my being. The tension of myself as the 
object of speculation and myself as I am, as a possible opening to the infinite, is one 
that Kierkegaard seeks to keep alive even for the believer, such that faith is not a 
transition into rest, which would for Kierkegaard be the equivalent of spiritual 
suicide. He introduces the category of repetition (gjentagelsen), desiring what one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 114 As Kierkegaard notes in Fragments, ‘belief and doubt are opposite passions’ (1994, 
Interlude). The sceptic achieves tranquility through the decisive act – constantly renewed – to 
withhold judgement about what presents itself to his senses. The Christian chooses, with ‘infinite 
interest’ to believe that for which there is not only insufficient evidence but which evidence 
positively argues against, that which is objectively impossible.  
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already has, in order to maintain the continued striving of existence against the 
temptation to become what Sartre would later call the en-soi, and what Kierkegaard 
refers to as death or fantasy existence. ‘Even if a person has achieved the highest, 
the repetition by which he must indeed fill out his existence, if he is not to go 
backward (or become a fantastical being), will again be a continued striving, because 
here in turn the conclusiveness is moved ahead and postponed’ (1992, p. 121). The 
only temporal dialectic available in which the subject does not either rush ahead to 
see herself as already actualised and reified (1992, p. 146) or does not try sneak 
backwards out of existence, as the Greeks recollected their way to union with the 
Ideal, is repetition—desiring to become what one is (2009, p. 3), which involves an 
opening to infinite possibility within time, within the humble scenes of daily life.  
 This dialectic is reinforced and encouraged in Kierkegaard’s writings. The 
movement of ‘going further’ that de Silentio criticises in Fear and Trembling is 
replaced with the spatial metaphor of beginning where one is, which, like becoming 
oneself, another key metaphor, is not a given but is something to be achieved. The 
task of working out where one’s interest lies can be understood as part of the larger 
aim in essayistic writing to ‘leave everything as it is’. In both there is an emphasis on 
the transformative power of seeing or acknowledging things as they are, with the 
understanding that this necessitates continual striving. The shape of these 
movements, and of essayistic writing more generally, is circular: what one is or 
knows is revisited or returned to in a gesture of repetition that entails both newness 
and what was already there as possibility. The next chapter will explore Stanley 
Cavell’s development of the theme of repetition into a notion of the everyday as a 
task or an achievement – a prize reclaimed from scepticism – reinforced through 
the philosophical form of the essay.  	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  6:	  Scepticism	  and	  acknowledgement	  in	  Cavell’s	  essays	  
	  
Everything glowed with a gleam;  
Yet we were looking away! 
 
-Thomas Hardy, ‘The Self Unseeing’ 
 	   Readers familiar with Stanley Cavell will have recognised his influence in my 
approach to the problem of scepticism and in a number of themes – ordinary 
language, the everyday, seeing anew, coming to terms – that appear in earlier 
chapters. It is to Cavell’s essays that I wish to turn in this final chapter, for his 
writings develop these themes – and the practice of philosophical writing – in a way 
that moves the guiding question of philosophy from one of knowledge to one of 
acknowledgement. In taking up the issue of scepticism as raised by 19th-century 
Romantic and 20th-century ordinary language philosophers, he moves the locus of 
discussion from the external world or the subject to the problem of human 
communication as such, maintaining that the sceptical impulse, at root, conceals the 
anxiety of beings who exist in language, an anxiety about relating to others under or 
within the conditions of language. This anxiety might be summed up, in Schlegel’s 
words, as the ‘Unmöglichkeit und Notwendigkeit einer vollständigen Mitteilung 
[impossibility and the necessity of complete communication]’ (KF 108). The formal 
qualities of Cavell’s work reflect this reorientation of the sceptical problem, with an 
emphasis on the negotiation between acknowledgement and transformation in the 
practice of philosophy – expressed by metaphors of seeing and reading – that 
opposes the gesture of denial or fantasy that he identifies in the sceptical impulse.  
 Cavell’s significance to this study is his ability to explain the resilience and to 
some extent the inevitability of sceptical doubt, offering one answer for why, even 
in ancient Pyrrhonism, being cured of the impulse to engage in (a certain kind of) 
philosophy and opting instead to live naturally or conventionally never takes. The 
sceptical ‘cure’ envisioned by Sextus was not a method that could be applied once 
and for all, since the lure for a more perfect form of knowledge in some sense 
appeared as ‘natural’ to human beings as their biological and social inclinations. The 
enduring existence of sceptical debates in contemporary philosophy suggests that 
scepticism is at the very least a perennial, if not a natural impulse, and one that 
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demands a reckoning. Cavell, like Kierkegaard, views doubting not as something to 
be avoided, which would be another form of the denial of the human that he 
struggles against, but as an achievement—the beginning of an acknowledgement 
that one is not fully oneself or not fully at home in the world. But doubting, as 
Kierkegaard recognised, is also a risk: the risk of denying the conditions in which 
life is possible, an image suggested in Wittgenstein’s familiar aphorism 107: ‘Wir sind 
aufs Glatteis geraten, wo die Reibung fehlt, also die Bedingungen in gewissem Sinne ideal sind, 
aber wir eben deshalb auch nicht gehen können [We have got on to slippery ice where there 
is no friction, and so, in a certain sense, the conditions are ideal; but also, just 
because of that, we are unable to walk]’ (2009, p. 51-51e). As Cavell elegantly argues, 
doubting can become a demand for the perfect conditions – to begin to act, to 
interact with others, to make oneself known – but these conditions in no way 
resemble those we actually inhabit, and so they become an excuse to not take 
responsibility for – not to take our place in – the world around us. For Cavell, the 
uncanniness that doubt discovers has to be tempered by a simultaneous recognition 
of common ground and by the work of coming to feel at home, which exists as a 
task to be carried out through repetition, repeated assays within the ordinary. 
Wittgenstein’s aphorism continues:  Wir wollen gehen; dann brauchen wir die Reibung. 
Zurück auf den rauhen Boden! [We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough 
ground!]’. For the philosopher, rejecting the temptation to identify ideal conditions 
and instead thinking from within the roughness of the everyday is an endeavour 
largely carried out through writing; finding forms of writing that are able to maintain 
the ‘friction’ or tension of experience becomes paramount.  
 
The prize of the ordinary 
 In The Claim of Reason (1979)115, Cavell offers a reading of Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations (1953) as a therapeutic response to scepticism’s inevitability, 
opposing the more standard reading that sees Wittgenstein’s critique of 
philosophical criteria and appeal to ordinary language as attempts to refute the 
sceptical problem outright. Resonant with the approach of the present study, which 
identifies direct refutations of the sceptical problem as an extension of scepticism, 
Cavell sees Wittgensteinean therapy as a way of doing justice to the sceptical 
problem while refusing to sacrifice the authority of ordinary experience. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 115 References to this work will be taken from the second edition, published in 1999.  
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Wittgenstein, on Cavell’s reading, affirms the thesis that it is impossible to rationally 
prove the existence of the world and others ‘and so shifts its weight’ toward the 
insight that ‘our relation to the world as a whole, or to others in general, is not one 
of knowing, where knowing construes itself as being certain’ (1979, p. 45). The 
motivation for this shift, and the discontinuous, anti-foundationalist form of 
Philosophical Investigations as a collection of fragments, reveals a by now familiar set of 
performative strategies, established by the essayists in the French, German, and 
English traditions. With Wittgenstein as an ally, Cavell sets out to redefine the 
terrain of the sceptical problem and what might count as an appropriate 
philosophical response. Taking Cartesian scepticism and 20th-century positivist and 
pragmatist attempts to solve or get around the sceptical problem as his starting 
point, he discusses the sceptical impulse along two related lines: a demand for 
certain knowledge that cannot be satisfied from within the conditions of human 
becoming, and a radical disappointment with the world and others for failing to 
correspond to some more ideal set of conditions. Scepticism as such is not just a 
misunderstanding of the conditions of thought and discourse but a denial of those 
conditions, one that it is not possible to remedy with philosophical argument. Since 
a lack of knowledge or certainty is not what gives rise to the sceptical question in 
the first place, shoring up knowledge philosophically cannot help the sceptic to 
come to terms with his doubt; on the contrary, such attempts are just another 
version of the sceptic’s denial. ‘The answer to scepticism must take the form not of 
philosophical construction but of the reconstruction or resettlement of the 
everyday’ (1988, p. 176). 
 The everyday or ordinary is a key term in Cavell’s writing, and the following 
discussion will attempt to circumscribe his sense of the everyday by differentiating it 
from other ideas with which it might be confused, namely the conservative appeals 
to ‘convention’ in Pyrrhonism (and to some extent echoed in Hume) and a 
pragmatic notion of common sense or common ways of speaking. Cavell wishes to 
distinguish his ‘resettlement of the everyday’ from a simple defence of prevailing 
wisdom or practice as well as from a certain strand of pragmatism that sets out to 
dismiss the sceptical problem by defending ordinary beliefs. Cavell is sympathetic to 
the latter line of argument and undertakes a similar kind of defence of the ordinary 
in his own work, bolstered by the understanding of language games that falls out of 
ordinary language philosophy. Yet he separates himself from the pragmatist 
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tradition, and even from his teacher J.L. Austin, in insisting on treating the sceptical 
problem as a serious and unavoidable aspect of modern consciousness. While 
pragmatic defences of everyday kinds of criteria serve as an important 
counterweight to demands for certain knowledge, they cannot effectively disarm 
sceptical suspicion. In taking up the issue of whether scepticism can be understood 
as natural in some sense or whether it is, as pragmatists claim, merely a pseudo-
problem created by philosophy itself and best ignored, Cavell notes that the key 
move in philosophical scepticism is from discreet instances of doubting in particular 
situations, which are commonplace, to a global doubt about any empirical, practical, 
or rational criteria that might be invoked in claiming to know a thing is so. As 
Descartes describes it, ‘the removal from below of the foundation necessarily 
involves the downfall of the whole edifice’ (Meditations, I: 2). It is precisely this step 
from the ordinary experience of doubting (someone’s word or the evidence of one’s 
senses) within particular situations to all-consuming doubt or suspicion that makes 
scepticism so threatening, for it suggests that there could be no better or worse 
criteria for acting in the world, that all criteria of equal, which is to say indeterminate 
value. This is the conclusion that led the Pyrrhonians to give up on any 
philosophical attempt to weigh certain grounds against others and instead to 
withhold judgement and live according to convention.  
 Cavell’s agreement with the pragmatists has to do with limiting the context 
in which criteria for knowledge claims are applied, and the grounds on which 
credulity is granted. Cavell uses J.L. Austin’s example of the goldfinch in the 
garden116 as a way of getting at how claims are evaluated in everyday life without 
ushering in the spectre of universal doubt. In the imagined scene, I mention to my 
neighbour that I have seen a goldfinch outside my window, and a conversation 
follows about how I know that what I saw was in fact a goldfinch—e.g. by 
discussing the criteria such as plumage, song, shape, etc. by which I made that 
determination. As the conversation continues, I may become more convinced that 
what I saw was a goldfinch or I may begin to doubt myself, if my neighbour raises 
sufficiently worrying objections: ‘the markings you describe correspond to a number 
of different birds’, ‘as an ornithologist, I can tell you that goldfinches have never 
been spotted in this region’, ‘yes, but you admit you weren’t wearing your glasses’, 
etc. Unlike the classic Pyrrhonian example in which all criteria are deemed ultimately 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 116 J.L. Austin, 1979, pp. 88ff. 
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insufficient to make a judgement, Cavell makes the point that everyday kinds of 
doubt (such as finding myself unsure of what it was I have just seen) are confined to 
discreet instances, and that the asking for and giving of criteria in such instances is a 
process limited by the horizon of what is deemed relevant given the circumstances. 
If my neighbour thinks the bird I saw may have been a yellow-bellied fantail, we can 
exchange justifications for our respective beliefs, but the idea that I actually saw a 
stuffed goldfinch or a dream goldfish, while not logically impossible, is highly unlikely 
in the context of watching birds outside my window and so is not likely to present 
itself as a real concern. In response to the efforts of some positivistic attempts to fix 
knowledge criteria absolutely, Fred Dretske (1970, 1971) makes the pragmatist, 
coherentist claim that justified true belief involves ruling out all of the relevant 
possibilities but not all of the logical possibilities (Gascoigne, 2002, p. 169). This is, in 
effect, an acknowledgement that truths are provisional and that doubts within 
everyday life can be addressed in a satisfactory, if not absolute way. Dretske’s 
account of justification is echoed by Donald Davidson (1983), who argues that 
existence in the world seems to demand a natural credulity, in which I believe that I 
and others are right most of the time. In order for communication to be possible at 
all, it is necessary to start from the charitable assumption that most beliefs are true, 
that most of what other people say is true, since communication relies on a 
background of shared assumptions and mutual assent. Indeed, those for whom 
doubt or paranoia pervades all of life are considered mentally ill; they shrink into 
idiosyncratic meanings. In the context of ordinary language philosophy, Cavell notes 
that Wittgenstein seems astonished, not by how often communication fails, but how 
often it succeeds, given the many ways in which language can cover over and go 
astray (1979, p. 31). The operation of language games suggests that the breakdown 
of agreement on common criteria, and so the breakdown of our ‘attunement’ with 
one another, has to be considered within the larger frame of a system that largely 
goes right, which is a way of situating the anxiety of the doubter within a wider 
context of credulity in others. Cavell is sympathetic to this pragmatic claiming of 
common ground and often criticises philosophical thought experiments for treating 
linguistic utterances as if they took place in a vacuum, rather than acknowledging 
the wide variety of frames in which the things we say to one another are habitually 
understood.  
 Yet he recognises that rejecting the need for absolute justification in the first 
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place is not likely to satisfy sceptics who think such a justification is necessary, and 
he reads this same recognition in Wittgenstein. ‘Epistemologists who think to refute 
scepticism by undertaking a defence of ordinary beliefs, perhaps suggesting that 
there is a sense in which they are certain, or sufficiently probable for human purposes, 
have already given into scepticism, they are living it’ (Cavell, 1988, p. 4, my 
emphasis). Although those who wield such arguments consider them an adequate 
safeguard against the defining movement of Pyrrhonian scepticism – wherein 
discreet instances of doubt lead to the universal doubt about any and all criteria – 
they fail in accepting the very terms that sceptics themselves use to justify doubt. 
Such arguments merely reiterate the sceptical predicament that knowledge is a 
matter of justification and probability and that the human subject is essentially 
related to the world by means of (justified or unjustified) beliefs. Cavell offers a 
more sophisticated conception of the relationship of subject to world which takes 
into account the Romantic notion of the everyday as at the same time ordinary and 
uncanny (1988, p. 9)—captured by Novalis’ image at the end of Heinrich von 
Ofterdingen of moving ‘immer nach Hause’, always homeward [but never home]. He 
asserts that the task of ordinary language philosophy, and by extension his own 
work, is not ‘to reinstate vulgar beliefs, or common sense, to a pre-scientific 
position of eminence, but to reclaim the human self from its denial and neglect by 
modern philosophy’ (1979, p. 154). Elsewhere, he formulates this task as wrestling 
with common sense or the natural attitude for the ‘prize of the ordinary’ (1988, p. 
4).  
 To the extent that essayists like Montaigne and Hume can be understood as 
defending common beliefs or common sense, Cavell’s criticism may fall on their 
work as well as on 20th-century positivists like Charles Stevenson (see Claim of 
Reason, Chapter 10) or pragmatists like Dretske, Davidson, and Rorty. I have 
attempted to demonstrate in previous chapters that both Montaigne and Hume 
provide ample grounds for questioning the common or the natural, even as they 
defend a conception of what Cavell calls ‘the human conditions of knowledge and 
action’—primarily temporality, language or sociability, and subjectivity. The defence 
of nostre conditions in Montaigne and the appeals to ordinary language use in Hume 
are, as I read them, not simple appeals to convention but philosophical forbears of 
Cavell and his concerns about the denial of fundamental features of human 
experience. However, Cavell’s remarks reflect an anxiety about his own writing and 
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about therapeutic philosophy more generally, which is that it could be seen – in its 
changing of both the terms of the sceptical problem and the shape of philosophical 
writing – as failing to take the threat of scepticism seriously, as simply giving up the 
sceptic, and perhaps the entire undertaking of epistemology and metaphysics, for 
lost. The worry is that these accounts ‘have already given into scepticism, they are 
living it’, in the sense that they have failed to recognise the significance of the 
sceptic’s ‘discovery of the everyday, a discovery of exactly what it is that scepticism 
would deny’ (QO, 1988, p. 170).  
 Cavell insists on taking the sceptic along with him—not to talk the sceptic 
out of doubt but to reckon with the perennial temptation to doubt and, like 
Kierkegaard, to suggest that those who do not recognise the threat of doubt miss 
something fundamental about human experience. He refuses to throw up his hands 
at the sceptic’s departure from common ways of speaking, and, unlike Hume, he is 
not inclined to laugh at the sceptic (or his twin, the dogmatic philosopher). For him, 
scepticism cannot be simply done away with or successfully ignored by speaking in 
an ‘ordinary’ way or by speaking in a new way, as Rorty sometimes suggests, though 
Cavell clearly agrees that the problem is insufficiently understood by those 
committed to upholding or refuting sceptical positions, and that a new way of 
writing is necessary for the task of ‘resettling’ the everyday. Cavell distinguishes 
himself both in his tone and in what he deems worth arguing about in philosophy. 
As Cavell declares, ‘[The sceptic] is neither the knave Austin took him to be, nor the 
fool the pragmatists took him for’, but a tragic figure (1988, p. 173) wracked with 
‘world consuming’ or ‘philosophy-consuming disappointment’ (1988, p. 5). Thus 
even though pragmatism’s solution that criteria are ‘good enough’ does the 
important work of pointing out the provisional nature of our claims and contextual 
nature of our criteria, a purely pragmatist solution still falls short. Cavell’s work to is 
to uncover the conditions of scepticism and in the process to show that these 
conditions are shared by all language speakers, such that there is room to convince 
the sceptic or to get the sceptic to see anew, rather than merely relegating the 
sceptic to the position of a ‘knave’ or a ‘fool’.  
 Cavell points out that the step from particular to global doubt in scepticism 
not only ‘undercuts the validity of our criteria’ but also ‘our attunement with one 
another’ (1979, p. 46) and so raises the question that will become central for him—
that of ‘other minds’. It is telling that sceptical philosophers have so often invoked 
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the moral concepts of betrayal and trust to justify the move toward total scepticism. 
Montaigne contends that when an opponent demonstrates that I have been wrong 
in my judgement, it ‘is not so much a case of my learning something new he told me 
nor how ignorant I was of some particular matter [...] as of my learning of my 
infirmity in general and of the treacherous ways (la trahison) of my intellect’ (2013, II: 
13, p. 430, emphasis mine). Descartes declares that ‘it is the part of prudence not to 
place absolute confidence in that by which we have even once been deceived’ 
(Meditations 1: 3). Cavell will show that ‘other minds’ scepticism – or moral questions 
about how we relate to others – helps us to see the heart of the wider sceptical 
impulse and what a genuine response might look like. Because scepticism is in the 
last analysis a wilful denial of something, responding to the sceptic entails the 
diagnosis or uncovering of his denial—on the one hand of commonality, of 
common ground, and on the other of difference or the uncanny. The dangers on 
either side are of thinking ourselves too different from others or erasing our 
separateness from others through false indentification. 
 
Language and others 
 Cavell inherits from Wittgenstein, Austin, and the tradition of ordinary 
language philosophy a concern for language as the principal condition under which 
subjects experience and relate to the world and others. His interest in language is 
not primarily referential – how language does or does not accurately describe the 
non-linguistic world – but concerns the intricate performances involved in everyday 
communication: the ways in which we form and are formed by what we say. One of 
the formulations of the sceptical problem in Cavell’s work is the desire to remove 
oneself from the condition of being ‘of a world’ and to occupy a fictional place 
‘outside language games’ (Cavell, 1979, p. 224). As outlined in the previous section, 
the operation of language games implies community, a shared frame of intelligibility 
that allows for meaningful exchanges. The shared frame is conventional and gains 
its force precisely from habit and practical necessity, rather than from any guarantee 
of similitude to things themselves. Without the import of others’ words – the 
existing conventions of a language – the capacity to experience a world or oneself is 
simply absent, since experience, even of oneself, inevitably moves through these 
‘external’ forms, as the tradition of essay writing brings to the fore. In language we 
find ourselves always already of a world, and, to this extent, ‘grammar is our fate’ 
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(1988, p. 40). The difficulty in responding to the sceptic is precisely that there can 
be – and frequently are – moments of breakdown in our communication and in 
how we ‘world the world together’ (1979, p 126). Indeed a part of the sceptic’s 
‘discovery of the everyday’ is that ‘criteria, for all their necessity, are open to our 
repudiation, or dissatisfaction [...] that our capacity for disappointment by them is 
essential to the way we possess language’ (1988, p. 5). We have already seen that the 
sceptical moment calls frames into question by moving from discreet instances of 
doubt in a particular situation – ‘She is nodding, but does she really understand 
what I am saying?’ ‘Those are just words’. ‘That was not what I meant at all’ – to a 
global doubt about the possibility of any common criteria. ‘We experience, at least 
in our sceptical moments, the very things that give us access to a common world as 
barriers to that world, seeing language, even our form of life, as empty of whatever it 
is we think necessary to establishing a satisfying connection to that world’ (my 
emphasis, Bertacco and Gibson, 2011, p. 108). The sceptic, in other words, comes 
to regard the conventions of ordinary language not as a means of disclosing the 
world but as an obstacle standing in the way of a more perfect access to or 
perspective on the world, a surer guarantee of connection between what is said and 
what is. In philosophy, this leads to ways of writing that attempt objectivity and 
authority by ‘subtracting’ the subject from discourse or by otherwise denying or 
supressing the conditions of their own composition (Adorno, p. 153).  Cavell 
understood, as Austin had, that the efforts of Ayer and other 20th-century positivists 
to dissolve scepticism by producing ‘a species of statement that will be incorrigible’ 
(Austin, 1964, p. 103), was not, as it appeared to be, an attempt to more precisely 
know the world, but rather a rejection of the ‘the human conditions of knowledge’ 
(Cavell, 1976 p. 61) under which the world comes to be available at all. Cavell’s 
‘grammar as fate’ suggests a condition of suffering that the sceptic both identifies 
and tries to escape. ‘With each word we utter we emit stipulations, agreements we 
do not know and do not want to know we have entered, agreements we were always 
in, that were in effect before our participation in them [...] [We are] victims of 
meaning’ (Cavell, 1998, p. 40). Through language we inherit a common world, the 
forms of which are decided in advance of our participation, and so in a sense not 
entirely ‘ours’. The gulf that opens up in the sceptical moment between mind and 
world, between self and other, ‘originates in an attempt, or wish, to escape (to 
remain a “stranger” to, “alienated” from) those shared forms of life, to give up 
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responsibility for their maintenance’ (1979, p. 109). The conventions that form the 
basis for common ground (‘attunement’) or a world in common are thus rejected as 
inadequate, and the sceptic withdraws from the world’s claim on him, locating his 
‘home’ elsewhere. As Bertacco and Gibson (2011) note in their insightful article on 
the implications of Cavell for post-colonialism, the refusal to recognise another as 
sharing a common world with oneself drains one’s relationships to others of their 
significance and absolves one of the ethical responsibility to care for or maintain 
one’s environment. The consequences of such a position range from apathy or 
boredom to more violent forms of ‘world-consuming’ disappointment.   
 Cavell’s most powerful expressions of this dynamic fall out of his 
discussions not of philosophical but of literary (or filmic) texts, particularly 
examples of suspicion and sexual jealousy in characters like Othello or Caliban, or 
examples of the perverse in Romantic literature that culminate in acts of violence 
and revenge. What becomes clear in these examples is not that the characters in 
question lack knowledge of their partners’ fidelity, or the love of their children or pets 
(Poe’s black cat), but that they fail to acknowledge what they do in fact know, and 
console themselves with the fiction that this failure is one of insufficient knowledge 
or evidence. ‘What philosophy presents as doubt brought on by the (necessarily 
unsuccessful) quest for certain knowledge, literature interprets as tragedy and even 
murder, precipitated by an individual’s need to deny something’ (Fischer, 1989, p. 
81). 	  
I am filled with this feeling – of our separateness, let us say – and I 
want you to have it too. So I give a voice to it. And then my 
powerlessness presents itself as ignorance—a metaphysical finitude as 
an intellectual lack (Reverse Faust, I take the bargain of supernatural 
ignorance) (Cavell, 1976, p. 263). 
 
The masking of metaphysical finitude – the linguistic and temporal conditions under 
which the world can be known – as an epistemological lack, as though there were some 
other, better species of knowledge to be had, is for Cavell an all-too-human mode 
of repression. He notes that it is ‘as though we have, or have lost some picture of 
what knowing another, or being known by another, would really come to – a 
harmony, a concord, a union, a transparency, a governance, a power – against which 
our actual successes at knowing, and being known are poor things’ (440). The desire 
hidden at the root of the claim not to know others is in fact a desire for greater 
proximity or intimacy – to others as they are, to the world as it is – but also an 
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anxiety of the real, disappointingly trivial, conditions under which intimacy 
develops. Michael Fischer offers the figure of the slave owner as representative of 
the gestures of denial that Cavell describes. ‘When I avoid others, knowledge does 
not fail me; like the slave owner, I try not to face what I know (Fischer, 1989, p. 74), the 
knowledge that the slave shares in my humanity. Although masked as the absence of 
knowledge, the failure is one of responsibility. Though Cavell does not (to my 
knowledge) directly discuss it, Milan Kundera’s Unbearable Lightness of Being (1984) is 
a work that addresses this theme of ignorance and accountability in a political 
frame. Set during the Prague Spring of 1968 and the subsequent Russian invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, the work considers the response of Czech communist leaders to 
outcry over the country’s economic and social decline and to the government’s 
complicity in the murder of countless Russians and Czechs.  
 
The accused responded: ‘We didn't know! We were deceived! We were 
true believers! Deep in our hearts we are innocent!’   
 
In the end the dispute narrowed down to a single question: Did they 
really not know or were they merely making believe? 
 
...[Tomas] said to himself, whether they knew or didn’t know is not the 
main issue; the main issue is whether a man is innocent because he 
didn’t know. Is a fool on the throne relieved of all responsibility merely 
because he is a fool? (Kundera, 1984, p. 176-177). 
 
Tomas, in the satirical newspaper editorial that eventual results in his exile, contrasts 
the ruling party to Oedipus, who, although he carried out his fated crimes of 
patricide and incest in ignorance, plucks out his eyes when he discovers what he has 
done. In Cavellian terms, this voluntary blinding is a gesture of acknowledgement or 
holding oneself to account for failing to know, rendering the framing of the crimes 
in terms of knowledge or ignorance insufficient. Tomas asks, ‘this country has lost 
its freedom, lost it for centuries, perhaps, and you say that you feel no guilt? How 
can you stand the sight of what you’ve done [...] Have you no eyes to see?’ (p. 177). 
Ignorance is recast as not merely a lack of evidence but as a wilful failure to see, a 
failure for which one can be held accountable.  
 Cavell’s response to the sceptic lies in the moral category of 
acknowledgement as a rejection of the standard epistemological terms in which the 
sceptical problem is presented. The shift in vocabulary is meant to reveal knowledge 
as a way of relating oneself to the world and to suggest that the dangers of turning 
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the world and others into mere objects of knowledge threatens other, more 
rewarding kinds of relationship. Acknowledgement includes a sense of responsibility 
for the ‘maintenance’ of our shared forms of life, including, or perhaps primarily, 
our ways of speaking to one another. The everyday breakdowns in communication 
that the sceptic takes as evidence that the whole edifice of mutual trust must be 
pulled down become, in Cavell’s frame, occasions to better say what we mean,117 or 
to do the difficult work of trying to overcome our sense of another’s 
incomprehensibility. ‘From Cavell’s point of view, we are separate, as the sceptic 
insists. But we are nevertheless still responsible for everything that comes between 
us. If we can be blind to one another, we can also see (even sometimes see through) 
one another; if opaque to one another, also clear; if hidden, also open; and so on’ 
(Fischer, 1989, p. 68).118 The sceptic’s ‘drive to reach the unconditioned’ (Cavell, 
1987, p. 17) is revealed as an immature response to the demands of real intimacy as 
they play out in ordinary interaction, often in repeated instances of frustration or 
embarrassment, of uttering half-truths, of pretending not to understand, of 
contenting oneself with superficial agreement. ‘From the sceptic’s point of view, 
repetition smacks of failure, or irony; it suggests our inability to get things right once 
and for all’ (Fischer, 1989, p. 130). In opposition to this ‘once and for all’, Cavell 
proposes a ‘diurnalisation’ (Cavell, 1989, p. 66) of the work of philosophy to come 
to terms with the everyday, or to make ourselves at home in the conditions in which 
we find ourselves. The work of ‘resettlement of the everyday’ is, in Romantic terms, 
an infinite striving, an effort daily renewed. As Fischer argues, the ‘goal is for 
scepticism to give way to the acceptance of repetition’ (Fischer, 1989, p. 130) 
through what Cavell calls ‘endless specific recoveries from it, endless as a circle’ 
(Cavell 1987, p. 30). ‘Instead of answering sceptical doubts, we thus undo them, 
“repeatedly, unmelodramatically, uneventfully”’ (Cavell, 1989, p. 76, in Fischer, 
1989, p. 130).  
 Cavell’s examples of this process often involve banal scenes from married 
life or intimate relationships, when boredom or issues of fairness or trust arise that 
change the scope or meaning of how one partner sees the other, or herself. His 
analyses of Hollywood ‘comedies of remarriage’ from the 1930s and 40s deal with 
couples who marry and separate and marry again; this pattern, for Cavell, becomes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   117 The sceptic denies his ‘responsibility for meaning [or failing to mean] one thing, or 
one way, rather than another’ (1988, p. 135). 
 118 See Cavell, 1979, pp. 369-370.  
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indicative of a commitment to seeing another person (and so seeing oneself), a 
process that involves continually reviving the ‘spirit’ in which things are seen and 
refusing to look away or to become complacent. In the Tracy and Hepburn film 
Woman of the Year (1942):  
 
The happiness of marriage is dissociated from any a priori concept of 
what constitutes domesticity ( [...] whether two people are married does 
not necessarily depend on what age they are, or what gender, or 
whether legally). Marriage here is being presented as [...] the scene in 
which the chance for happiness is shown as the mutual 
acknowledgement of separateness, in which the prospect is not for the 
passing of years (until death parts us) but for the willing repetition of 
days, willingness for the everyday (until our true minds become 
unreadable to one another) (1989, pp. 177-178).   
 
The shift from an a priori concept of domesticity, to which a married couple 
succeeds or fails to conform, to the improvisational arrangement that Cavell 
describes offers a sense of what successful repetition might look like. It is a shift into 
becoming, an acknowledgement of the on-going nature of relationship and a 
willingness to ‘stick it out’ and renew the aspect under which one sees another and 
oneself.  It is also an acknowledgement of inevitable difference or separateness, 
which is not allowed to become an excuse for withdrawal or disinterest.  
 
Reading and responsibility 
 Cavell uses figures of ‘reading’ and ‘seeing’ to work out the central theme of 
resettling the everyday and philosophy’s role in this task. These metaphors are 
offered as an alternative to the purely cognitive terms in which the dilemmas 
stemming from scepticism are generally phrased, and they express – and promote – 
an element of receptivity or inheritance that scepticism, in its ‘drive for the 
unconditioned’ denies. One of the most salient features of Cavell’s essays is the 
presence of other people’s texts, a particular set of texts that recurs across his 
writings: Emerson, Thoreau, Wittgenstein, and Austin. The link between essays and 
commentary on the words of others was established as early as Montaigne, whose 
extensive borrowing and quoting from existing texts served as a representation – on 
the level of form – of the given that ineluctably shapes the subject (both in the 
sense of an agent and as the subject of a book). This practice was linked to 
Montaigne’s many remarks about the internal diversity of the self, which is always 
constituted by the texts of others and which forms itself by interpreting and 
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‘glossing’ what is already there (2007, III: 13, p. 1115). In Hume, the appeal to 
ordinary language served a similar function of highlighting and attempting to 
preserve in the form of philosophical thinking the determinative role of the given—
in contrast to speculative accounts beginning from first principles. The Romantics 
and Kierkegaard too, in their polemical responses to their immediate historical and 
philosophical contexts, chose other texts as their starting point, often employing the 
technical vocabulary of the idealists and the language of popular culture in parodic 
or ironic ways. Lukács reminds us that: ‘The essay is always concerned with 
something already formed, or at best, with something that has been; it is part of its 
essence that it does not draw something new out of an empty vacuum, but only 
gives a new order to such things as once lived’ (Lukács, 1974, p. 10). Cavell’s 
commitment to ordinary language philosophy and to a Romantic notion of a 
contingent – rather than an absolute beginning – adds to this general feature of the 
essay a specific emphasis on negotiating between what is given or inherited and 
what is created; this is a theme that Cavell deals with explicitly in much of his work 
and can be a seen as a third way between the sceptic’s denial of conditionedness – a 
denial of common ground – and the denial of human possibility or originality that 
might result from an appeal to the ordinary. Cavell’s vision of moral perfectionism 
involves the transformation of the given or contingent into that for which the 
subject holds herself accountable.    
 In In Quest of the Ordinary, Cavell relates this theme to the process of reading, 
where reading is ‘a way of accepting responsibility for one’s own discourse’.  
 
But suppose what is meant by argumentation in philosophy is one way 
of accepting full responsibility for one’s own discourse. Then the 
hearing I require depends upon the thought that there is another way, 
another philosophical way (for poetry will have its way, and therapy will 
have its way) of accepting responsibility. This other philosophical way I 
am going to call reading; others may call it philosophical interpretation 
(1988, p. 14).  
 
Cavell’s contrast between the work of reading or interpretation and argumentation 
calls to mind Montaigne’s separation of his essais from arguments—both the 
deductive style of argument from established principles that he disliked in 
Scholasticism and the conventions of oral debates in which the truth tends to be 
distorted for the sake of vanquishing one’s opponent. What Montaigne claims for 
his own writing, by contrast, is to ‘talk about [him]self’. Cavell’s work has the similar 
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quality of a writer who talks to and about himself, using the words of others in the 
attempt to better understand his own experience. In this sense, reading others’ texts, 
or speaking in a language passed down from others, is part of the task of 
autobiography or coming into one’s own. One’s ‘self’ begins with a common 
inheritance and is expressed and realised through existing forms, as the idea of 
‘grammar as fate’ from In Quest of the Ordinary brings to light. Cavell raises the 
question of responsibility in reading, but it is not (only) a responsibility to what or 
to whom one is reading, as if reading were a primarily passive activity. Rather, 
reading means taking ‘responsibility for one’s own discourse’—suggesting that 
reading is a way of acknowledging one’s place ‘in a world of other’s words’ (Bakhtin, 
1984, p. 143) and that the shape of one’s own words, and one’s own self, is a 
negotiation between receiving and creating.  
 Cavell extends his discussion of reading by examining the theme in 
Emerson and Thoreau. Thoreau’s suggestion in Walden that one can ‘read’ the stars: 
. . . interprets reading (dangerously invoking, to revise, the idea of the 
astrological) as a process of being read, as finding your fate in your 
capacity for interpretation of yourself. ‘Will you be a reader, a student 
merely, or a seer? Read your fate, see what is before you, and you walk 
on into futurity.’ What is before you is precisely not, if you catch 
Thoreau’s tune, something in the future; what is before you, if you, for 
example, reading, is a text. He asks his reader to see it, to become a seer 
with it. Only then can you walk beyond where you are (1988, p. 16). 
 
The co-extensiveness (Montaigne’s ‘consubstantiality’119) of reading with the process 
of self-interpretation is made explicit in this passage. Thoreau presents his readers 
with the question they must ask themselves about their relationship both to his text 
and to their own: student or seer? Reading could take on the academic sense of 
being ‘a student merely’, which suggests a lack of appropriation or a lack of essential 
interest in what one knows or in what there is to be learned. Alternatively, the 
reader is invited to become a seer of ‘what is before [her]’. The temporal knot of 
‘fate’, ‘what is before’, and ‘futurity’ needs some unravelling. ‘Before’ might mean 
prior to or it might mean in front of, an ambiguity that Cavell’s reading exploits by 
deriving fate (which is set prior to one’s reading of it) from what is in front of the 
subject—the conditions (‘texts’) given to her or inherited by her, including the 
agreements of language that we have always already entered into (1988, pp. 39-40) 
merely by virtue of existing. ‘Walking into futurity’ then means to realise oneself in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 119 Montaigne, 2007, II: 18, p. 703. 
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the context of inherited social and linguistic conditions, to ‘take responsibility for 
one’s own discourse’. The activity of reading continues when we look up from our 
books, in the activity of seeing—seeing oneself and seeing a task for oneself in what 
is there. ‘That reading is a way, or a goal, of seeing, is something attested – as I 
found in The Claim of Reason – by the history of the word reading in a word for 
advising, which in turn contains a word for seeing’ (1979, p. 17).  
 Cavell has sometimes been reproached for reading within such a narrow 
range of texts, particularly the American Romantics and Wittgenstein. He admits 
that ‘reformulation seems forever an essential piece of my intellectual business’ 
(1988, p. 175), referring both to the core set of texts to which he frequently returns 
and his many rewritings and reworkings of his own texts. With a background of the 
essayist’s commitment to reshaping in view, his remark strikes one less as an excuse 
for intellectual laziness and more as a genuine commitment to uncovering, by 
repeated attempts, what there is to be seen differently in the same, Kierkegaard’s 
‘possibility’ realised in the everyday. This movement of repetition is essential to how 
Cavell’s essays, and essays more broadly, develop what Adorno calls their ‘texture’ 
and what Lukács calls their ‘faithfulness’ to the existing words or objects that they 
reformulate. Beginning from a contingent somewhere and returning to the same 
contrasts with the usual sense of development in a philosophical text, which 
involves getting to the bottom (Grund) of a matter. Against this figure of 
development, Cavell cites Wittgenstein’s fragment 126:  
 
Die Philosophie stellt eben alles bloß hin, und erklärt und folgert nichts. a Da alles 
offen daliegt, ist auch nichts zu erklären. Denn, was etwa verborgen ist, interessiert 
uns nicht [Philosophy just puts everything before us, and neither explains 
nor deduces anything. – Since everything lies open to view, there is 
nothing to explain. For whatever may be hidden is of no interest to us] 
(Wittgenstein, 2009, pp. 55-55e). 
  
This controversial claim has been read by many as the reduction of philosophical 
activity to a strict behaviorism, denying the dimension of the secret or private in 
human experience. On Cavell’s reading it suggests instead that what is to be seen is 
already visible, if only perhaps through a glass, darkly. For Wittgenstein, and for 
Cavell, the material of everyday life furnishes what there is for philosophy to know, 
but one is led astray in the typical metaphors used to express truth: ‘getting to the 
bottom of’ or ‘penetrating’. Literary critic John Hollander expresses the significance 
Cavell attaches to such descriptions.  
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Cavell constantly implies that there are parables to be drawn about the 
way we treat the objects of our consciousness and the subjects of parts 
of it. What is so powerful and yet so elusive of the nets of ordinary 
intellectual expectation in The Claim of Reason is the way in which the 
activities of philosophizing become synecdochic, metonymic, and 
generally parabolic for the activities of the rest of life itself (Hollander, 
1980, p. 586).  
 
Born out of a sense that the ‘getting to the bottom’ of a matter risks a denial of 
what is there to be seen for (enlightened) eyes, Cavell’s gestures of returning to the 
same philosophical and literary material thus suggest new figures for what activities 
might be of value—both for philosophy and for life with others.  
 
The task of philosophical writing 
 Cavell’s writing style develops out of a commitment to interrogating the 
everyday philosophically, while remaining faithful to ordinary experience: a project 
which he sometimes refers to as the ‘task’ of the everyday, or the ‘quest of the 
ordinary’—emphasising the activity of uncovering or unconcealing what is given, 
for which essays are particularly suited. His notoriously long, complex, and 
parenthetical sentences perform precisely the activities of shifting, qualifying, 
comparing, and emerging into view that he describes as operating within the 
everyday—the opening sentence of the Claim of Reason is a prime example.120 A 
general lack of understanding of how form might inform epistemological and moral 
positions has led many philosophers to dismiss Cavell’s writings as insufficiently 
philosophical, or purposely obfuscatory. As Stephen Mulhall attests,   
 
[The] standard line of criticism focuses upon Cavell’s style: his use of 
parentheses and qualification, his idiosyncratic modes of punctuation, 
his reliance upon complex, allusive, and endlessly reflexive rhetorical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 120 I reproduce the sentence here for the convenience of the reader. ‘If not at the 
beginning of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, since what starts philosophy is no more to be 
known at the outset than how to make an end of it; and if not at the opening of Philosophical 
Investigations, since its opening is not to be confused with the starting of the philosophy it 
expresses, and since the terms in which that opening might be understood can hardly be given 
along with the opening itself; and if we acknowledge from the commencement, anyway leave 
open at the opening, that the way this work is written is internal to what it teaches, which means 
that we cannot understand the manner (call it the method) before we understand its work; and if 
we do not look to our history, since placing this book historically can hardly happen earlier than 
placing it philosophically; nor look to Wittgenstein’s past, since then we are likely to suppose 
that Investigations is written in criticism of the Tractatus, which is not so much wrong as empty, 
both because to know what constitutes its criticism would be to know what constitutes its 
philosophy, and because it is more to the present point to see how the Investigations is written in 
criticism of itself; then where and how are we to approach this text?’ (179, p. 3). For an analysis 
of this sentence, see the opening chapter of Mulhall’s Inheritance and Originality (2001).  
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strategies, his constant foregrounding of essentially personal or 
biographical matters—all of these seemingly self-indulgent features of 
his writing are taken to derogate from his claim to be engaging in 
philosophically rigorous work (1988, pp. 283-84).  
 
Breaking down these critiques, the substantive charges are that Cavell’s writing is 
unsystematic, that it takes poetic liberties with language, that it openly reflects on its 
own procedures, and that it is unabashedly rooted in the personal experience of the 
writer. These features are familiar hallmarks of essayistic writing, and, as we have 
seen, each is motivated by distinctly philosophical and ethical considerations, rather 
than by self-indulgence. It is precisely to counter the negative element of 
idiosyncrasy – being doomed to follow one’s own prejudices without realising it – 
that essayistic writing takes the self-conscious and subjective shape it does (Adorno, 
1984, pp. 153; 158). It is also the reason for the stress on particular cases and on the 
constant possibility of error that are expressed in Cavell’s many parenthetical 
qualifications. Adorno contrasts these essayistic tendencies with the ambition of 
‘scholastic’ or ‘positivistic’ philosophy to become ‘objective’ after the manner of the 
sciences. ‘Every impulse of expression – as far as the instinct of scientific purism is 
concerned – endangers an objectivity that is said to spring forth after the 
subtraction of the subject’ (Adorno, 1984, p. 153). But ‘if truth in fact has a 
temporal core, then the full historical content becomes an integral moment in truth; 
the a posteriori becomes concretely the a priori [...] The relation to [subjective] 
experience [...] is a relation to all of history’ (Ibid., p. 158). On this reading, 
discourses that begin from the ‘I’ and that openly reflect on the relationship of form 
to ideas achieve a greater degree of reliability or truth than those that deny the 
contingent, historical starting point of philosophical enquiry and the meaning 
inherent in pre-existing linguistic forms. Mulhall, wishing to defend Cavell against 
critics of his writing style, contends that Cavell’s ‘may be a species of rigour that 
analytical philosophers are not accustomed to, but it is no less admirable for that’ 
(1994, p. 283-84).121   
 Cavell’s focus on his own experience and his return to the same themes is 
an attempt to guard against one of the primary ways in which philosophical inquiry 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 121 This echoes similar comments made by Cavell about Emerson and Thoreau ‘[They 
propose, and embody, a mode of thinking, a mode of conceptual accuracy, as thorough as 
anything imagined within established philosophy, but invisible to that philosophy because based 
on an idea of rigour foreign to it establishment . . . [they say] a work like Walden has nothing in it 
to call arguments’ (1988, p. 14). 
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can go astray: the philosopher’s lack of awareness of – and so lack of responsibility 
for – how her thought and her means of expression are conditioned, and how they 
condition the practice of philosophy. This is, one the one hand, an argument against 
the ‘ideal of a context-free or neutral medium characteristic of a philosophy which 
models itself on scientific discourse’ (de Obaldia, 1995, p. 33). Writing about the 
role of examples or paradigm cases in moral philosophy, Cavell asks:  
 
Is there any case about which we will feel, as we felt about ‘best’ cases 
in epistemology, that ‘If any case is one in which we can know 
something to be (or agree that it is) good or bad, right or wrong, we can 
know this to be?’ [...] [W]e might feel that any agreement about the 
morality of the act will turn upon some agreement about how the act is 
to be described. Was it really breaking a promise? Is it fair just to say he 
lied when what he did was to lie in order to...or as a way of...? [...] 
Apparently what is the ‘case’ in question forms part of the content of 
the moral argument itself (pp. 264-265).  
 
Here Cavell pushes back against the notion that there could be a neutral form of 
philosophical discourse for the moral concerns that most interest him—concerns 
which, as it turns out, accompany a whole range of problems that are generally 
described as purely epistemological. The promise of the philosophical example is 
the clarity it can bring to difficult subjects, but, as Cavell points out, this clarity, and 
any philosophical agreement that might issue from it, is achieved at the expense of 
overlooking the real philosophical – and moral – work to be done, determining the 
position one is taking responsibility for (1979, p. 268), which is a question of ‘the 
nature or quality of our relationship to one another’ (Ibid.).122 Criteria then, are not 
merely a question of determining what can be known, as the sceptics claim, or what 
can be agreed upon, as the pragmatists claim, but are ‘terms in which I relate what’s 
happening, make sense of it by giving its history, say what “goes before and after”. 
What I call something, what I count as something, is a function of how I recount it, 
tell it’ (1979, p. 94). Cavell’s interest in literature and film lie precisely in their ability 
to more richly describe the terrain of these relationships than philosophy has been 
able to do.123  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 122 ‘Attention to the details of cases as they arise many not provide a quick path to an 
all-embracing system; but at least it promises genuine instead of spurious clarity (Cavell, 1976, p. 
41). 	   123 ‘The ability to produce more compelling models of what our moral-and even what 
our epistemologically and metaphysically wondrous-life is like has given major novelists and 
great poets, in the same three and a half centuries since Descartes, a disproportionate claim to 
human knowledge of the human’ (Hollander, 1980, p. 582).  
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 For Cavell, as for Kierkegaard, ‘valuing underwrites asserting’ (COR, 1979, 
pp. 94-95). Interest underwrites talking. If, in everyday conversation or in 
philosophical writing, we talk about things that interest us in a way that does not 
interest us, that does not really say what we mean, we are not only doing ourselves a 
disservice but slowly ‘stupefying’ (COR, 1979, p. 94) ourselves. Given that 
expressing ourselves amounts to making or constituting ourselves in the world with 
others, the fiction of the neutral text that exempts itself from the agreements into 
which the use of language forces us, amounts to a complicity in this stupefaction, an 
abandonment of the maintenance of ‘shared forms of life’. The task of maintenance 
as a response to and ‘restructuring’ of the everyday allows Cavell to maintain a place 
for the work of philosophy that guards against the tendency toward fantasy, 
understood as a denial of real constraints or conditions.   
Cavell’s essayism is an attempt to better express the position of inheritance 
or embededness that derives from the basic fact of being linguistic creatures, 
precisely the feature which gives rise to the sceptic’s anxiety that our language, and 
so our world, is not our own. He reads the recognition of inheritance as the primary 
insight of Thoreau’s Walden, which he expresses with the formulation: ‘dwelling 
comes before building’ (1988, p.175). When Cavell stresses that ‘the answer to 
scepticism must take the form not of philosophical construction but of the 
reconstruction or resettlement of the everyday’ (1988, p. 176, my emphasis), he 
suggests that the error committed in many sceptical accounts (or attempts to solve 
or get around the sceptical problem) is one of failing in the responsiveness to one’s 
environment, of building without the foundation of knowing what it is to dwell (and 
so building structures unsuited to dwelling). The element of receptivity or response 
in ‘dwelling’, rather than rendering us ‘victims of [inherited] meaning’ (Cavell, 1998, 
p. 40), is crucial to how Cavell conceives of the moral task of philosophy and the 
kind of writing that is best able to carry out this task. ‘Instead of leading the passive 
reader “step-by-step”, in a logical and orderly manner, to an already established 
point of certainty and clarity, the essayist requires the reader’s active participation in 
the form of a constantly renewed evaluation, deduction, and interpretation of the 
matter at hand’ (de Obaldia, 1995, p. 32). Cavell’s watchword for philosophical 
writing – and reading – is: ‘Don’t say “must” but look and see’ (1989, p. 66). 




 This study has been shaped by the idea that modes of writing contribute in 
significant and philosophically sophisticated ways to the kinds of questions 
philosophy is able to ask and to answer about the relationship between self, world, 
mind, and language. The specific example of essayism demonstrates a novel 
response to the problem of scepticism that changes the terms of the discussion 
from the attempt either to shore up knowledge (foundationalism and positivism) – 
by way of foundationalist arguments or a rigorously applied method – or to make 
knowledge a matter of sufficient probability (pragmatism). In place of these efforts, 
the open-ended, heterogeneous, and subjectively-rooted textual form of the essay 
brings to light the conditions of ordinary life under which philosophical inquiry 
takes place, and, like ancient Pyrrhonism, suggests that the ‘cure’ for an overzealous 
drive for knowledge lies in raising the question of the value of knowledge for life. 
This opens up an alternative understanding of philosophy’s task that is on the one 
hand critical or negative – Kierkegaard’s ‘taking away’ – and on the other hand 
therapeutic, concerned with uncovering, expressing, and taking responsibility for the 
conditions in which one finds oneself.  
 These considerations give rise to a style of writing that engages writer and 
reader as partners in the project of constructing meaning in the absence of any 
traditional epistemological or metaphysical guarantees. The activity of establishing 
timeless, universal truths – or the criteria that would allow for such truths – is 
replaced by more provisional efforts of essaying that reflect on their own context 
and circumstances of production – including the writer’s relationship to inherited 
discursive and historical forms. Such an attention to form is, for the essayist, 
integral to the project of understanding, since the possibility of a neutral 
interpretation or representation is categorically denied. As Cavell declares, ‘What I 
call something, what I count as something, is a function of how I recount it, tell it’ 
(1979, p. 94). Reflexivity is one of the hallmarks of the essayistic, and, rather than 
being motivated by playfulness or postmodern exhaustion, this feature serves as a 
reminder for philosophy of the meaning inherent in textual forms, and so of the 
importance of textual forms for philosophical reflection and pedagogy. As Jonathan 
Lavery notes in his ‘Philosophical Genres and Literary Forms’, ‘opening up 
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questions about genres of philosophy leads inexorably to questions about what 
philosophy is’, about philosophy’s understanding of itself (2007, p. 187).  
 Montaigne’s essaying sets the standard for discontinuous, perspectival, and 
open-ended forms of writing that emphasise nostre conditions: time or becoming, 
subjectivity, and language as the shared horizon within which epistemological 
questions arise. He builds up a rhetoric of exemplification and multiple perspectives 
to replace the systematic, deductive structures of Scholasticism, diagnosing the 
tendency to ‘sally forth outside ourselves’ and ‘seek other [more ideal] conditions 
because we do not understand the use of our own’ as a form of avoidance and self-
deception. The challenging, questioning, teasing form of the essai invites the reader’s 
participation in weighing, assessing, and learning to see anew—staging the moral 
task of taking responsibility for oneself in the context of an inherited discourse. 
Hume further develops the essay as an arena of experience, both in its familiar sense 
and in its etymological link to experimentation, trying out and testing different 
propositions and frameworks. He works to cultivate and reflect upon sociability, 
linking philosophical questions to broader considerations of what human 
communities value and what is worth arguing about. 
 The Frühromantiker, like their predecessors, make gestures to widen 
philosophy’s scope to include features of experience that are obscured by deductive 
or systematic accounts. Accepting the Pyrrhonian position, revived by Jacobi, that 
infinite regress is an inevitable part of the justification of knowledge claims, they 
seek a therapeutic remedy to this problem by removing the need for absolute 
justification, or at least the possibility of absolute justification at the beginning of a 
philosophical system. Schlegel proposes the trope of a circle rather than a vertical 
trope of uncovering the absolute as a Grundsatz. Novalis posits the impossibility of 
an absolute Grund as the motor for philosophy as an endless activity. Like 
Montaigne and Hume, they embrace difference, the exception, and the particular. 
But in choosing the specific essayistic form of the fragment, they bring into focus 
the notion of a whole, of absolute knowing, toward which their various attempts are 
directed and as part of which they gain their meaning. By raising the possibility of 
the Whole as an impossible but at the same time necessary point of orientation, the 
Romantics suggest that any natural connection to such a whole has been lost and 
must instead be constructed—perhaps as a necessary fiction. The thinking of 
difference or non-identity is crucial to the kind of whole they imagine – a ‘manifold 
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unity’ – and their poetic project involves the attempt to create organic structures of 
self, of society, and of philosophical activity that allow for difference. The fragment 
collection functions as a metaphor for such structures; each ‘fragment’ is infused 
with meaning as part of a collective activity of writing the Book of Books, the 
encyclopaedia combining all fields of human understanding. Difference is 
systematised or harmonised through the meaning-making activity of self-governing 
subjects, an activity that, as Schlegel says, alternates between creation and 
destruction, hope and doubt.  
 Kierkegaard turns his attention toward the critical side of essayism, 
multiplying disjunctive and ironic structures to lead his readers to, rather than away 
from doubt. Positioning himself polemically against the ‘absent-mindedness’ of his 
contemporaries, he attempts to revive sceptical doubt as a task, a way of refusing 
the levelling impulses of cognition that the Romantics describe as the Trieb nach 
Einheit. Doubt in Kierkegaard introduces a moment of the uncanny, a distancing of 
all that is from what might be; a realisation that what is is not what necessarily is. This 
‘fall’, from complacency or certainty, provides an opening ‘not to a higher realm, 
but to another inhabitation of this realm’ (Cavell, 1989, p. 107), with repetition 
replacing transcendence as a way of overcoming doubt and coming to terms with 
the conditions of becoming. Kierkegaard’s ironic textual structures, which explode 
any stable frame and call for constant re(e)valuation, can be read as a figure for the 
possibility of such a transformation.  
 Cavell describes a similar dialectic of loss and recovery in his own work 
(1989, p. 114). Like Kierkegaard, he conceives of sceptical doubt not merely as an 
epistemological position but as a mode of relationship to or orientation within the 
world, one that discovers structures of meaning to be inherited and so, in an 
unsettling way, not ‘ours’. The negative sceptical moment that Cavell seeks to 
overcome is a cleaving of subject from world; this is expressed by the thought that 
because I can never really know the world and others beyond or behind appearances, 
then I lack a responsibility for maintaining my relationship to them; I become 
disinterested. Recovery means a ‘turn’ in my relationship to finitude.   
 
The ancient task of philosophy, to awaken us, or say bring us to our 
senses, takes the form of returning to us the everyday, the ordinary, 
every day, diurnally. Since we are not returning to anything we have 
known, the task is really one, as seen before, of turning (1989, p. 66).	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Cavell rejects the idea that the given is merely or obviously given (Sellars’ ‘Myth of the 
Given’, 1956) and recasts – as an on-going task – Wittgenstein’s notion that 
‘everything lies open to view’ and that philosophy ‘sets everything before us’ 
(Wittgenstein, 2009, pp. 55-55e). The reflexive structure of the essay reveals the 
everyday as both something received and constructed under particular aspects. As such, 
the everyday is always the ‘eventual everyday’ (1989, p. 46), part of an unending 
activity of interpretation and ‘resettlement’. One expression for this might be that 
the project of finding the ground beneath our feet cannot be satisfied all at once – 
and not by a philosophical construction – but must be renewed, as a matter of what 
we value or take interest in. Thus finding words and forms that better speak to the 
experience of losing one’s ground or of discovering oneself or others to be 
strangers may be able to provide a more adequate, more rigorous response to the 
sceptical impulse than standard epistemological arguments. As Cavell says of 
Emerson and Thoreau, they offer a ‘mode of conceptual accuracy, as thorough as 
anything imagined within established philosophy, but invisible to that philosophy 
because based on an idea of rigour foreign to the establishment’ (Cavell, 1988, p. 
14). Producing ‘more compelling models of what our moral-and even what our 
epistemologically and metaphysically wondrous-life is like’ is becomes part of the 
goal of ‘knowledge of the human’ to which philosophy lays claim (Hollander, 1980, 
p. 582).  	   Perhaps a better way of getting at what is really at stake in the sceptical 
problem to which we have been recurring in this study, is to ask, with Wittgenstein 
(no. 129) and Cavell, ‘What don’t I see when everything is in front of my eyes?’ 
(1979, p. 370). Framed in these phenomenological terms, the challenge is not that it 
is impossible to ‘get beyond’ appearance but that appearances are all-too present, 
showing everything at once, while appreciating and interpreting what is there to be 
seen takes time, experience, insight, disappointment, what Kierkegaard calls 
‘interest’ and Heidegger calls ‘care’. The presence of the world or of others is thus 
experienced as hiddenness, in plain sight, rather than merely as an object of 
knowledge, subject to proof or probability. The essay brings this to light by ‘setting 
everything before’ the reader, showing the ‘how’ of thought along with its content, 
and resisting the urge to reduce or reconcile multiple perspectives. In the framework 
established by Cavell, revelation is possible not by knowing but by noticing, or seeing 
differently what one has already seen. In everyday experience, the face to which one 
	  	  
143	  
is indifferent can become ugly, or beautiful; an insignificant moment in childhood 
can become a precious memory after a parent has died. In philosophy, established 
questions and figures can lose their relevance. ‘There is a spirit in which things can 
be seen, as of a spirit in which words may be meant, and believed. And of course 
the spirit may die out’ (1979, p. 371). Renewing and resettling the framework in 
which philosophical activity takes place—re-evaluating what counts as relevant to 
philosophy, is a way of maintaining philosophy’s vitality. 
 For Cavell, giving expression to the ways in which we fail to see what is 
before us is part of the moral work of taking responsibility for our separateness – 
from our environment and from others – which scepticism reveals. He favours the 
essay for its circularity, the way it recurs to the same themes from different 
perspectives, suggesting that the work of uncovering is never a settled matter, and 
that any flight out of the circle amounts to a refusal of the conditions within which 
relationships to the world and others are formed and maintained.  
 
The direction out of illusion is not up...but down, at any rate along each 
chain of a day’s denial. Philosophy (as descent) can thus be said to leave 
everything as it is precisely because it is a refusal of, say disobedient to, 
(a false) ascent, or transcendence. Philosophy (as ascent) shows the 
violence that is to be refused (disobeyed), that has left everything 
indifferent to me, as if there are things in themselves (1989, p. 46). 
 
Cavell begins his essay ‘Between Acknowledgement and Avoidance’ with the 
suggestion that finding a better expression (or ‘parable’) for our relationship to the 
world is a critical part of philosophy’s work, since ‘false views of the inner and the 
outer produce and sustain one another’ (1979, p. 349). The essay recasts the inner 
and outer of Cartesian scepticism, the world ‘out there’ inaccessible (and 
‘indifferent’) to the subject, in terms of the individual subject’s negotiation between 
inheritance and creativity. Being receptive to the inherited world – particularly in 
being attentive to the words which are ours and not ours – becomes key to the 
dynamic interchange involved in understanding self and world, or the enworlded 
(enworded) self.  
 One of the manifestations of this attitude of receptivity is the search for 
reading practices and discursive structures that allow for difference and 
heterogeneity, refusing to reduce texts to concepts. Related to this is a revised role 
for the author, who is no longer an omniscient narrator but rather a fellow reader, 
offering and consciously multiplying models of possible interpretation. Rather than 
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presuming that questions are set out in advance by established philosophical 
‘problems’, essayistic texts stages the kinds of questions one might want to ask, 
often by allowing the reader to see the essayist in the process of reading others’ 
texts, where reading is a way of ‘taking full responsibility for one’s own discourse’ 
(1988, p. 14, my emphasis). The suggestion is that the hermeneutic model favoured 
by literary studies entails a greater degree of self-awareness and ethical and political 
potential than the neutralist textual model that dominates analytic writing and 
reading practices. Cavell explains that his approach is to ‘understand philosophy not 
as a set of problems but as a set of texts. This means to me that the contribution of 
a philosopher—anyway of a creative thinker – to the subject of philosophy is not to 
be understood as a contribution to, or of, a set of given problems’ (1979, p. 3). These 
remarks recommend not only a way of doing philosophy but also a way of teaching 
it, one that expands the range of insights that it is possible to glean from 
philosophical texts and that may, in addition, change the canon of texts that are 
considered to be of philosophical value.  	   I began this study by remarking on the lack of interest in contemporary 
analytic philosophy in reading and teaching strategies that deal with questions of 
style and form. It is my hope that the brief sketches offered here have given some 
sense of what might be gained from a textual approach. Attending to the various 
features and possibilities of the essayistic mode yields an alternative picture of 
philosophical rigour that goes beyond the establishment of criteria or definitions or 
the employment of a consistent method. The essay’s insistence on interrogating its 
own means of production, and thus disclosing the historical and linguistic 
conventions that shape human understanding, opens up the possibility of better 
responding to those conventions, moving from denial to the acknowledgement of 
the possibilities within the everyday and our role in shaping and transforming them. 
The essay reminds us that there is no single narrative to be told, and that philosophy 
must, as a result, be various in its ways of recounting, moving beyond the ‘semantic 
and cognitive considerations’ (Bowie 2013, p. 188) that prevail in current 
discussions. As Cavell reminds us, ‘what is of philosophical importance, or interest 
– what there is for philosophy to say – is happening repeatedly, unmelodramatically, 
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